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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
POLITICAL STRATEGY, LEADERSHIP, AND POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN 
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND POLITICS:  
A COMPARISON OF THREE PRIME MINISTERSHIPS  
by  
Daniel Clausen  
Florida International University, 2013 
Professor Paul Kowert, Major Professor 
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense policy and politics has gone through 
significant changes. Throughout the post cold war period, US-Japan alliance managers, 
politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of foreign 
governments have all played significant roles in influencing these changes. Along with these 
actors, the Japanese prime minister has played an important, if sometimes subtle, role in the 
realm of defense policy and politics. Japanese prime ministers, though significantly weaker than 
many heads of state, nevertheless play an important role in policy by empowering different 
actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through personal 
diplomacy, through agenda-setting, and through symbolic acts of state. The power of the prime 
minister to influence policy processes, however, has frequently varied by prime minister.  
My dissertation investigates how different political strategies and entrepreneurial 
insights by the prime minister have influenced defense policy and politics since the end of the 
Cold War. In addition, it seeks to explain how the quality of political strategy and entrepreneurial 
insight employed by different prime ministers was important in the success of different 
approaches to defense. 
ix 
 
My dissertation employs a comparative case study approach to examine how different 
prime ministerial strategies have mattered in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. 
Three prime ministers have been chosen: Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). 
These prime ministers have been chosen to provide maximum contrast on issues of policy 
preference, cabinet management, choice of partners, and overall strategy.  
As my dissertation finds, the quality of political strategy has been an important aspect of 
Japan’s defense transformation. Successful strategies have frequently used the knowledge and 
accumulated personal networks of bureaucrats, supplemented bureaucratic initiatives with top-
down personal diplomacy, and used a revitalized US-Japan strategic relationship as a political 
resource for a stronger prime ministership.  Though alternative approaches, such as those that 
have looked to displace the influence of bureaucrats and the US in defense policy, have been less 
successful, this dissertation also finds theoretical evidence that alternatives may exist.  
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 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND COMMONLY USED TERMS 
 
2001 Anti-Terror Legislation. The Anti-Terror Legislation Special Measures Laws announced 
on October 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. They authorized 
supply and transport in support of US-led coalition anti-terror operations, search and rescue, and 
humanitarian missions.  
 
2003 Iraq Legislation. The 2003 Law Concerning the Special Measures for Humanitarian 
Relief and Reconstruction in Iraq. It authorized the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq for purposes of 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
2006 Realignment Agreement. The 2006 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment 
Implementation. A comprehensive package for realignment of bases in Japan, it included a 
reaffirmation of US-Japan intent to move the functions of Futenma Airbase to the Henoko Bay 
area of Nago city in Okinawa (with 8,000 Marines and their dependents to be moved to Guam).  
 
ACSA. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. It governs the reciprocal provision of 
supplies and services between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and US Armed Forces. It applies to 
bilateral exercises and training, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian 
international relief operations, and operations in response to “situations in areas surrounding 
Japan.” 
 
Ampo (also, Security Treaty). A colloquial term for the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960. 
This term is commonly used in journal articles and even academic essays written in Japanese.  
 
ASDF. Air Self Defense Force 
 
Bereaved Family Association.  Following scholarly conventions, this term is used to refer to the 
Japanese organization “izokukai,” a conservative group with links to the military that is well 
known for its support of politicians who visit Yasukuni Shrine. 
 
BMD. Ballistic Missile Defense 
 
CLB. Cabinet Legislative Bureau  
 
DPJ. Democratic Party of Japan 
 
EASR (also referred to as the “Nye Report”). The Department of Defense East Asian Strategy 
Report It argued that the US military presence in Asia was partially responsible for economic 
growth and democracy in the region.   
 
Futenma Airbase. US Marine Corps Airbase Futenma, a controversial airbase currently located 
in a crowded area of Ginowan City in Okinawa.  
 
GSDF. Ground Self Defense Force 
xiii 
 
 
Higuchi Report. The final report by a committee chaired by Asahi Beer president Higuchi 
Kotaro called “The Modality of Defense and Security Capabilities of Japan” (Nihon no Anzen 
Hosho to Boeiryoku no Arikata). The report was released in 1994, and advocated for a 
continuation of the US-Japan alliance and greater contributions to UN-based security initiatives.  
 
HSN (or Host Nation Support). The civilian and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to 
foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 
agreements mutually concluded between nations. 
 
JCP. Japan Communist Party 
 
Joint Declaration. The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security signed by President Bill Clinton 
and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996.  
 
Joint Guidelines. The  US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation  
 
JSDF. Japan Self Defense Force 
 
Kantei. The prime minister’s official residence. It refers to the combined resources of the prime 
minister’s office and the cabinet office, which were significantly expanded by administrative 
reforms in 2001.  
 
Koenkai. Best translated as “local support groups,” these organizations serve as an invaluable 
tool for Japanese politicians to receive funds and to distribute favors to constituents.  
 
Komeito. Sometimes referred to as the New Komeito or Clean Government Party.  
 
LDP. Liberal Democratic Party 
 
METI (formerly MITI). The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; formerly, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry 
 
MoD (formerly JDA). The Ministry of Defense, formerly the Japan Defense Agency 
 
MoF. The Ministry of Finance 
 
MoFA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
MSDF. The Marine Self Defense Force 
 
Murayama Apology. Then-Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s remarks on the event of the 
50th anniversary of the end of the war. This apology was issued in 1995 and expressed  “deep 
remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for the actions of Japan during the Pacific War. This apology 
was backed by a Lower House resolution. Since the time of this apology, even conservative 
prime ministers have endorsed and re-articulated the apology.  
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Mutoha (also, non-aligned voters). Voters not affiliated with any party. This group has 
regularly numbered above 50 percent of the electorate since the early 1990s.  
 
Nemawashi. The process of laying the groundwork for a project through informal discussion 
with stakeholders and the gradual formulation of consensus on an issue. 
 
PARC. The Policy Affairs Research Councils, which have been a feature of both the LDP and 
the DPJ, as well as smaller parties, at various times. They serve as key institutions for vetting 
policy proposals in the parties.  
 
SACO. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa. This was an important working group set up 
following the infamous rape case in which several US Marines raped a middle school girl on 
Okinawa. This joint committee was set up to reevaluate the base presence on Okinawa.  
 
SCC. The Security Consultative Committee, or the 2 plus 2 meeting. This is a key institution of 
the US-Japan alliance consisting of meetings of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State 
on the US side and the Defense Minister and Foreign Minister on the Japanese side.  
 
SDPJ (formerly JSP). The Social Democratic Party of Japan. This party is the rump party of the 
once powerful Japan Socialist Party 
 
SOFA (or Status of Force Agreement). The agreement defining the legal status of US 
personnel and property in the territory of another nation. The purpose of such an agreement is to 
set forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government on such 
matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction, wearing of  uniforms, carrying of weapons, tax and 
customs relief, entry and exit of personnel and property, and resolving damage claims. 
 
Subgovernments. The constellation of politicians, bureaucrats, and client groups that specialize 
in specific issue areas such as education, health, industry, and defense.  
 
Zoku. “Policy tribes” within the Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council that focus on 
specific issue areas.  
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A NOTE ON CONVENTION 
 
This dissertation uses the Japanese conventions for writing names, with family names appearing 
first and given names appearing second.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction to Leadership, Strategy, and Entrepreneurship in Japanese Defense Politics 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense policy and politics has gone 
through significant changes. In the post cold war era, Japan’s first major experience was 
the “Gulf War shock,” where Japan was criticized for not providing a human contribution 
to coalition forces commensurate with its financial power and its hefty financial 
contribution1. In the early 1990s, elites at every level internalized the Gulf War incident 
as a failure. This failure was conceptualized at various levels as a failure of alliance 
management and as a failure of “international contribution.” From this original shock, 
Japan has evolved into an active “civilian power,” a staunch supporter of the US military 
presence in Asia (and to a lesser extent a supporter of its global security agenda), and a 
gradually “normalizing” middle power country (see Izumikawa, 2010; Samuels, 2007a; 
Shinoda, 2007b; Soeya, 2005; Wilkins, 2011). 
In the backdrop of the last two decades of the post cold war world—a period 
best defined by its uncertainty and periodic shocks—the transformation of Japan’s 
defense policy and politics has been anything but inevitable. US-Japan alliance managers, 
politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of 
                                                 
1 Despite contributing 13 billion dollars to coalition forces, Japan would not be recognized in the thank you 
letter published by the Kuwait government in the New York Times. This article thanked all the participants 
of the coalition but failed to mention Japan. This came as a great shock to the Japanese government and 
proved to be a hot topic in the Japanese media. The lesson learned was simple: it was not enough to provide 
money; Japan would also need to provide a “human contribution” in order to be recognized for its 
contributions to global security. Japan responded by dispatching minesweepers to the Gulf. However, by 
this time, the “shock” of not being recognized for its contribution had permeated the ranks of elite 
politicians, and bureaucrats, and had become a fixture of elite and popular political discourse (Akiyama, 
2002, p. 10-11; Funabashi, 1999; Soeya, 2005; Tanaka, 2009, p. 69-70).  
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foreign governments have all played significant roles in influencing this trajectory. Along 
with these actors, the Japanese prime minister has played an important role in the realm 
of defense policy and politics. Japanese prime ministers, though weaker than heads of 
states in presidential democratic systems and weaker than the British prime minister, 
nevertheless play an important role in policy by empowering different actors 
(bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through agenda-setting, 
and through symbolic acts of state (Angel, 1989; Hayao, 1993; Stockwin, 2008; Shinoda, 
2000). The power of the prime minister to influence policy processes, however, has 
frequently varied by prime minister.  
Though structural contexts—the balance of threat within the East Asian region, 
both regional and domestic animosity toward past Japanese militarism, and the legacy of 
US bases and Japanese dependence on the US military deterrent—provide an essential 
ingredient for understanding Japan’s policy trajectory, they cannot fully account for the 
strengths and weaknesses at various times of actors within Japan at promoting their 
policy preferences. Even governmental politics models of Japanese defense politics retain 
strong elements of structuralism that tend to obscure seeing policymakers as active 
participants in their own dramas. My dissertation demonstrates that Japan’s defense 
policies are not only the product of structural contexts, but also involve innovative agent 
interactions and political strategies most aptly captured by the concepts “political 
strategy” and “policy entrepreneurship.”   
The present study focuses on the role of the prime minister as a key actor in 
Japanese defense policy and politics. As my dissertation will demonstrate the quality of 
strategy and policy entrepreneurship—the way decision-makers make use of available 
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resources, the degree to which decisions find synergies with other administration policies, 
and the degree to which prime ministers are able to exploit underutilized resources—have 
impacted the course of Japan’s defense trajectory and have had important implications for 
the overall success of different prime ministerial agendas in Japan.  
 
A Brief History of Japan’s Postwar and Post Cold War Defense and Security 
 
Following its defeat in the World War II, Japan found itself an occupied power 
with a devastated economy and a shattered political system. The Japanese constitution, 
drafted by the US on November 3, 1946 and promulgated on May 3, 1947, included the 
famous Article 9 that renounced the use of military force:  
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized (Umeda, 2006, p. 2; GoJ, N.A.). 
 
Although the constitution was an invention of the American occupying forces, a large 
element of the Japanese public would eventually embrace it and its pacifist sentiments 
(Umeda, 2006; Berger, 1996; Oros, 2008). Moderates like Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru were able to effectively neutralize opposition to Article 9 from the right by 
establishing a bilateral security treaty with the US that would ensure Japan’s safety, while 
at the same time neutralizing left wing opponents by embracing Article 9. The US-Japan 
Security Treaty with the United States offered an asymmetric bargain: in return for a US 
guarantee of protection, Japan was to provide the US with bases (Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Treaty). In the original Security Treaty, the US was also granted authority over Japan’s 
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internal security. Not until 1960, under the heavy-handed tactics of the Kishi Nobusuke 
administration, would the Treaty be renegotiated to return responsibility for internal 
security, and thus sovereignty, back over to Japan. Though the ratification of the Treaty 
took place in an atmosphere of intense protests, the US-Japan Security Treaty would be 
renewed and Japan would be thoroughly ensconced in the Western alliance against the 
Communist Bloc (Samuels, 2003; Green and Szechenyi, 2011). Thus, under what would 
be called the Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese politics would be driven by concerns over 
domestic social harmony, raising living conditions, and economic development. Security 
and diplomatic commitments, for their part, would be kept to the lowest acceptable level. 
Though Japan would eventually re-establish a “self-defense force” (the Japanese Self 
Defense Force (JSDF)) with extensive military capabilities, limits on the use of force 
would be instituted through successive interpretation of the constitution that bound Japan 
to “minimum self-defense” (Tanaka, 1997). This interpretation of “minimum self-
defense” would also prohibit “collective self-defense” that would allow Japan to come to 
the defense of an ally. Thus, while the US is treaty-bound to defend Japan from an attack, 
Japan has no similar obligation. Japan, for its part, would continue to supply the US with 
bases from which it could continue to project military power in the region.  
Though a mainstream consensus formed under the Yoshida Doctrine affirming 
the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty (often referred to as Ampo), various 
groups in Japan have nevertheless competed to promote their idea of which defense 
posture best serves the public interest. Roughly speaking, ideas regarding the prospective 
path of Japanese defense can be divided into four groups: Japanese Gaullists, who seek 
an autonomous defense position outside of the US-Japanese bilateral treaty; military 
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realists, who seek rearmament within the bilateral treaty framework; civilian 
internationalists or political realists, who seek greater regional integration and a lower 
stance on defense issues within the bilateral treaty (along with greater diplomatic 
participation in the UN); and unarmed neutralists, who see an unarmed, peace-loving 
Japan as the only assurance against conflict in the region and the rise of militarism within 
their own country (Mochizuki, 1983/1984; Mochizuki, 1995; Otake, 1983; Samuels, 
2007a, 2007b; Sebata, 1992; Sebata, 2010, p. 53-54; Soeya, 2005).  
 
Graphic 1. Mapping Ideas of Japanese Defense and Security 
Source: Adapted from Mochizuki (1983/1984); Mochizuki (1995); Otake (1983); 
Samuels (2007a, 2007b); Sebata (1992); Sebata (2010, p. 53-54); Soeya (2005). 
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During the early stages of the Cold War, political realists were generally more 
influential. However, since the 1980s military realists have been slightly more dominant 
than their political realist counterparts in mainstream politics. Even though both Japanese 
Gaullists and their pacifist counterparts on the other side of the spectrum generally 
remain marginalized from policy debates, they still nevertheless play key roles in 
empowering or obstructing actors in the mainstream.  
Though the US exerted pressure on Japan to raise defense expenditures 
throughout the postwar period in order to contribute a greater share in its own defense, 
Japan was largely successful at invoking Article 9 as a constraint on a more active 
contribution. In addition, and partially as a result of this external pressure by the US, 
Japan would eventually begin promoting its own concept of security, comprehensive 
security (sogo anzen hosho). As a concept meant to counter external criticism, the 
concept stressed its foreign aid and contributions to international organizations as part of 
a comprehensive contribution to international security; as a concept focused on Japan’s 
national security, the concept has been used to focus attention on Japan’s reliance on 
trade, as well as the importance of food and energy imports. Over time, Japanese 
concepts of comprehensive security have found affinities with UN concepts such as 
human security (Edstrom, 2008, p. 63-66; Soeya, 2004; Clausen, 2009)2.  
                                                 
2 The particular role human security (ningen anzenhosho) has played in Japan’s overall security policy has 
been a subject of debate among scholars. Some scholars believe that Japan’s promotion of UN concepts of 
human security was and continues to be more cosmetic than substantial. At the very least, human security 
remains a concept alive and well in bureaucracies (such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA)), think tanks, and NGOs in Japan responsible for implementing Official Development Assistance 
and humanitarian assistance more broadly. For the author’s previous writing on the subject, see Clausen 
(2009).  
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Anti-militarism was deeply institutionalized over the years with the introduction 
of other policies to supplement Article 9. These policies included the rigorous separation 
of the military and civilian leaders (and the denigration of the former in policy circles); 
the executive order establishing the one percent of GDP cap on military expenditures; the 
three non-nuclear principles not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons in 
Japan; and the ban on arms exports. Though postwar Japan has been described as being 
allergic to defense strategy, this basic characterization of Japanese strategy misses just 
how much of postwar Japanese prosperity was derived from its minimalist defense 
policies. A minimalist defense posture, constructed to deter but not threaten, allowed 
Japan to pursue mercantilist policies that helped build up its national wealth and construct 
policies in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that could buy the support of 
neighboring nations. Samuels (2007a, 2007b) has called this a successful case of “cheap 
riding” on US extended deterrence (see also, Lind, 2004). Others, such as Kawasaki 
(2001) have suggested that this was a conscious strategy of minimizing offensive 
capabilities so as not to aggravate the regional security dilemma and provoke a costly 
arms race.  
As Tanaka (1996, 1997) writes, the 1970s would serve as a “rehearsal” for the 
post cold war era. The combined influences of détente and the US need for greater 
burden-sharing among allies created an environment where Japan had to consider more 
seriously its own security needs. During the late 1970s, Japan would develop its Basic 
Defense Policy, which provided that the Japanese forces should be sufficient for the 
minimum defense of Japan. Throughout the late seventies and eighties, the US put 
increasing pressure on Japan to increase its efforts to contribute to the alliance. Increased 
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burden-sharing would come in the 1970s in the form of Host Nation Support or “burden 
payments” (omoiyari yosan) which offset the US expense of housing troops in Japan. 
These subsidies were the most generous of any US ally.  
Despite the end of the Cold War, the East Asia region was nevertheless beset by 
a “Cold War residue” (Stockwin, 2008). The two halves of the Korean peninsula 
technically remained at war, nascent democratic impulses in China proved abortive, and 
Chinese relations with Taiwan remained tense. Most importantly, territorial disputes by 
various actors in the region stunted political relations and threatened the region with 
accidental war. Over time, this “recessed security dilemma” created a structure of 
embryonic multilateralism overlapping with balance of power politics (Buzan and 
Weaver, 2003; Katzenstein and Okawara, 2004). Despite the growing economic ties 
between Japan and China, political relations in many ways remained zero-sum, focused 
on the territorial disputes and the issue of history (Calder, 2006; Samuels, 2007a; Ishii, 
1997; Masuda, 2007). China presents a danger both in its capability to harm Japan 
through conventional weapons like ballistic missiles and its ability to use its navy for 
blockade purposes and to disrupt sea lines of communication. These threats are 
embedded in deeper historical tensions between the countries that reflect anxieties about 
great power competition, colonial legacies, and wartime atrocities (Ebata, 1996, 1997, 
2007; Calder, 2006; Samuels, 2007a). North Korea also remains a primary concern for 
defense planners. North Korea threatens Japan with its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 
and territorial incursions. These threats are intensified by the affront of kidnapping cases. 
The kidnapping cases, which occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s, are seen by the 
Japanese as a unique crime against Japan. Though the issue of how to handle North 
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Korea’s nuclear programs, its unpredictable leadership, and its frequent humanitarian 
crises provides a focal point for powers in the region, it can also often be another source 
of tension.  
The post cold war world has thus created new dynamics that have opened up the 
basic tenets of Japanese defense. Through various special legislation and ad hoc 
arrangements, Japan has continued to reinterpret and work around Article 9 of the 
constitution in ways that reflect changing realities. Policy changes in the post cold war 
world included allowing the dispatch of the JSDF overseas, including peacekeeping 
missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and East Timor (Edstrom, 2008; Oros, 
2008; Shinoda, 2007b). In the mid-1990s, the government would also reconfirm its 
commitment to the US-Japan security treaty through a joint declaration between the US 
president and Japanese prime minister. The issuance of the joint declaration would be 
followed by the revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation to clarify missions 
and roles with regards to contingencies in the areas around Japan and in regions that 
would affect Japan’s security (see Chapter 3). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the US, the JSDF would be deployed for operations in the Indian Ocean and in 
Iraq in support of their US ally. These operations would push the limits of Japanese 
prohibitions against collective self defense (see Chapter 4). In 2006, the two countries 
would agree to enhance military inter-operability by establishing joint bases. The 
agreement would increase the integration of its military establishment with US 
technology, as well as US command, control, and intelligence (see Sunohara, 2007; 
Tatsumi and Oros, 2007). Throughout the post cold war period, Japan would also take 
steps to expand the role of military-civilian relations and expand its military capabilities 
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within the one percent GDP limit on defense expenditures. Gradual changes in Japan’s 
defense posture would include: the elevation of the Japan Defense Agency to a full 
ministry (Ministry of Defense); more frequent dispatches of the Japan Self Defense Force 
for reasons of alliance contribution, peacekeeping, and disaster relief; and the acquisition 
of an operational Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system (Hughes, 2009; Tatsumi and 
Oros, 2007). Throughout this period, the legacy of Japan’s colonial past has also hindered 
relations with its closest neighbors. All of these changes have taken place against the 
backdrop of public sentiment that increasingly accepts the existence of the Japan Self 
Defense Force (JSDF) and is more favorable to amending Article 9 of the constitution to 
clearly acknowledge the JSDF as a military (Hughes, 2009; Tatsumi and Oros, 2007; 
Samuels 2007a; Kliman, 2006). In the midst of these changes, the US-Japan security 
alliance remains strong. However, in the context of a deepening and broadening of the 
US-Japan alliance, thorny questions still remain over burden-sharing in times of military 
crisis and human security issues related to the concentration of bases on Okinawa 
Prefecture3.  
In the post cold war world, Japan also faces enormous domestic obstacles that 
influence how it plans for its defense. These combined obstacles also increase the 
likelihood that something drastic might happen in domestic politics, overturning what has 
been an otherwise stable political order since the establishment of the Yoshida Consensus 
in 1955. In addition to the tragic events of March 11, 2011 (the combined earthquake, 
                                                 
3  As the case studies of this dissertation will demonstrate, human security issues related to bases 
concentrated in Okinawa have become a central aspect of Japanese defense politics. In particular, the issue 
of what to do with US Futenma Airbase has dominated the bilateral agenda for the US and Japan in recent 
years.  
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Table 1: Chronology of Key Dates in Japanese Defense 
 Japan’s National Defense Chronology 
1946 McArthur orders SCAP to draft a model Japanese constitution (February) 
1947 Japan’s Peace Constitution goes into effect 
1950 McArthur orders Japan to form the National Police Reserve (July) 
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty signed (September) 
1952 Occupation ends, Japan becomes independent (April) 
1955 JDA and SDF established (July) 
1960 Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty (January) 
1972 Reversion of Okinawa 
 GOJ declares that Japan cannot exercise collective self-defense (October) 
1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Security Cooperation established (November) 
1989 The Berlin Wall comes down (October) 
1990 Iraq invades Kuwait (August) 
 U.N. Peace Cooperation bill dies (November) 
1991 Gulf War starts, Japan contributes 13 billion (January) 
 Japan dispatches minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (April) 
1992 International Peace Cooperation Law enacted (June) 
 SDF sent to Cambodia for PKO (September) 
1993-1994 Korean Peninsula Crisis 
1995 Nye Report (February) 
 Okinawan Rape Case 
1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Summit, Joint Defense Declaration (April) 
1997 Agreement on New US Defense Guidelines (September) 
1998 Taepodong flies over Japan (August) 
1999 New Guidelines enacted (August) 
2001 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. (September) 
 Anti-terrorism legislation enacted (November) 
 SDF dispatched to Indian Ocean for rear-echelon support (December) 
2002 Contingency legislation introduced in the Diet (April) 
 Koizumi visit to Pyongyang; five abductees return to Japan (September) 
 North Korea admits its violation of the 1994 framework agreement (October) 
2003 North Korea withdraws from NPT (January) 
 Special law on Iraq reconstruction enacted (July) 
2004 Ground SDF sent to Iraq (January)  
2005/ 2006 Agreement on Force Realignment reached 
2006 Koizumi’s “Graceland” Diplomacy with Bush; US-Japan alliance declared to 
have global scope 
2007 Japanese Defense Agency is upgraded to Ministry of Defense 
2007 Abe’s Constitutional Reform Program proves abortive 
2009 The Democratic Party of Japan’s Hatoyama Yukio comes to power promising a 
“Close, equal alliance” and to move US Marine Airbase Futenma in Ginowan 
City  
2010 Prime Minister Hatoyama resigns after failing in his pledge to move Futenma 
Airbase out of the prefecture.  
 A Chinese fishing trawler collides with a Japanese Coast Guard ship near disputed 
territories marking a dramatic decline in Japanese-Chinese relations 
2011 The dramatic March 11 triple disaster occurs: a major earthquake, a tsunami, and 
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a nuclear disaster; during the crisis US-Japan joint military operation 
“Tomodachi” proves a success for the alliance 
*Adapted from Shinoda (2007); Oros (2011) 
 
tsunami, and nuclear disaster), Japan faces significant medium to long-term issues: the 
specter of demographic decline and an aging population; an enormous national debt (over 
200 percent of GDP at the writing of this dissertation); and prolonged political paralysis 
in dealing with these problems. Japan will face important questions about the 
continuation of its nuclear energy policy and how to meet its energy needs in the future, 
adjust to the harsh demographic challenges, pay its public debts, and revitalize its 
economy. How these issues are handled will have an important impact on whether Japan 
can rehabilitate itself into a healthy middle power in the region, able to project its 
political influence. Thus, future decisions on Japan’s defense policies will need to be 
made within a framework of these larger issues. No doubt, how security issues are 
addressed will also influence how Japan is able to address these domestic problems.  
 
Prior Approaches to Japanese Defense Policy and Politics 
 
Prior scholarship on Japanese defense policy and politics has done much to 
demonstrate why Japanese defense policy has been progressively more “realist” (i.e., 
pursuing military modernization and a closer relation with the US), but also, why 
domestic norms and institutions have repressed stronger moves toward military 
rearmament. Even though Japan has begun an ambitious military modernization program, 
engaged in joint Ballistic Missile Defense with the US, loosened restrictions on the 
participation of the military in policy debates, and participated in de facto collective 
security, these actions have been less than what neo-realists predicted would occur in the 
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post-cold war environment (for a full critique of neo-realist predictions see Katzenstein 
and Okawara, 2004, p. 110). Japan still retains a one percent of GDP limit on its defense 
expenditures, has retained Article 9 of the constitution which prohibits Japan from 
waging war, and still has framed many of its military dispatches in terms of humanitarian 
missions (Oros, 2008). Though these approaches have enriched our understanding of the 
underlying structures of Japan’s defense trajectory, they have nevertheless neglected to 
fully conceptualize the role of individual choice and political strategy in the 
transformation of Japan’s defense trajectory.  
This section addresses three particularly important approaches to Japanese 
defense policy and politics: reluctant realism, the security identity approach, and the 
governmental politics approach.   
Reluctant (or transitional) realist approaches to Japanese security politics 
examine the way shifts in the distribution of capabilities, particularly the rise of China 
and North Korean nuclearization, have served to move Japan away from its pacifist 
stance toward a more realist policy (Green, 2001, 2009; Kliman, 2006) that is more 
focused on the balance of power, the “national interest,” and security from external 
threats in a (somewhat constrained) security dilemma. In contrast to conventional 
neorealist approaches, reluctant realist approaches have rejected both the unitary actor 
position and the materialism of neorealism. Instead, these approaches tend to be 
methodologically constructivist, examining the way external threats create the permissive 
conditions for internal actors in Japan to shift toward more “normal” forms of discourse 
on security. In addition, these approaches also identify variables at both the international 
and domestic level that have constrained Japan’s transition toward a more realist security 
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culture. The tangible effects of this shift in security culture can be seen in programs for 
force modernization, the erosion of the separation between civilian and military 
leadership, encroachments on the pacifist constitution and other peace principles that 
have allowed for greater commitments to peacekeeping, and to some extent cooperation 
with the US in the realm of defense.  
In his study of the trajectory of Japanese security policy, Kliman (2006) argues 
that Japan should be described as in a stage of transitional realism. For Kliman, four 
major factors—foreign threats, US policy, executive leadership, and generational 
change—have worked to slowly erode the foundation of a domestic idealism built on 
pacifist principles (2006, p. 4). While each of these four factors is important, Kliman’s 
key focus is on the socializing influence of foreign threat as an independent variable. 
Because of the shift in power following the Cold War, Japan is no longer the 
indispensable ally the US once needed to face the Soviet Union. The redistribution of 
threats within the international system has made it more difficult to rely on US military 
capabilities at a time when Japan is facing the external realities of a rising Chinese power 
set on military modernization and a belligerent and unstable nuclear-armed North Korea. 
Unlike traditional realism, Kliman’s approach does not “black box” the state. Kliman 
locates key facilitators and constraints to realism in domestic institutions and political 
processes. While executive leadership and generational change have played key 
facilitating roles for a realist approach to defense, residual domestic idealism helps to 
prevent Japan from reaching a realist strategy too quickly. Part of the slowness of change 
is the consequence of institutional inertia, but also stems in part from pragmatism—
Japan does not want to alarm its neighbors and aggravate the security dilemma. Even 
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though executive leadership is addressed in Kliman's (2006) approach, much of the focus 
is placed on the prime ministership of Koizumi with little analysis of other actors or the 
variety of choices available to political actors at different levels of the policy process. 
Additionally, one important prediction by Kliman, that “Koizumi may represent the 
forerunner of a new breed of Japanese executive” (2006, p. 152), has not come to pass. 
Thus, there is a need for research that addresses not only Koizumi-type prime ministers 
(outliers in terms of their assertive approach to prime ministerial power) but also more 
consensus-oriented prime ministers who have nevertheless had an important impact on 
Japan’s policy trajectory.  
The security identity approach examines the way norms of anti-militarism 
have been embedded in domestic political institutions and political discourses, and thus, 
the way this anti-militarist identity has produced a greater amount of continuity between 
the Cold War and post-cold war world than realists are willing to admit (Berger, 1993, 
1996, 1998, 2007; Katzenstein, 1996; Oros, 2008). The security identity literature 
examines the way anti-militarist ideas, formed under the aegis of US extended deterrence 
through the 1950s and 1960s, and embedded through the Yoshida consensus, has formed 
an anti-militarist security identity. The approach looks at the long-established attitudes 
against violence, the institutionalization of anti-militarist sentiments through Article 9 of 
the constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, the one percent ceiling on defense 
spending, restrictions on arms exports, the rigid separation of military officers from 
policymaking, and the prohibition against the military use of outer space as examples of 
the presence of this anti-militarist identity. As Oros defines security identity:  
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A security identity is a set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad 
political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and 
are institutionalized into the policy-making process. Once (or if) such an identity 
become hegemonic in the polity, it serves as a structure in which all future policy 
decisions must operate, providing an overarching framework recognized both by top 
decision makers and by societal actors under which a state shapes its security practices 
(2008, p. 9).  
 
According to Oros, the three central tenets of Japanese anti-militarism are: no 
traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defense, and no Japanese 
participation in foreign wars (2008, p. 10). Though the security identity does not 
determine agent actions, those politicians who wish to cross any boundary of this identity 
must pay extensive political costs. A security identity shapes the public debate and 
provides its vocabulary, but does not determine the outcome. As Oros argues (p. 1), these 
principles shape what is considered “normal” in Japanese politics.  
Oros himself notes, however, that accounts of Japan's security identity need to 
have a stronger focus on the way agents actively use and redefine the resources of the 
anti-militarist security identity. Oros writes: “In looking to Japan’s security future, 
however, scholars and practitioners must redouble their effort to investigate important 
sources for sustaining and altering Japan’s security identity, including renewed attention 
to how “enterprising agents” (or as others term them “political entrepreneurs”) seek to 
craft ideas and boost their power” (2008, p. 198).  
As Oros (2008) suggests, by addressing the role of political entrepreneurs, one 
can then better see how structural elements are reworked through the practices of agents. 
As this dissertation will demonstrate, however, the anti-militarist security identity is just 
one resource that political entrepreneurs can draw from (and often it is not even the most 
relevant resource). Though the anti-militarist security identity is a resource largely 
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supported by the general population, it finds decreasing salience in security and defense 
policy circles where cultures of realism remain prevalent. These policy circles—largely 
US-Japan Security Treaty diplomats, members of the armed forces and defense 
bureaucrats, relevant think tank officials, as well as politicians—are often influenced by 
their education in the United States and England, as well as by their frequent interactions 
with counterparts from the US (Sebata, 2011, personal interview; Watanabe Tsuneo, 
2012, personal interview; Watanabe Akio, 2012, personal interview; Green, 2001). Thus, 
a realist vocabulary that includes terms such as “balance of power” and “national 
interest” is also becoming increasingly important (see Samuels, 2007a, 2007b).  
A third approach includes variations on the Bureaucratic Politics and 
Organization Process Models developed by Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974), which I 
will describe for purposes of brevity as the Governmental Politics Model. The most 
direct uses of the Governmental Politics approach has been Sebata’s (1992, 2010) study 
of bureaucratic politics and Shinoda's (2007a, 2007b) approach to policymaking using a 
modified version of Halperin’s model of concentric policymaking circles.  
In Sebata’s (1992, 2010) approach, institutional procedures and inertia make 
any grand changes to policy difficult. Thus, policy change is often an incremental and 
pragmatic shift from one policy to the next. Sebata (2010) overcomes some of the 
limitations of the model as applied to the US policymaking system by incorporating 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians and US alliance managers as key actors in 
internal bureaucratic struggles. Instead of understanding policymaking as coming from a 
single rational actor, actions are seen as the result of semi-feudal actors within 
government attempting to pursue their own organizational objectives through action 
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networks. As Sebata argues, instead of a unified “national interest” (kokueki), what 
occurs instead are “ministerial interests” (shoeki) (Sebata, 2011, personal interview). 
Thus, the concepts of “logrolling” and ministerial interests are applied through each of 
the cases with a great deal of explanatory utility. While Sebata’s approach puts more 
emphasis on agent interactions, it often creates a form of “rump” agency. Actors are 
frequently little more than the position they occupy within the policymaking hierarchy. 
For this reason, a study that fully theorizes the role of strategy and policy 
entrepreneurship is needed to demonstrate when and how differences in political skill and 
mastery of surrounding political resources have mattered in policy making and why more 
dramatic shifts have sometimes occurred.  
A particular weakness of the literature is in explaining why the power of the 
prime minister has varied so drastically since the end of the Cold War. A critical 
examination of strategy and policy entrepreneurship—the degree to which leaders are 
able to exploit different structural contexts positively through political strategies—is 
necessary to complement these governmental politics explanations.  
Shinoda’s pioneering research on the role of the prime minister has taken 
important steps toward filling this gap (Shinoda, 2000, 2007a, 2011). Shinoda’s (2007a) 
examination of the role of the kantei (the combined resources of the Cabinet Office and 
the Office of the Prime Minister) in recent foreign policymaking also uses a form of 
governmental politics. In his approach, Shinoda uses a modified form of the Halperin/ 
Hilsman concentric circles model. In this model, concentric circles are drawn to 
demonstrate the relevance of different actors to the inner workings of government. The 
outermost circle is the general public (whose support the inner actors need, even if they 
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do not participate directly in public policy). Progressing inward toward the center are the 
media and the opposition parties, followed by coalition partners, the ruling party, and 
finally the prime minister’s own cabinet at the center. Shinoda uses this model to explain 
how Prime Minister Koizumi was able to elicit support from outside actors to pressure 
actors on the inside to consent to his policies. Koizumi’s approach included the use of 
general public support and the support of coalition partners to pressure members of his 
own party in policy negotiations. Through his concentric circles approach, Shinoda 
demonstrates the various relationships of actors in the policy process to the prime 
minister and how the prime minister can use bargaining approaches to pressure dissenting 
parties (2007, p. 11-15). In short, Shinoda finds that the more radical the policy, the more 
public support is needed to pressure interest groups to adopt the controversial legislation.  
My dissertation will not attempt to supplant Shinoda’s explanatory framework, 
but rather to demonstrate broader aspects of strategy as performed by various prime 
ministers. Most importantly, the current dissertation will look at aspects of coherence, 
focus, and the formulation of proximate goals as sources of prime ministerial power. 
While the dissertation will use an approach that focuses on the role of strategy and 
entrepreneurship, insights drawn from the work of scholars using the governmental 
politics approach will be indispensable for theorizing the broader contexts of the prime 
minister’s field of action. Key concepts from the governmental political approach will 
prove valuable for an approach that takes into account more fully the different forms of 
strategy and entrepreneurship available to the prime minister. The key concepts borrowed 
from the governmental politics model included the role of expertise, knowledge, and 
position in the policymaking process as a form of governmental power, as well as notions 
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of bureaucratic turf and the intransigence of bureaucratic actors when policies impact 
their ministerial interests. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, while bureaucrats have key 
advantages in terms of information, having a permanent stake in policies related to their 
area of policy and access to personal networks, the prime minister has his own 
advantages. These advantages include a platform for eliciting public approval and the 
ability to act as the spokesman for the nation.   
 
Theoretical Perspective: Political Strategy and Policy Entrepreneurship 
 
Early examples of the difference that leadership makes in the success or failure 
of a military campaign or political project can be seen in the likes of Thucydides History 
of the Peloponnesian War, in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, and in Machiavelli’s The Prince 
(Thucydides, 1993; Machiavelli, 2004; Byman and Pollack, 2001; Grove, 2007; Preston, 
2010; Sun Tzu, 2008; Rumelt, 2011). Thucydides’ contrasting descriptions of the realistic 
and cautious strategies of Pericles and the reckless and self-aggrandizing strategies of 
Alcibiades are an early example of how authors have explained outcomes in terms of the 
quality of strategy and leadership (Thucydides, 1993). More contemporary examples of 
leadership study have used comparative approaches to demonstrate how leaders in similar 
contexts have used different strategies to bring about different outcomes (see Samuels, 
2003). More recent scholarship in leadership has sought to demonstrate how the quality 
of strategy can be evaluated across fields and disciplines. This approach demonstrates the 
utility of in depth case studies for examining when a new entrepreneurial insight has 
inspired the formation of bold new strategy (Rumelt, 2011).  
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Despite the general recognition of the importance of leadership and strategy in 
international affairs (especially by practitioners), in much of the International Relations 
scholarship, these concepts are often seen as something that must be recovered or even 
rescued from the excesses of structural theories4 (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p. 108; 
Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Samuels, 2003). The dissertation seeks not only to recover 
agency as a key variable, but also to move beyond frequent assertions that “leadership 
matters,” by exploring two important components of leadership: strategy and 
entrepreneurship. While the term “strategy” will be well recognized as a concept in 
International Relations, the term “entrepreneurship” may be less recognized. For most 
scholars, entrepreneurship is largely associated with the fields of economics and business. 
Indeed, there are few good translations of the term into Japanese that do not evoke 
meanings associated with business5 . Nevertheless, “entrepreneurship” is increasingly 
being recognized as trait that exists in nearly every sphere of human activity (Stockley, 
Frank, and Stough, 2009, p. 3; Maclachlan, 2010, p. 1; Klein et al, 2010). 
The leadership literature often associates entrepreneurship with creativity, 
innovation, and in some cases even deviance (Boyett 1996; Klein et al 2010; Samuels 
                                                 
4 This neglect of the role of leadership, however, does not extend to other disciplines. The role of the leader 
is still very much celebrated in disciplines such as history, management, and military studies. The field of 
International Relation’s ambivalent relationship with the role of individuals can be seen especially in 
Kenneth Waltz’s The Man, the State, and War. Waltz introduces the individual as one level of analysis side 
by side with the state and the international system only to reject this level in the book’s conclusion (Waltz, 
1959).  
 
5 When discussing the topic with peers in Japanese, a katakana variant of the word policy entrepreneurship 
was used: “porishi antorupurunushippu”. This was seen as a better translation than “kigyokaseishin”, which 
has a meaning specific to business (kigyoka means “someone who starts a business” and seishin means 
“way of thinking”). One interviewee (Watanabe Akio, 2012, personal interview) urged me not to use either 
term in my talks with Japanese officials, and instead to focus on “ridashippu” (leadership) for simplicity’s 
sake.  
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2003). Entrepreneurs are “different” because they engage in “creative discovery,” 
exploring new opportunities to push their ideas and achieve their objectives (Porter, 
1996; Schneider and Teske, 1992; Teske and Schneider 1994; Kirzner, 1973; King and 
Roberts, 1991). What my theoretical focus will retain from the business and public sector 
management literature on entrepreneurship is the focus on creativity, innovation, and the 
ability of entrepreneurial agents to see opportunities and resources that other agents miss. 
Thus, entrepreneurial behavior suggests “alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities” 
(Kirzner, 1973, p. 39; See also, Stockley et al, 2002; Klein et al, 2010; Samuels, 2003; 
Staveley, 2000). This is not to suggest that “entrepreneurs” are pure agents, unbounded 
and free. Instead, my use of the concept of policy entrepreneurship posits that agents are 
able to exert an unusual amount of power through their relationship with structures. In 
my conceptualization of policy entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs are able to understand 
and learn from their environments—often intuitively—in ways that allow them to see 
resources and constraints in ways others do not, thus providing them with a competitive 
advantage. 
As Rumelt (2011) recognizes in his study of strategy, there is a strong 
relationship between new forms of strategy and entrepreneurial insight. He argues that a 
new strategy is usually facilitated by a moment of insight (an “aha” moment) where a 
new resource or advantage is discovered. Rumelt writes, “[i]n a changing world, a good 
strategy must have an entrepreneurial component. That is, it must embody some ideas or 
insights into new combinations of resources for dealing with new risks and opportunities” 
(2011, p. 244, no emphasis added). If new “entrepreneurial” insights can be seen as 
underpinning unexpected successes, then we must also consider the possibility that new 
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approaches (“aha” moments that proved premature) have also produced conspicuous and 
unexpected failures6. 
In addition, a focus on strategy and entrepreneurship has the potential to 
complement the eclectic theories described above. My emphasis on strategy and 
entrepreneurship can build on reluctant realist, security identity, and governmental 
politics approaches by examining the difference that innovative agent practices make on 
policy outcomes. My approach borrows much from Samuels’s (2003) comparative study 
of Italian and Japanese leadership. Like Samuels, I do not see the study of leadership as 
opposed to the study of structural contexts as important causes. As Samuels writes, 
leadership is “that constrained place where imagination, resources, and opportunity 
converge” (2003, p. 6) and thus, “in the contingency of leadership, is where we are apt to 
find a connection between agency and structure” (2003, p. 10). A focus on 
entrepreneurship can demonstrate how different political strategies either helped or 
hindered actors within these structural contexts, and thus, reveal to us aspects of structure 
of which we may not have previously been aware.  
As Chapter 2 will explore in more depth, the prime minister occupies an 
interesting position in the game of defense policy. Though formally situated as the 
ultimate “insider” in the policymaking process, the prime minister in many ways comes 
to the position as a defense policy outsider. The prime minister, typically groomed 
through several positions in the cabinet before becoming a prime minister, has 
                                                 
6 Indeed, one of the chief motivations behind this research is the realization that prior research on Japanese 
defense politics has overemphasized the unexpected successes of one prime minister (Koizumi Junichiro), 
while ignoring more mundane (but at the time, no less unexpected) successes of other prime ministers (like 
Hashimoto Ryutaro) and unexpected failures (like Hatoyama Yukio).   
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traditionally had little experience handling defense and security related issues. In addition, 
if he does have concrete policy preferences in the area of defense, he must often compete 
against the stable workings of professional US-Japan alliance bureaucrats on both sides 
of the alliance. These actors typically have more experience, access to key information, 
and often their own personal networks. Thus, aspects of the position of prime minister at 
least in some ways demonstrate the possibility of the “deviant” actions often seen from 
policy entrepreneurs.   
 
Research Questions and Scope of the Study 
 
This dissertation asks: 
 
 How have different strategies and entrepreneurial insights by the prime minister 
influenced defense policy making and politics since the end of the Cold War?    
 
 How has the quality of strategy and entrepreneurial insight employed by the prime 
minister impacted the trajectory of Japan’s defense policy? 
 
 
Thus, the scope of the dissertation is the prime minister’s political strategy and 
entrepreneurial practices in the realm of defense policy and politics in the post cold war 
period.  
For the purpose of the study, the author employs the term “defense” broadly. In 
addition to decisions concerning military budgets, weapons procurement, and other 
military issues usually encompassed by the term “defense,” this broader definition also 
encompasses “softer” civilian security policies, historical symbolism regarding the 
Pacific War, and issues regarding US bases in areas such as Okinawa Prefecture. Though 
the dissertation’s focus is on “defense,” the particularities of Japan’s anti-militarist 
culture, its colonial legacy in the region, and the presence of US bases in Japan often 
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destabilize the artificial barriers between “defense” as security from foreign threats and 
other forms of security more broadly7. 
The key focus of the study will be strategy and entrepreneurial insight. Each 
case study will focus on the individual actions of the prime minister, attempt to ascertain 
the key insights driving these actions, and then evaluate the outcomes of the prime 
minister’s actions. The study’s focus on political strategy, however, should not be 
conflated with the strategy of the Japanese state. As the review of the governmental 
politics literature should make clear, the prime minister is but one player in the game of 
policy and agenda setting, and many times not even the strongest player. As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, Japanese prime ministers have varied in their ability to 
intervene in the affairs of defense policy and politics, and this difference has mattered in 
the overall trajectory of Japan’s defense posture.  
Though much of the focus of the case study chapters will be on the actions of 
the prime ministers and their results in the area of defense policy, the case studies will 
also focus on entrepreneurial insights, or new insights into restraints and resources that 
appear to be driving these actions. As Rumelt (2011) has argued, in their employment of 
new ideas and new resources to achieve change in the world, leaders as policy 
entrepreneurs are natural scientists positing new hypotheses. Thus, a close examination of 
                                                 
7 For the purpose of this study, however, the author refrains from employing the term “security,” since 
aspects of Japan’s human security, disaster security, environmental security, energy security, and security 
from transnational crime are only taken up when they impact “defense” politics directly. The Japanese case, 
however, demonstrates the often arbitrary boundaries between defense and security, and how, in certain 
cultural contexts, defense can become penetrated by larger security issues and how defense can be replaced 
by “softer” forms of security for various political reasons. The complex relationship between “security” and 
“defense” will be most apparent in Chapter 5, the case study of the Hatoyama Yukio administration.  
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the ideas driving actions and the resulting outcomes can yield new insights about the field 
in which they operate.  
Rather than focus exclusively on instances of successful strategy, my research 
will also look at instances where deviant behavior proved to be a strategic fiasco. These 
actions could include: ill-timed introduction of new ideas; employing resources in ways 
that are inappropriate; or the assumption of unanticipated risks. Failures can often be as 
instructive as successes (if not more) because they offer instances where “natural 
hypotheses” have been falsified (though scholars should be cautious about what 
conclusions they draw from these failures).  
My research will also examine strategy and entrepreneurial insight alongside 
two important intervening variables: operational context and the policy challenge. 
Though each of the cases will employ a weak control--the actors examined were each 
prime ministers in the Japanese political system in the post cold war era--their operational 
environments were nonetheless different. Thus, each case study has a highly independent 
operational context. Though operational context is conceptualized as an “intervening 
variable,” this dissertation will examine the approaches of the prime minister side by side 
with their operational contexts. As discussed above, leaders do not work outside of their 
contexts, but rather within them, employing their own understandings of constraints and 
opportunities. As Wight (2006, see also, Samuels 2003, Curtis, 1999, p. 6) argues, agents 
cannot be artificially separated from the structural contexts in which they must act. For 
this reason, the study will examine the prime minister’s situation within the party, within 
his own cabinet, his domestic situation, the regional situation, as well as the international 
situation as a part of each case study. While these contexts will be examined for resources 
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and constraints on prime ministerial power, keeping in mind the theoretical approach of 
the study, the author will also examine what prime ministers can teach us—through their 
strategies and approaches—about these various contexts that may seem counter-intuitive. 
In addition to operational context, the author will also examine how differing motivations 
and expectations influenced the actor’s strategy. Thus, the dissertation will evaluate the 
relevant strategies and insights in the context of the relevant policy challenge the actor 
faced.  
The dependent variable is differing degrees of policy efficacy. Policy efficacy 
will be evaluated on several levels. On one level, policy efficacy will be evaluated strictly 
in terms of whether the prime minister had the effect on the field of defense policy and 
politics he had hoped for prior to coming to office. The policy preferences of the prime 
minister will largely be gauged based on biographical material available through books, 
interviews, and policy speeches. Another measure of policy efficacy will be the degree to 
which defense policies can be demonstrated to have boosted or hindered the prime 
minister’s policy agenda overall. In most of the case studies, defense policies were 
secondary to economic issues or government reform agendas; and yet, success or failure 
in areas of defense were essential to how the prime minister would later fare in other key 
policy initiatives. In this vein, at key points initiatives on defense will be evaluated for 
their impact on the prime minister’s popularity figures, since high popularity figures have 
been recognized as an important (in many cases indispensable) resource for getting one’s 
way in intergovernmental bargaining (see Stockwin, 2008; Shinoda, 2000, 2007a, 2011).  
In terms of the time period, there are compelling reasons to see the post cold 
war era as distinct period worthy of study. The period of 1989-1993 represented a time of 
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four “shocks”: the collapse of the real estate and stock bubble, the death of the Showa 
emperor, the end of the Cold War, and the loss of LDP control of the Diet. The final 
shock, perhaps the one that would have the  most direct impact on debates about defense, 
was the “failure” of Japan to provide a “human contribution” (jinteki koken) to the first 
Gulf War. Much of the literature on policy leadership generally agrees that political 
agents matter more in times of uncertainty (Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Samuels, 2003; 
Grove, 2007). Thus, the post cold war period, a period where Japan suffered through a 
long period of economic recession, political change, and periodic security challenges, 
should be a period ripe for the investigation of strategy and entrepreneurship. 
 
Research Design and Case Selection 
  
A comparative case study approach will be used to examine how prime 
ministers have employed different strategies and used different entrepreneurial insights in 
the realm of Japanese defense politics and policy. The case study approach generally 
allows for a greater exploration of the interrelationship between many different kinds of 
variables in ways that privilege the creation of causal complexes over single variable 
explanations (Kurki, 2008; for more on this point, see Curtis, 1999, p. 4-6; Katzenstein 
and Sil, 2004). Because of the importance of operational context and individual 
motivation in the study of political strategy and entrepreneurship, the study will use thick 
description of a limited number of cases instead of rigorous controls. Though the 
approach used in this dissertation follows George and Bennett's (2005) logic of “soaking 
and poking” historical data to make new contributions to theory, the approach will also 
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have important aspects of structure and focus provided by the research questions stated 
above.  
My research will compare three cases: the prime ministerships of Hashimoto 
Ryutaro (1996-1998); Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Hatoyama Yukio (2009-
2010). The three cases have been selected to provide maximum contrast among different 
forms of strategy and entrepreneurship, while providing a limited control on international 
context (the backdrop of the post cold war era). Data collection efforts for each of the 
three major case studies will focus on primary and secondary source documents. 
Secondary source documentation will focus on studies of the prime ministers under study 
and articles in both magazines and peer reviewed journals. My primary source research 
will focus on documents such as white papers, party manifestos, autobiographies and 
memoirs of key officials, and official interviews available through publications during 
each of the prime ministerships. Interviews with policy officials, think tank researchers, 
and knowledgeable members of the various administrations will also be used to 
supplement published resources on the administrations.   
The Hashimoto prime minstership (1996-1998) was selected because Prime 
Minister Hashimoto served during a time of distress between the US and Japan and an 
ambiguous security environment following the end of the Cold War. During Hashimoto's 
prime ministership, US-Japan security cooperation was strengthened through revised 
guidelines, a large contingent of US troops was retained on Japanese soil, and the 
Japanese Self Defense Force was maintained at about the same level as during the Cold 
War. There was nothing inevitable about this outcome or the political processes that 
brought it about. One could argue that the impetus for greater ties between the two 
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countries originated from high level defense officials and members of independent 
commissions (Joseph Nye and Higuchi Kotaro) and the initiatives of bureaucratic actors 
within both the US and Japan (Sebata, 2010, p. 280; Funabashi, 1999). However, a closer 
examination of this case study will demonstrate that Hashimoto was an active participant 
in this process, empowering bureaucrats and driving an already active process further. In 
addition, Hashimoto was also able to pivot on the success of measures to reinvigorate the 
US-Japan alliance, improving ties with China, assuaging actors in Okinawa, and 
upgrading Japan’s profile in relations with ASEAN and Russia.    
The Koizumi prime ministership (2001-2006) was chosen because Koizumi is 
widely seen as an exemplar of prime ministerial leadership in a setting where scholars 
have become used to weak leadership. Despite being the leader of a weak faction within 
the Liberal Democratic Party with little experience in foreign policy or defense, Koizumi 
was able to improve ties with the US, enacting legislation to support US missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Koizumi was able to help establish a long term course 
for greater interoperability between US and Japanese military forces. The case also stands 
out because of the adept way Koizumi used the enhanced capability of the Prime 
Minister’s office (the kantei), and because of his ability to use coalition partners in the 
government and public support to rally support within his own party and the bureaucracy. 
Most importantly, however, the author finds in several seemingly contradictory actions of 
Koizumi’s defense policy an important coherence and focus that prior studies of his 
administration have overlooked.   
The Hatoyama prime ministership (2009-2010) was chosen because Hatoyama 
has been seen as an unusually ineffectual prime minister. Despite coming to power with 
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overwhelming public support and new ideas about the direction of defense policy, 
Hatoyama would have to resign within a short period of time after mismanaging the issue 
of the relocation of Futenma Airbase. Hatoyama’s case represents a stark contrast with 
those of both Hashimoto and Koizumi. Hatoyama came to power at a time when the 
institution of the prime minister was institutionally at its strongest and when public 
sentiment was decidedly against the continuation of strong bureaucratic power. However, 
Hatoyama also had to deal with instability within his own party. In comparison with the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was largely 
untested and had to deal with starker divisions within the party on defense issues. Also, 
whereas Hashimoto was dealing with a structural shift (the end of the Cold War and 
ambiguity over the direction of policy) and Koizumi was dealing with exogenous shocks 
(the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the North Korean missile tests), Hatoyama was attempting 
to alter Japan’s policy direction after a long term course had already been set through 
tedious negotiations with the US.  
  
The Argument: The Importance of Effective Strategy 
 
Strategy is the art of fitting available resources to desired ends, of finding 
hidden advantages to exploit weakness, and of minimizing risks while maximizing 
opportunities. Leaders can develop winning strategies through unique insights on how to 
utilize available resource; by developing coherences between different initiatives; 
through focus; and by identifying and sequencing proximate objectives. In two of the 
cases (Hashimoto Ryutaro and Koizumi Junichiro) we see the difference that good 
strategy and entrepreneurial insight can make in shaping defense policies and politics. In 
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addition, we see how early success in defense issues can create a more robust prime 
ministership. In these two cases, effective strategies were built from a combination of 
mundane and exceptional resources. These strategies at times used the expertise of actors 
in the defense and foreign policy bureaucracies, and at other times, bypassed them in 
order to accomplish important objectives. In another case, the nature of the policy 
challenge was misunderstood from the beginning. This misunderstanding created a 
situation where expectations were betrayed, resources were squandered, and a promising 
prime ministership ended abruptly.   
Thus, the first insight of this dissertation attests to the power of entrepreneurial 
vision and strategy in influencing Japan’s defense trajectory during the post cold war era. 
Both Hashimoto Ryutaro (through his skilled management of defense issues) and 
Koizumi Junichiro (through his bold use of newly formed kantei resources) were able to 
help foster a path toward greater military capabilities, the erosion of barriers between 
military and civilian leaders, and greater integration of Japan’s defense establishment 
with US technology and intelligence capabilities, along with US regional (and to some 
extent global) defense priorities. Moreover, this path was further secured through 
Hatoyama’s failure to overturn this course.  
Second, the skillful management of defense issues by Japanese prime ministers 
was very often an important component of prime ministerial power overall, often serving 
as a precursor for larger economic and administrative reforms.  
Third, though past studies have demonstrated that the ability to manage US-
Japan foreign relations is an important aspect of prime ministerial leadership, prior 
accounts have not fully accounted for the fungibility of good US-Japan bilateral relations 
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as a political resource. As both the Hashimoto and Koizumi case studies demonstrate, 
good US-Japan bilateral relations often provide prime ministers with flexibility both in 
external relations and domestic politics. The cases suggest that successes in managing 
US-Japan relations can be used in a number of ways: to broaden relations with other 
countries (as was the case in the Hashimoto prime ministership); to pursue domestic 
reforms (as was the case in the Hashimoto and Koizumi prime ministerships); and to 
enhance military capabilities and achieve cultural changes in military affairs (as was the 
case during both the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations).  
Finally, though the cases would seem to suggest the necessity of “embracing” 
the US as a political partner as a way of overcoming the usual limitations of the office of 
prime minister, aspects of Koizumi’s postal reform initiative demonstrate that there are 
political resources for challenging US influence. Following Gaunder (2007) and 
Maclachlan’s (2010, 2011) studies of reform initiatives in the Japanese setting, the US, as 
an entrenched interest in Japanese defense politics, can only be challenged through 
approaches that place policy entrepreneurs in positions where they can influence policy 
(advisory councils, maverick cabinet ministers) coupled with approaches that use popular 
politics, accept risk, and which leaders are committed to. By failing to learn from the 
Koizumi example (his direct confrontation of the postmasters and postal bureaucrats), 
Hatoyama’s leadership has been an important “cause” of the continuation of the status 
quo in the US-Japan security relationship.  
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Outline of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation has six chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 will examine the relationship between the prime minister and the 
defense subgovernment in Japan with the intent of demonstrating different practices of 
political leadership and possible forms of policy intervention and policy entrepreneurship. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, though the prime minister has difficulty intervening in 
some aspects of defense policy, he nevertheless has important resources and courses of 
action unavailable to other actors. 
Chapter 3 will focus on the prime ministership of Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-
1998). Prime Minister Hashimoto was an important example of policy stewardship during 
a time of great uncertainty. Despite being in power for just over two years, Hashimoto 
oversaw significant accomplishments. In the areas of defense, he was able to: bring about 
the Joint US-Japan declaration; foster the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation; help negotiate the return in principle of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa; 
and foster greater ties between civilian and military officials (eroding some of the 
inhibitions against cooperation with military authorities). Though it cannot be argued that 
Hashimoto introduced new ideas on defense or that he was particularly innovative in his 
use of institutional resources, he nevertheless demonstrated adeptness at balancing the 
needs of various actors. Mostly importantly, Hashimoto demonstrated important 
entrepreneurial insight in his discovery of the degree to which a reinvigorated US-Japan 
Security Treaty could be used as a political resource to improve relations with other 
actors and help his reform initiatives.  
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Chapter 4 will focus on the prime ministership of Koizumi Junichiro (2001-
2006). Prior studies have noted Koizumi’s talent for political theater, his skill in using the 
expanded resources of the kantei, and his willingness to take risks in confronting his own 
party. In addition to these much explored aspects of his prime ministership, the author 
also finds important examples of coherence and focus in his political strategy. Though the 
content of Koizumi’s policies on defense varied across the political spectrum, there was 
nevertheless an important coherence to Koizumi’s decisions on defense. Whether it was 
his emphatic support of the US president, his dramatic trip to Pyongyang to meet North 
Korea leader Kim Jong Il, or his controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, each policy 
made the most of the available opportunity to show off Koizumi’s policy acumen and 
willingness to face down resistance in accomplishing his goals. By demonstrating his 
policy effectiveness and his independence, his disparate actions in the area of defense 
boosted his standing with the public, allowing him greater freedom of action in his postal 
reform agenda.  
Chapter 5 will focus on the prime ministership of Hatoyama Yukio (2009-
2010). The prime ministership of Hatoyama Yukio is an important case because it is the 
first time in recent history that a prime minister has challenged—however subtle that 
challenge may have been—the primacy of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Despite coming 
to power with overwhelming public support and new ideas about the direction of defense 
policy, Hatoyama would nevertheless have to resign within a short period of time after 
embroilment in a money scandal and mismanagement of the relocation of U.S. Airbase 
Futenma. Hatoyama’s prime ministership demonstrates the limitations of civilian 
internationalist approaches as a substitute for alliance maintenance with the US, as well 
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as the weaknesses of “consensus-based” and “muddle through” tactics in Japanese 
politics. Though Hatoyama had significant new ideas on security, he nevertheless took 
few risks in promoting his own ideas and showed little acumen in using his institutional 
resources.  
Chapter 6 will place the case studies in a comparative framework, outline the 
key findings from the study and the strengths and limitations of the theoretical 
perspective, and pose my recommendations for future research on strategy and 
entrepreneurship in International Relations, as well as recommendations for future 
research on Japanese defense policy and politics.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
Theorizing Prime Ministerial Leadership in the Context of Japanese Defense Policy and 
Politics  
 
Introduction 
 
At first sight, Japanese politics would seem like an unlikely setting for a study 
of political strategy and policy entrepreneurship. After all, Japanese politics is usually 
associated with tedious consensus-building, gradualism, and at times even immobilism 
(Curtis, 1999; Sebata, 2010; Stockwin, 2008; Sohma, 2010), not creativity, flexibility, 
and innovation. A common theme in the political literature on Japan is the relative 
weakness of the prime minister in comparison to other heads of state, even the prime 
minister in Westminster styles of government (Angel, 1989; Mulgan, 2002; Stockwin, 
2008). Hayao (1993), for example, characterizes the prime minister’s role as “reactive,” 
serving as a mediator of last resort when consensus breaks down in the normal running of 
the various subgovernments (the assemblage of politicians, bureaucrats, and client 
groups that specialize in specific issue areas). Since Hayao’s study, several administrative 
reforms, new institutions, and changing public sentiment have given more formal and 
informal strength to the prime minister’s office. Despite these changes, his overall 
characterization of the office remains relevant. Prime ministers continue to be weak 
figures within the Japanese system because:  
  
 they must contend with powerful subgovernments—combinations of elites from 
politics, the bureaucracy, and business who have vested interests in these areas  
 38 
 
 they must expend their limited energies balancing and maintaining order within an 
unruly political party  
 
 cultural norms and the selection process for prime ministers often encourages prime 
ministers who can maintain consensus within the party, not leaders adept at 
implementing bold new policies. 
 
 
Even given these observations, most authors (see for example, Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 
2000; Staveley, 2000; Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009) recognize that the 
efficacy of prime ministers has varied greatly on policy issues. As broader studies of 
leadership outside of the Japanese case have demonstrated, how leaders use the various 
resources at their command—administrative resources, unusual opportunities, and 
symbolic resources—matters greatly in the outcomes of policy initiatives (Grove, 2007; 
Hardgrove and Owens, 2003; Machiavelli, 2004; Preston, 2010; Samuels, 2003). The 
same can be said of Japanese politics: the timing of prime ministerial interventions in the 
affairs of subgovernments, their choice of political allies, their use of institutional 
resources, as well as the public framing of their initiatives, have led to significant 
differences in the outcomes of their policy initiatives. The ability to accept risk, employ 
new insights, and develop innovative resources has been and will continue to be an 
important factor in the outcome of policy and politics.  
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This chapter examines the position of the prime minister in Japanese politics 
and theorizes the potential for strategy and policy entrepreneurship in defense policy and 
politics. As this chapter demonstrates, the prime minister has a number of approaches he 
can use to intervene in the affairs of the defense subgovernment. These approaches 
include using his position as chief spokesperson for the state to shift the policy debate, 
the use of extraordinary events as catalysts for change, using unique forms of coalition-
building and bargaining to overcome sectionalism, as well as the option to empower 
elements within the subgovernment.  
As Rumelt (2011) has argued, leaders who are able to thrive in competitive 
environments typically have an entrepreneurial element. They are able to see resources 
and opportunities differently than their peers and to form a “theory” of action with 
regards to their policy area. Thus, while this chapter looks at some of the limitations of 
the position of the prime minister, it also pays close attention to the resources of the 
position and the possibility for action in defense politics.  
 
Theories of Power: Who Acts in Japanese Politics? 
 
 
A lack of strong leadership in Japanese politics has often been lamented by 
both scholars and pundits of Japanese politics (some examples see, Watanabe 2011, June 
7; Mulgan, 2002; Okimoto, 2011). In the wake of multiple failures of leadership and 
governance, including failures in the regulation of the nuclear industry, failures in 
response to the financial crisis of the 1990s, and scandals at ministries responsible for 
pension and health (to name only a few), commentators have bemoaned the lack of 
 40 
accountability in a political system where power is diffuse. One answer to the enigmatic 
question “Who acts in Japanese politics?” is: no one. The more scholarly framing of this 
answer is that discrete actors and agents are difficult to locate because in Japanese 
politics power is diffuse and political agency is often the product of a “milieu” based on 
the sentiment of the ruling elite (Wolferen, 1989)8. In this account—called the “Power 
Elite” model—the fragmentation of power produces a bias toward the status quo, with 
frequent stretches of policy immobility. Typically, dramatic external events are seen as 
the impetus for policy change. However, even when these events occur, policy changes 
slowly in order to accommodate vested interests in the bureaucracy, business, and 
politics. Change is slow because at every level of government, business, and politics 
powerful stakeholders must be appeased.  
 The Power Elite model, however, has been criticized for its oversimplification 
and underspecification. Others, searching for a more nuanced description of Japanese 
governmental process, contend that government, political, and business elites do not 
constitute a solid, unified entity; in reality, there is quite a bit of maneuvering by different 
actors to realize their agendas (see Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 2000; Stockwin, 2008; Curtis, 
1999). In an attempt to move past the Power Elite model, some scholars have taken a 
comparative approach, demonstrating the unusually strong role of the bureaucracy in 
Japan compared to other parliamentary democracies. Various authors agree that even 
compared to the Westminster system of Britain, Japanese bureaucracies have a significant 
                                                 
8 In Wolferen’s (1989) much cited work on the subject, Japanese elites in the bureaucracy, political, and 
business classes rule over a submissive middle class. Japanese policy making cannot be located in any one 
place, but rather, is the product of an expansive and amorphous “System” where elites in business, 
bureaucracies, and politics share common ideas on how the country should be ruled. 
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amount of control over the day to day running of the government (Angel, 1989; Emmott, 
2008, p. 98-99; Johnson, 1982, 1995; Shinoda, 2000; Stockwin, 2008). The roots of 
Japan’s strong bureaucracy reach back even before the Pacific War, when bureaucrats 
maintained a reputation as a highly-educate elite, dedicated to government service. The 
removal of the military from political influence by the American occupation after the war, 
in turn, greatly enhanced the clout of the civilian bureaucracies (Stockwin, 2008, p. 137). 
This level of influence grew with time, as the honesty and efficiency of Japan’s 
bureaucracies was seen as a driving force behind Japan’s meteoric economic rise. During 
Japan’s economic rise, bureaucracies enjoyed relatively high public approval, a 
reputation for honesty and efficiency, and an unusually large amount of autonomy, 
including the ability to draft legislation.  
Some authors, while not disagreeing with this interpretation of Japanese power, 
note that bureaucrats have been given a great deal of power because they have met the 
needs of their political masters who wish to stay in power (Rothacher, 1993; Wight, 
1999). This principal-agent approach sees politicians as principals empowering 
bureaucratic agents in order to allow them to focus their energies on developing better 
support networks and clientelist relationships with local businesses, civic groups, and 
other organizations so that they can stay in office. As long as bureaucratic power met 
their electoral needs, intensive intervention by politicians was not necessary. But as has 
been seen in recent political developments, as electoral opinion has turned against the 
bureaucracies, the politicians have responded by curtailing the power of the bureaucrats 
and usurping larger legislative and administrative roles for themselves.  
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Perhaps the most enduring description of Japanese power is the “truncated 
pyramid model” of policy making. In the truncated pyramid model, the mid-level 
actors—namely the party zokus (policy tribes) and subcommittees of PARC (the party’s 
Policy Affairs Research Council) and the division level chiefs in the bureaucracy—have 
an unusually strong influence on policy. In this model, the prime minister and cabinet 
members still give policy direction; however, mid-level actors have a great deal of 
flexibility in implementing these policy directives, including the ability to advise actors at 
the top on which policies are feasible and which ones are not. Bottom-up policy making 
is an extensive feature of this model, including ringisei or extensive consultation that 
creates consensus for policies from the bottom-up (Hosoya 1979; Shinoda, 2006, p. 72-
74; Shinoda, 2007, p. 23; Ishihara, 1997, 2002). For much of the postwar period, 
approval in the subcommittees was the same as approval of the Diet, given the LDP’s 
long tenure in power. Once the policy passed the subcommittee it would go to the PARC 
and then the LDP General Council. While decision making does occur at the highest 
levels of government—such as the cabinet—usually these higher level meetings are the 
product of a much longer decision-making process within the government (Shinoda, 
2006; Ishihara, 2002). Leading officials are only called on to act when there is a need for 
mediation between conflicting groups, when multiple actors need to be coordinated, or 
when fundamental reforms are required (Hosoaya, 1979; Sebata, 2010; Hayao, 1993). 
Since the DPJ came to power in 2009, this bottom-up process has fluctuated somewhat, 
with key institutions such as the Vice Ministers Consultative Meeting (a key forum for 
bureaucratic coordination and policymaking) and the party’s own PARC (Policy Affairs 
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Research Council) being abolished. These changes resulted in the centralization of 
policymaking within the cabinet and senior political appointees in the bureaucracies, and 
diminished the role of career bureaucrats and party backbenchers. However, after two 
short-lived administrations, these two institutions were subsequently re-established. 
Despite the DPJ’s campaign slogan to transfer power from bureaucrats to politicians, 
frequent turnovers in cabinet ministers and party infighting have helped to maintain the 
power of bureaucrats (Koellner, 2011). 
For the most part, these aspects of the political system—strong mid-level 
actors in the bureaucracies, political parties, and interest groups—have led to semi-
autonomous fiefdoms or “subgovernment” structures. These subgovernments develop 
strong ties, form quasi-monopolies on information, and are often hostile to intervention 
by outsiders. In some cases subgovernments can be made up of a division of the LDP’s 
PARC (now the DPJ’s PARC), one or more bureaucracy, and relevant interest groups 
(Hayao, 1993, p. 142-143). However, the strength of these subgovernments has also been 
facilitated by the lack of resources and experience of external actors. This included: a 
tradition within the LDP of regularly rotating politicians through ministerial positions 
(with a typical tenure of about one year) in order to maximize political patronage; a lack 
of politically independent think tanks; as well as small personal support staffs for 
politicians (Mishima, 2007; Sebata, 2011, personal interview; Shinoda, 2000, 2011). 
 Multiple crises in the early to mid 1990s and 2000s have gradually created 
public antipathy toward the continued existence of these largely rigid subgovernments, 
along with the lack of transparency and incentives for corruption they brought. These 
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failures include the perceived failure of the first Gulf War, the failure of political officials 
to respond to the multiple financial crises following the bursting of the economic bubble, 
a high profile scandal involving lost pension records, a scandal involving HIV-tainted 
blood at the Ministry of Health, as well as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis following 
the 2011 triple disaster. In these cases, vested interests slowed the response to a crisis, 
prevented proper oversight, and/ or prevented the scandal from coming to light sooner. 
These scandals and failures now make up an essential part of Japanese political 
consciousness. Since the early 1990s, political and administrative reforms have been on 
the political platforms of many prime ministers. These reforms have targeted not only the 
persistence of bureaucratic power, but also areas in politics that have been the source of 
strong forms of political patronage, most conspicuously the postal savings system and 
public works. 
Indeed, many expected that a series of electoral and administrative changes 
enacted in the nineties and early 2000s had fundamentally changed the political parties 
and the office of the prime minister for good. The 1994 electoral changes, which 
introduced the creation of three hundred single-seat voting districts (out of five hundred 
total seats, the remainder of which were to remain multimember districts), it was believed, 
would create an atmosphere of more intense competition among parties. In this new 
competitive environment, parties would have to choose more charismatic, top-down style 
leaders who could introduce bold new policies or face defeat at the polls. The 
government reforms of 1999 had also consolidated Japan’s vast bureaucracy and lowered 
the number of cabinet ministers from twenty to fifteen, making it easier for the prime 
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minister to reach consensus on an issue in the cabinet. The reform also eliminated the 
Government Commissioner System, which allowed bureaucrats to answer questions 
directly from opposition Diet members. This reform was meant to discourage over-
reliance on bureaucrats. Finally, the administrative reforms of 2001 had given the prime 
minister’s residence and the cabinet office (collectively known as the kantei) greater 
resources, coordinating power, and institutional support (Shinoda, 2003, 2007a; 
Machidori, 2010). As we will see in the Koizumi case study, this would provide a 
significant resource for prime ministers with the creativity to use it. The rise of the DPJ 
as the ruling party of Japan has brought with it significant changes in the relationship 
between bureaucrats and politicians. Most notable has been the creation of a National 
Strategy Office, the elimination of the Vice Minister Coordination Meetings, and the use 
of a greater number of political appointees in the ministries. As was demonstrated by 
both Hatoyama Yukio’s approach to the re-negotiation of the relocation of Futenma 
Airbase (see Chapter 5 for details) and Kan Naoto’s handling of several crises during the 
March 11, 2011 disaster (see Hayashi and Shirouzu, 2011, April 9), the first two prime 
ministers under DPJ tenure have gone to great lengths to sidestep bureaucrats and handle 
policy issues on their own. However, under the Noda Yoshihiko administration (the 
current administration as of the writing of this dissertation) many of the previously 
abolished LDP-era decision-making structures were brought back, including the 
previously abolished Vice Ministers Coordination Meetings and the DPJ’s own Policy 
Affairs Research Council (PARC) (Makihara, 2011).  
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Despite these reforms, strong subgovernments and weak political leadership 
remain a persistent aspect of Japanese government. Explanations for why Japan continues 
to suffer from weak political leadership span both individualist and institutionalist 
explanations. Some scholars continue to point out the lack of charisma and leadership 
skills in individual prime ministers and politicians, while others point out persistent 
institutional barriers to strong leadership. These institutions include: the continuation of 
factional politics and patronage practices within the parties; the mixed electoral laws 
governing the election of members of the Upper House that lead to twisted Diets where 
one party rules the Lower House and another the Upper House; and the lack of a direct 
election of the prime minister (for a review of these various arguments, see Machidori, 
2010). Thus, twisted Diets and patronage-minded prime ministers have continued to lead 
to weak prime ministers and a deepening of cynicism among the public—an increasing 
number of whom prefer neither of the two major parties.  
 
Prior Perspectives on Prime Ministerial Power 
 
 
Even reaching back before the postwar period in Japanese politics, the position 
of the prime minister has been weak9. Before the war, the prime minister was little more 
than an equal among cabinet ministers. Often certain ministers, through the influence of 
their powerful bureaucracies, could rival the prime minister. Much like today, dissent 
within the cabinet had the power to bring down the government (Angel, 1989; Stockwin, 
                                                 
9 Stockwin traces the history of Japan’s prohibitions against strong leadership back to the seventeenth 
century Tokugawa settlement where complex political arrangements were established to prevent any one 
group from assuming too much power (2008, p. 15). For Stockwin, these arrangements foreshadow current 
arrangements of factional balancing in government to prevent forceful leadership from assuming power.  
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2008). Factors contributing to this weakness include cultural inhibitions against 
aggressive leadership styles, a tradition of consensus building in Japanese politics, the 
strong position of subgovernments, and the influence of powerbrokers within the political 
parties (Angel, 1989; McCargo, 2004; Mulgan, 2002; Shinoda, 2000, 2011). Much has 
been written about the cultural inhibitions against strong leadership (see for example, 
Angel, 1989 and Hayao, 1993). A prime minister must deal with sectionalism on two 
sides: one, the side of the party faction, or habatsu; on the other side, he must deal with 
the power of the bureaucracies and other permanent members of the subgovernment 
(Sinoda, 2000, 2011).  
Studies of the Japanese prime minister often stress his role as leader of the 
party. The internal party selection process has tended to favor candidates who have 
extensive connections among party members, are skilled at fundraising, and typically 
make decisions only after extensive consultation. Thus, the grooming process for future 
leaders has favored consensus-making and party patronage over charismatic, policy-
savvy leaders. The same politicians who have been skilled at intra-party patronage have 
often had little skill at “going public” (Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009; Shinoda, 
2000; Hayao, 1993). There are other compelling legal and institutional reasons for the 
prime minister’s weakness. The Constitution of Japan vests executive power in the 
cabinet (Article 65) and deems that the prime minister represents the cabinet (Article 72). 
Article 6 of the Cabinet Law of 1947 more clearly establishes the limitations on the prime 
minister’s power, obliging him to seek the consent of the entire cabinet before exercising 
executive authority (GoJ, n.d.). Because the prime minister relies on the cabinet to wield 
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power, the prime minister’s control over the cabinet determines his influence over 
government (Shinoda, 2000, p. 201; Shinoda, 2011, p. 50-51). For a long time, intra-party 
competition and a weak support staff also limited the effectiveness of the prime minister. 
Though political and administrative reforms during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
increased the support staff of the prime minister and consolidated the number of cabinet 
ministers, thus making cabinet consensus easier, the problem of intra-party competition 
still remains.  
Prime ministerial power has also been diminished by the weakness of the 
cabinet. Despite the prime minister’s legal power to choose cabinet members, in reality 
the cabinet has often been used as a vehicle for party patronage and a method of 
maintaining balance among the different factions within the party. Constant reshuffles, 
with tenures lasting often less than a year, and limited political appointees have resulted 
in unusually independent bureaucracies. Though the DPJ has taken important steps 
toward increasing the power of politicians over the bureaucracy since coming to power in 
2009, it has not changed its practice of constant cabinet reshuffles or choosing a cabinet 
independent of party factional considerations. Thus, compared to other parliamentary 
democracies, Japanese bureaucracies remain relatively independent (Stockwin, 2008; 
McCargo, 2004; Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 2000).  
There have been, however, some noticeable exceptions to the general rule of 
weak prime ministerships. These prime ministers include Tanaka Kakuei, Sato Eisaku, 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, and Koizumi Junichiro (McCargo, 2004, p. 94). There has been 
some consensus that the ability of especially the latter two prime ministers has been due 
 49 
to several factors, including: their conscious pursuit of a stronger executive power; their 
canny use of media to produce a higher profile as prime minister; and their use of 
expertise outside of traditional party and bureaucratic resources, such as advisory 
commissions and special advisors (two tools that will be discussed in detail later)10 
(McCargo, 2004; Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009).  
Another important facet of prime ministerial power is the role of US gaiatsu 
(or external pressure) in the formation of prime ministerial leadership. As Angel (1989) 
writes, in the early postwar years prime ministers often used the cover of US pressure to 
implement unpopular but necessary reforms like trade liberalization. US pressure thus 
can be an effective alibi for political leaders. Even authors working within different 
theoretical traditions agree that prime ministers—especially in the area of defense 
policy—have become addicted to US gaiatsu (Sebata, 2010; McCormack, 2007; Shinoda, 
2007a). As we will see in all three case studies, however, partnerships with the US come 
in many varieties that overturn simple formulations of Japanese policymakers as the 
passive recipients of US demands.  
Though the prime minister faces major constraints in his execution of power, 
he also has many significant resources that are unavailable to other actors. One, often as 
the leader of the party, he has control over who has membership in the party (as we will 
                                                 
10 Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, for example, point out that strong prime ministers have often been 
supported by an extensive brain trust, usually consisting of scholars, think tank officials, and intelligent 
members of the business community (2009, p. 122). Prime Minister Nakasone was an exemplar in this 
respect. Another way to bolster one’s power as a prime minister—a method used especially by prime 
ministers Tanaka Kakuei and Takeshita Noboru—is to build extensive connections within the 
bureaucracies. By establishing their own connections within bureaucracies, both Tanaka and Takeshita 
were able to have privileged access to unvarnished information (Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009; 
Shinoda, 2000).  
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see in Chapter 4, the Koizumi chapter, this resource can be a powerful one; in Chapter 5, 
we will see how Hatoyama was limited without some of this power). Two, he is the actor 
of last resort for the coordination of different sectional interests. Prime ministerial power 
thus becomes essential when extensive coordination is needed, as is often the case in 
issues such as trade and defense. Three, the prime minister is the senior diplomat and 
Commander and Chief of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF). As the lead diplomat for 
Japan, the prime minister has the ability to override the Foreign Ministry, to conduct 
“tezukuri gaiko” (hand-crafted diplomacy), as Nakasone did during his tenure—thus 
frustrating the bureaucracies. Four, the prime minister has an extensive platform for 
defining the basic ideology of the nation (as we will see with the example of the issue of 
Yasukuni Shrine visits and the Murayama apology for wartime atrocities). Five, the 
prime minister has the ability to appoint cabinet ministers (though this power is 
somewhat constrained by the need to maintain unity within the party). Six, the prime 
minister can use his public platform to seek popular support for policies. As we will see 
in the case studies, popular support is an essential resource for prime ministers who wish 
to challenge vested interests. For this reason, skill in using the media is an important 
resource for the prime minister (Shinoda, 2000, 2007a, 2011; Hayao, 1993; Kurosawa, 
Kurosawa, and Takero, 2009). 
Finally, the prime minister has the extensive resources of the “kantei.” By far, 
the most extensive research on the use of the kantei has been Shinoda’s (2007a) 
pioneering study of Prime Minister Koizumi’s use of the institution during his term. The 
author broadly defines the kantei as the entire body of the Cabinet Secretariat and the 
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Prime Minister’s official residence. As Shinoda writes, there were 655 staffers at the end 
of March 2006 (2007, p. 9-10). Much of the strength of the kantei has been a result of the 
administrative reforms of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro. Koizumi was the first 
prime minister to benefit from Hashimoto’s reforms (Shinoda, 2007, p. 11). As Shinoda 
(2007, p. 12) argues, the kantei has become an essential part of the foreign policymaking 
process because it provides support and coordination that MoFA cannot provide.  
As both the sections on Japanese politics and the institution of the prime 
minister demonstrate, power is diffuse within the Japanese political system and rigid 
sectionalism and clientelism has tended to be the order of the day. This has made it 
difficult for prime ministers (the so-called “top” of the pyramid) to impose their agendas 
on the various parts of the government. However, as will be discussed in the next section, 
the prime minister has a number of courses of action he can take in realizing his preferred 
policies.  
 
Competitive Approaches in Japanese Defense Policy and Politics 
 
 
As my review of Japanese politics has made clear, much of the prime 
minister’s power is curtailed by strong political and bureaucratic sectionalism. In Japan, 
issue-specific subgovernments have tended to dominate issues from education, to energy, 
to healthcare. These subgovernments have often been hostile to intervention by prime 
ministers or other policy entrepreneurs seeking to enact change. As discussed in the 
previous sections, even when strong external shocks demonstrate the need for change, 
policy activists may still find it difficult to encroach on the policy territory of the 
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subgovernments. Thus, in order to enact major changes that threaten vested interests, they 
must find alternative political resources. However, pursuing innovative policies does not 
necessarily mean challenging subgovernments. One particularly appealing strategy is to 
add political support to measures that have already been “softened up” by bureaucratic 
actors. Picking winners from ongoing initiatives can be an effective way of using 
proximate successes to support an image of policy competency. In addition, when 
solutions to ongoing problems are nowhere to be found, or when interventions into the 
business of subgovernments means assuming unacceptable risks, prime ministers have 
the option of leaving issues to linger in committees at the bureaucratic level.  
The prime minister of Japan has a unique position in relation to the defense 
subgovernment. As Commander and Chief of the Japan Self Defense Force and lead 
diplomat for the state, the prime minister is seemingly the ultimate insider in the defense 
subgovernment. And yet, the prime minister is also an outsider in many important 
respects. Though prime ministers are typically groomed through several key positions 
before becoming prime minister—chief among them the positions of Minister of Finance, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Minister of Foreign Affairs—only one prime minister, 
Nakasone Yasuhiro, has been head of the Japan Defense Agency (now Ministry of 
Defense). For this reason, the prime minister is often heavily reliant on bureaucrats for 
policy advice. In addition, the dual structure of the US-Japan Security Treaty (which 
pledges the US to come to Japan’s defense) and Article 9 of the Constitution (which 
renounces war as a legitimate form of policy) places the Japanese prime minister in an 
ambivalent position relative to his own defense establishment and the US.  
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This section details a number of approaches available to the prime minister. 
These approaches range from empowering outside actors to pursuing consensus within 
the party to high-risk strategies that sacrifice political office for concrete policy 
accomplishments. These approaches have been drawn not only from past examples of 
interventions in defense policy and politics, but from wider examples of Japanese politics.   
 
Approach: Empowering outside policy entrepreneurs: using advisory commissions, 
appointing “maverick” cabinet ministers, emboldening entrepreneurs outside of 
government.   
 
 
As discussed earlier, two of the most common centers of policymaking are 
bureaucracies and the party policy committees responsible for their respective policy 
area. Typically, these actors are conservative in their policy orientation. For a prime 
minister looking to intervene in the processes of subgovernments in a more proactive way 
(including the defense subgovernment), one of the options available is to empower 
external policy entrepreneurs. The most common way to do this is either to form an 
advisory council or to appoint “maverick” politicians as cabinet ministers. 
 
a. Empowering outside policy entrepreneurs: advisory councils (shingikai) 
 
 
The first two prime ministers to make extensive use of advisory councils 
(shingikai) were Ohira Masayoshi and Nakasone Yasuhiro. Ohira Masayoshi (1978-
1980) established several different advisory groups on a range of subjects from security 
issues to economics and lifestyle. However, it was Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) 
who can be said to have institutionalized the use of advisory councils as a resource of the 
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prime minister (see Gaunder, 2007; Samuels, 2003; Shinoda, 2000, p. 108). The most 
significant advisory councils during Nakasone’s tenure was the advisory council for 
railroad and telecommunication privatization and the Study Group for Peace Issues. 
These advisory councils allowed Nakasone to recruit intellectuals and business people 
respected by the public who could give assessments free of the factional politics of the 
LDP. As Angel writes, “He [Nakasone] appointed individuals of high reputation and 
visibility known to be sympathetic to his policy objectives in order to publicize and 
legitimize predetermined policy objectives and overcome resistance to change from 
career bureaucrats” (1989, p. 593; see also, Gaunder, 2007, p. 127; Samuels, 2003, p. 12-
13). In many ways, Koizumi would follow in Nakasone’s footsteps in his use of advisory 
councils. As has been documented extensively in studies of Koizumi’s economic reforms, 
the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy proved to be a highly effective vehicle for 
implementing his economic reform agenda (see especially, Gaunder, 2007). 
Not all uses of advisory councils are created equal. The prime minister needs to 
compose the council in such a way that the council comes to the “right” conclusions. In 
addition, because public opinion waxes and wanes, it is important for the prime minister 
to gain public support long enough to overcome the resistance of subgovernments. One of 
the drawbacks to this approach is that subgovernments can sometimes simply obstruct 
and outwait the advisory council and the prime minister, whose tenure is typically short-
lived.  
It should be noted that advisory councils have, thus far, had some impact on 
the field of defense politics and policy. The most significant examples have been 
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Nakasone Yasuhiro’s Study Group for Peace Issues and Hosokawa Morihiro’s (1993-
1994) Higuchi Commission (which will be discussed in Chapter 3). In 1983, Nakasone 
created the Study Group for Peace Issues as his personal advisory body on defense issues. 
Nakasone hoped to use the advisory body to gradually shift public opinion away from its 
military allergy and to eventually allow for the removal of the one percent GDP limit on 
defense spending (Sebata, 2010, p, 177; Angel, 1989, p. 595). The group’s composition 
was selected in such a way as to come up with a recommendation for the removal of the 
one percent of GDP framework on defense spending. When the group presented its final 
report, it concluded simply that the one percent framework should be reconsidered 
(Sebata, 2010, p. 178). With the backing of the LDP defense-related committees and the 
JDA, Nakasone was able to resist pressure from the powerful Ministry of Finance and 
eclipse the one percent limit for one fiscal year (the only time this has been done since 
the establishment of the limit by cabinet order). However, since then, the one percent 
limit has remained a fixture of Japan’s defense establishment—demonstrating the limit of 
even skillful entrepreneurial approaches11.  
 
 
 
     
                                                 
11 Though the use of advisory councils is an important tool for entrepreneurial prime ministers, it should be 
noted that advisory councils have not made up a central aspect of all of the case studies. The importance of 
advisory councils has ranged drastically from one case to another. For example, during the Koizumi 
administration the Araki Commission was significant in moving Japan to increase its military capabilities, 
but paled in comparison to policy moves in the area of alliance contribution and defense symbolism (thus, 
there will be little discussion of the Araki Report in Chapter 4). In the case of Hatoyama, his advisory 
council, the Council on Defense Capabilities, did little to enhance his prime ministerial power. In addition, 
it should be noted that the final report of this commission—which emphasized Japan’s role as a “peace-
making nation” was dwarfed by the atmosphere of “realism” that prevailed following what many saw as his 
negligent handling of alliance diplomacy, as well as in the aftermath of the collision of a Chinese trawler 
with a Japanese Coast Guard ship in 2010.   
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b. Empowering Policy Entrepreneurs: appointing “Maverick” cabinet ministers  
 
 
Another method of empowering policy entrepreneurs is to appoint them to the 
cabinet (often, in positions where they can influence the policy field they care about 
most). Because cabinet positions are often assigned after consultation with party elders, 
this approach can be extremely difficult to implement in practice. Thus, this tactic has 
been associated with top-down or “maverick” prime ministers since appointing policy 
entrepreneurs and reformists to the cabinet often undermines the power of factional 
balancing and consensus-making within the party. Nakasone, for example, chose a big 
name as the Minister of Education in order to promote education reform during his 
administration. Likewise, Koizumi would use an appointee outside of politics, Keio 
University Professor Takenaka Heizo, to head his economic reforms and postal reform 
agenda. As a specialist on free market economics and economic reform, and an outsider 
to LDP political infighting, Takenaka was ideally suited to lead Koizumi’s reforms. Not 
surprisingly, Takenaka was the only member to serve on all of Koizumi’s cabinets (see 
Gaunder, 2007; Maclachlan, 2010, 2011). 
In addition to making negotiations with one’s own party more difficult, there are 
other risks associated with promoting policy entrepreneurs. The risk of promoting policy 
entrepreneurs in either advisory councils or the cabinet is that their agenda might exceed 
the prime minister’s control. As we will see in Chapter 4, Koizumi also appointed another 
maverick personality—Tanaka Makiko—as foreign minister. Though this appointment 
helped Koizumi’s popularity in the short term, in the long run his foreign minister’s 
erratic behavior became a liability. Koizumi’s decision to dismiss the popular Tanaka 
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became the most significant threat to his administration. There is also the risk that a 
maverick cabinet minister’s stardom might outshine one’s own. Prime Minister 
Hashimoto (1996-1998), for example, would name Koizumi Junichiro as the Minister for 
Health and Welfare, knowing his strong reformist preferences. As Hashimoto began to 
negotiate with industry and party officials over the details of postal reform during his 
administration, it was Koizumi’s threat to resign from the cabinet that eventually pushed 
Hashimoto to take a stauncher stance on postal reform than he was otherwise inclined. 
Ironically, Koizumi’s actions during Hashimoto’s administration would eventually give 
him the very reformist credentials he needed to beat out Hashimoto in the race for the 
party presidency two years later (see Maclachlan, 2010, 2011). Thus, as the case of both 
the Koizumi and Tanaka appointments make clear, appointing policy entrepreneurs can 
be a useful but risky tactic.  
 
Approach: Pressure One’s Own Party and the Subgovernments with Outside Support: 
Use Coalition Partners, Opposition Parties, and Public Opinion to Overcome Inertia  
 
In his seminal study, Shinoda (2007a) demonstrates how Koizumi was able to 
use public opinion, his negotiations with coalition partners, and even his courtship of the 
opposition party to put pressure on his own party and the bureaucracy to support his 
preferred policy initiatives (see Chapter 1). Even though issue-specific bureaucrats and 
the ruling party have the most direct power over policymaking, Shinoda hypothesized 
that passive support from the outer rings was necessary to support the work of the inner 
ring actors. Thus, Shinoda demonstrates how Koizumi used the support and threat of 
support from outer ring actors such as the coalition party, the opposition party, and the 
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public to overcome the inertia of the bureaucracy and his own party in passing 
groundbreaking legislation (see Chapter 4).  
One of the resources that has made this approach possible is the expanded 
resources of the kantei since 2001. Whereas before the prime minister relied heavily on 
the resources of the bureaucracy for policymaking, the expanded resources of the kantei 
have allowed prime ministers to develop policy internally and then seek out actors to 
support that policy. Because the prime minister can use the best talent from the 
bureaucracy and civil society in his policy groups as well, he now has an excellent 
vehicle to coopt talented members of the bureaucracy. Koizumi used the capability to 
great effect to seek out support from coalition parties first. With the acceptance of 
coalition parties, he was then able to present legislation to his own party as a fait 
accompli. As we will see in the Koizumi case study (Chapter 4), he used courting 
strategies with the opposition parties (most notably members of the DPJ) to keep pressure 
on coalition parties and dissenters within his own party to help promote his reform 
efforts.  
As discussed earlier, since the early 1990s elections the number of non-aligned 
voters (mutoha) has consistently passed the 50-percent mark. This has expanded the 
opportunities to grab voters through policy substance rather than through pork-barrel 
spending or party allegiance. Personal popularity is a crucial asset for any effective prime 
minister, and a leader without a strong power base within the party must acquire popular 
support if he hopes to survive (Shinoda, 2000; Kurosawa, Kurosawa, and Shizuki, 2009). 
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Both Miki Takeo12 and Nakasone Yasuhiro were famous for using the mass media to help 
their position in relation members of their party (Shinoda, 2000, p. 103-104). A high level 
of popularity allowed Nakasone to stay in power for five years and pursue administrative 
reforms that cut wasteful spending, despite a weak support base within his party. On the 
other hand, two party insiders, Tanaka Kakuei and Takeshita Noboru, leaders of the 
largest faction, were forced out of office by low popularity ratings (Shinoda, 2000, p. 99).  
  
Approach: Adding Your Support to Ongoing Initiatives in the Subgovernment 
 
 
Another strategy is to add support to an initiative that has been “softened up” 
in the subgovernment. Usually if there is already an initiative on the table in one or more 
bureaucracies, then all that is needed is a little push to keep the momentum going or to 
expand the potential of the policy initiative. By adding one’s support to an initiative that 
has already been vetted by the members of the subgovernment, one also assures an easier 
implementation process (as we will see in Chapter 3, the Hashimoto case study). Though 
this approach can be relatively safer than the use of outside entrepreneurs, the approach 
nevertheless contains risks. When choosing one policy approach over another, the prime 
minister must often back one ministry or section of the ministry over another. Elevating 
an issue’s standing from the bureaucratic or subgovernment level may also raise 
                                                 
12 Popularity was essential in the case of Miki Takeo. Following the Lockheed scandal in which party 
stalwart Tanaka Kakuei was accused of accepting bribes, Miki came to power because of his strong public 
support and his reputation for being a clean politician. Despite coming from the smallest LDP faction, he 
was able to swim against the LDP tide and pursued the indictment of Tanaka. Many LDP members saw the 
move as self-serving and begin a “down with Miki” campaign. However, he was able to withstand the 
assault for some time because of his adept use of public media (Shinoda, 2000, p. 100-101).   
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expectations of proximate results among the public. Thus, it is often important to choose 
an initiative where success (and if possible overwhelming success) is assured.  
As we will see in our case studies, prime ministers often have an incentive to 
use this approach rather than others, even when these initiatives are not among their 
policy priorities or even conflict with their policy preferences. Getting a major initiative 
done (any initiative) promotes the public image that the prime minister is competent and 
has control of the government. This perception can start “a virtuous cycle” where 
perception of competence leads to greater public approval, and this greater public 
approval allows him to override opposition and accomplish even more (as we will see in 
Chapter 4, the Koizumi case study).  
Backing powerful stakeholders in the subgovernment has some important 
advantages. As Japanese political scholars have noted, actors in the subgovernment are 
permanent players in their issue area, often with greater stakes in the outcome of policies 
than outsiders (Shinoda, 2000; Hayao, 1993; Mulgan, 2002). Since these actors are 
permanent professionals in their field, they often have instincts and knowledge that are 
beyond the abilities of outside players. Indeed, prior studies have demonstrated that 
bureaucracies, with the help of semi-governmental think tanks, have had success at 
incrementally shifting defense arrangements in ways that strengthen the US-Japan 
alliance (Sebata, 2010; Funabashi, 1999). In addition to managing alliance issues with the 
US, bureaucratic officials have also been able to manage projects that establish dialogues 
on the history issue with both China and South Korea (Watanabe Akio, 2012, personal 
interview). At the bureaucratic level, these are relatively low-risk projects. However, 
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when there is a potential for these projects to make a major breakthrough, a savvy prime 
minister can often pick up the initiative and add their support.  
Finally, policy initiatives that have had the support of important stakeholders 
tend to be more enduring than those that do not. As can be seen in the history of 
Koizumi’s postal reforms, despite the dramatic nature of his political successes and the 
high public approval for these reforms, important stakeholders have been able to slowly 
roll back some aspects of his reforms (Maclachlan, 2011). These rollbacks have been 
facilitated by Koizumi’s own retreat from politics following his term and his decision not 
to take on a party-elder role (similar to that of Nakasone Yasuhiro) following his 
resignation as prime minister.  
 
Approach: Take Advantage of Unique Opportunities, Shocks, or Shifts in the Operating 
Environment 
 
 
One foundational concept of the leadership literature is that leaders can often 
substantially boost their power by exploiting the potential of short-term crises, shocks, or 
shifts in the operating environment (Machiavelli, 2004; Byman and Pollack, 2001; Grove, 
2007; Preston, 2010; Sun Tzu, 2008; Rumelt, 2011). This can be a great resource for 
prime ministers with a sense of timing and an instinct for changes in public appetite. The 
downside is that it takes great skill and patience to make the most of these opportunities.  
The long-time LDP factional leader Ozawa Ichiro, for example, seemed to 
understand, more than any of his peers in the LDP, the public appetite for reform 
following multiple scandals involving his own party in the early 1990s (Samuels, 2003; 
Gaunder, 2007). After the failure of political reform legislation under an LDP 
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government, he left the party and used his extensive ties with young LDP members and 
opposition parties to create a short-lived coalition that was able to significantly change 
the electoral system from multi-member districts to single-member districts. As will be 
seen in Chapter 4, Koizumi also had an uncanny understanding of his operational 
environment. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, he was able to use his 
budding relationship with President Bush, his own maverick reputation, and the 
administrative resources of his office to accomplish high profile policy successes in the 
realm of alliance contribution.  
As Rumelt (2011) has written, while these opportunities often seem obvious in 
retrospect, there is usually little that is obvious about them when they occur. Using these 
events requires patience, honed political instincts, and an appetite for risk.  
 
Approach: Embracing the US Partnership: Using Personal Relationships with the US 
President to Boost International Standing 
 
 
Another important tactic is the use of personal relations with the US--and 
especially a personal relationship with the US president--to improve one’s international 
and domestic standing. Most prime ministers choose the US as the destination for their 
first overseas visit, and the party and general public are usually very sensitive to how this 
first meeting plays out (Shinoda, 2000, p. 113; Hayao, 1993). Nakasone was able to use 
his personal relationship with Ronald Regan to improve his image domestically and to 
promote himself as active in international politics. The media quickly termed this the 
“Ron-Yasu” relationship. A close personal relationship with the US president can 
increase media exposure and help broaden the international platform for the Japanese 
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prime minister. As we will see in the Koizumi case study there is also some evidence to 
suggest that a certain kind of close relationship with the US—over-delivering on alliance 
commitments early—enhances in some crucial ways the number of available foreign 
policy options.  
This tactic, however, comes with a drawback. A close, personal relationship 
with the president often limits flexibility on defense issues, especially the ability to 
counter US demands. It may also cause some political backlash for politicians with 
support from organizations that adhere to pacifist principles. Socialist Prime Minister 
Murayama Tomiichi, for example, went out of his way to assuage US anxieties about 
whether he was going to recognize the US-Japan Security Treaty when he became prime 
minister in 1994. Though his official acceptance of the US-Japan Security Treaty (as well 
as the constitutionality of the JSDF) cleared the way for his tenure as prime minister in a 
coalition government with the LDP and the Sakigake political party, in the long term his 
decision split the Japan Socialist Party. Murayama’s decision effectively eliminated 
unarmed neutrality as a legitimate alternative to the US-Japan Security Treaty (if it had 
ever been one), and facilitated a significant and semi-permanent shift to the political right 
on all issues related to defense.  
 
Approach: Seeking Consensus, or the Unfortunate Position of Party-beholden Prime 
Ministers 
 
As the case studies will demonstrate, the public appetite for consensus-type 
prime ministers has severely diminished and will continue to diminish in the near future. 
Although the conventional wisdom suggests that consensus-seeking is the least risky 
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form of leadership in the Japanese case, in reality this “low risk” approach typically leads 
to an early departure from the prime minister’s spot, usually after one or more 
embarrassing policy failures. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, prime ministers who see 
themselves as “orchestrators” (as Hatoyama sometimes referred to himself) soon find 
themselves overwhelmed by the disparate interests of intra-party factions, predatory 
opposition parties, and a sensationalist media. Still, because the party chooses the prime 
minister, there has been no shortage of consensus-style prime ministers. In short, except 
in unusual situations, the party has an interest in avoiding top-down leaders, like 
Koizumi, who threaten the stable workings of party patronage. Usually, only when a 
party’s popularity is at a nadir will it resort to finding charismatic figures. 
These types of prime ministers are frequently described as “reactive.” Rather 
than pursue clear cut preferences, they discover their preferences through extensive 
consultation and dialogue with other partners and respond to crises as they arrive (Hayao, 
1993). As will be seen in Chapter 5 (the Hatoyama case study), these types of prime 
ministers cannot run their government effectively without a strong political “fixer” 
behind them. These backroom “fixers” or “managers,” such as Ozawa Ichiro or Tanaka 
Kakuei, have long been admired for their political skill and realpolitik. Just as cabinet 
positions are rotated regularly to allow for fresh appointments, the position of the prime 
minister is seen as temporary and expendable to the party. In many cases, these leaders 
are asked in short order to sacrifice themselves for the failings of their party or a 
particularly unpopular policy and a new consensus-oriented figure is chosen to replace 
him.  
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Approach: Symbolic Politics and Personal Diplomacy 
 
As discussed earlier, the prime minister, as chief diplomat and representative of 
the Japanese state, has a very large platform to promote the essential ideology of Japan 
and to seek public support for his policies. When this power is used well, it can give the 
prime minister a strong advantage over vested interests in the various subgovernments. 
When used poorly, these actions can trigger dissent within the cabinet and the party, and 
spur negative coverage in the press.  In the realm of defense, the prime minister must 
often find effective ways of approaching the most delicate subjects in defense politics: 
the lingering base issue in Okinawa; the need to balance Japan’s desire for security from 
military threats with its preference for soft power contributions; how to frame the US-
Japan alliance; and how to approach the legacy of Japan’s actions during the Pacific War.  
While each of these issues is of great importance, one symbolic gesture bears 
in depth discussion--the prime minister’s decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni 
Shrine was originally established in 1869 by the Meiji government and was maintained 
by the Army and the Navy until the end of the Second World War. The American 
Occupation authorities were responsible for severing ties between the Shinto religion and 
the state. Despite its status as a private entity, the shrine has been an important symbol of 
Japan’s past, both domestically and regionally. One of the main controversies of the 
shrine is the “enshrinement” of fourteen World War II Class-A war criminals in 1978. 
Nationalists in Japan view Yasukuni Shrine as a memorial to the war dead, but also see it 
as a symbol of Japan’s rise as a modern state from the mid-19th to mid-20th century 
(Shibuichi, 2005; Emmott, 2008). Thus symbolic acts of state, such as prime ministerial 
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visits to Yasukuni Shrine, impact relations not only with regional actors but also with 
important domestic actors. In 1985, Nakasone Yasuhiro became the first prime minister 
to visit Yasukuni Shrine as an act of state. His visit triggered intense protests in the East 
Asia region, and he refrained from visiting the shrine further during his prime 
ministership.  
Since this time, for the prime minister the choice of whether to visit Yasukuni 
Shrine or not to has been an important one. These visits reflect not only a personal sense 
of obligation, but also, the strength of conservative organizations like the Bereaved 
Families Association which are able to mobilize large numbers of voters and typically 
pressure politicians to visit the shrine. Leftist groups for their part see the prime 
minister’s visits as a symbol of an outmoded militarism and feudalism that contradicts 
Japan’s postwar legacy as a state devoted to human rights, democracy, and peace. These 
leftist groups, such as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), Social Democratic Party 
(SDP), labor unions, and various NGOs, such as the National Organization of Pacifist 
Bereaved Families, as well as sympathetic intellectuals and newspapers, oppose the 
prime ministerial visits (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 200-205).  
As we will see in the case studies, another important decision for prime 
ministers has been whether (and in what way) to formally apologize for Japan’s actions 
during the Pacific War. In the early to mid-1990s, two non-LDP prime ministers would 
issue public statements of apology—Hosokawa Morihiro and Murayama Tomiichi. The 
latter prime minister, Murayama, would even help pass a Diet resolution officially 
apologizing for wartime atrocities and set up a hybrid public-private fund to compensate 
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former comfort women (ainfu) in the region. Though these apologies created some good 
will in South Korea, China, and other regional countries, these countries also found the 
apologies insincere given the conservative backlash that followed them (Lind, 2011, p. 
312-313; Wan, 2011)13. 
Though these symbolic actions would seem at first sight to fall outside the 
realm of defense policy, as important aspects of defense politics they can have an 
important impact on the regional security dilemma, regional perceptions of Japan as a 
threat, and the ability of the prime minister to use personal diplomacy to alleviate 
tensions with its neighbors.  
 
Approach: The Kamikaze Tactic—Focusing All One’s Political Energy on One Issue 
 
 
Finally, there is the approach Shinoda (2000) describes as the kamikaze attack. In 
this instance, a prime minister who feels that his power is waning may opt for an all-or-
nothing strategy focused on one crucial policy. Hosokawa Morihiro (1993-1994), for 
example, was able to initiate a very important electoral reform before resigning as prime 
minister. Though the multi-party coalition that was constructed under Ozawa during 
Hosokawa’s term agreed on very little, they were at least able to pass this very important 
legislation before breaking up. Similarly, Prime Minister Miki Takeo (1974-1976) felt so 
adamant about continuing with the investigation of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei 
that he risked his own political livelihood to see the investigation through to the end. 
                                                 
13 Indeed, in the Diet session to pass the resolution endorsing the apology, large numbers of politicians 
from conservative parties abstained from voting. In addition, Communist Party officials voted against the 
resolution because the apology was seen as not going far enough (Tanaka, 2009, 148-149).  
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Often a prime minister will offer his resignation as the price for the passage of a crucial 
piece of legislation. For example, during his tenure Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956) tried to 
normalize ties with the Soviet Union. Strong opposition from the business community 
accelerated an anti-Hatoyama campaign. As a result, Hatoyama offered to resign in return 
for the restoration of Soviet-Japan relations (Edstrom, 1999).  
The kamikaze attack approach is important because it is the one tactic that 
holds out the most potential for radical change in policy. Indeed, the most important pillar 
of current defense policy and politics, the US-Japan Security Treaty, is a product of this 
very tactic. In 1960, the debate over the ratification of the Security Treaty was fierce, and 
opposition parties used every tactic available to them to try to block the ratification. Thus, 
Prime Minister Kishi took the extraordinary step of using the police to block opposition 
members from entering the Diet. Without Kishi’s use of these heavy-handed tactics and 
without his own willingness to take the political fall for his approach, it is very unlikely 
that both the Security Treaty and Japan’s nascent democracy would have survived 
together (for more in-depth discussion, see Izumikawa, 2010; Reed and Shizuma, 2009, p. 
6; Samuels, 2003; Edstrom, 1999; McCormack, 2007). With the most entrenched aspects 
of any policy, absent a major focal event or shock, sometimes only a kamikaze attack can 
change the policy.   
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Table 2: Competitive Approaches in Japanese Politics 
Competitive 
Approach 
Qualities needed from 
Prime Minister 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Empowering:  
Advisory Councils 
Popular support; ability to 
sell the proposals to the 
public 
Can help the prime 
minister obtain 
support for 
controversial new 
policies 
Limited effectiveness without 
a popular prime minister and 
the willingness to accept risk 
to implement policies  
Empowering:  
Maverick Cabinet 
Member 
An appetite  for risk; a 
willingness to go against 
party patronage system 
Can be a powerful 
agent for change; not 
constrained by party 
patronage or 
bureaucratic loyalties 
Can be difficult to control; 
political stardom might 
outshine one’s own. 
Seek External 
Support: Coalition 
partner, Opposition, 
Public support 
Personal charisma; personal 
connections; a willingness 
to approach opposition 
Can pressure one’s 
own party to get on 
the bandwagon 
Can create mistrust within 
one’s party 
Endorsing Initiatives 
in the 
Subgovernment 
An ability to pick 
winners among ongoing 
projects 
Has the approval or 
permanent 
professionals in the 
issue area;  
Have been vetted by 
professionals 
Initiatives are often 
conservative and reflect the 
interests and objectives of 
bureaucrats or industry groups 
Take Advantage of 
Shocks or Shifts in 
the Operating 
Environment 
Patience, an ability to 
recognize opportunity 
Offers an opportunity 
for dramatic change 
Opportunity is perishable; 
opportunity may not 
correspond with one’s policy 
aims 
Embrace the US 
Partnership 
Personal charisma; the 
ability to connect with the 
US president 
An expanded 
platform for activism 
in diplomacy; 
expanded leverage in 
external relations 
with regional 
partners 
A limited ability to refuse 
requests for support; at times, 
negative association with US 
policy and militarism  
Seeking Consensus The presence of a strong 
“fixer” behind the prime 
minister; weak policy 
preferences 
Maintains one’s 
standing within 
party; retains 
reputations as good 
“party man” 
Lowest common denominator 
policies prevail; weak ability 
to influence policy; Semi-
feudal subgovernments retain 
power over policy drift 
Personal Diplomacy/ 
Symbolic Actions 
The ability connect with 
other leaders 
A large public 
platform to rally 
popular opinion 
Gaffes and missteps can fuel 
centrifugal processes of 
government 
The Kamikaze Attack A focus on one policy 
goal; an appetite for risk; 
allies to implement policy 
(even if short term) 
The ability to create 
a radical change in 
policy 
The prime minister is often 
asked in short order to 
“sacrifice” himself for the 
sake of his policy; may spell 
the end of political career 
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Conclusion: Toward a Theory of Strategy and Entrepreneurship in Defense Policy 
and Politics 
 
This chapter has sought to develop a thick description of Japanese politics that 
demonstrates the possibility of strategy and entrepreneurial action in the area of defense. 
It has done so by describing the features of Japanese politics, the position of the prime 
minister, and various approaches available to the prime minister. The prime minister has 
both formal and informal resources to influence defense policy but is often handicapped 
by the centrifugal aspects of the Japanese governmental process. This lends the defense 
subgovernment a great deal of power that usually results in incremental change and at 
times even immobolism. In order for the prime minister to have any meaningful impact, 
he must use the resources available to him to form a coherent political strategy based on a 
diagnosis of the situation. This includes understanding which approach works best at 
what time and being sensitive to opportunities in his operational environment.   
Rather than suggest that success can be reduced to one or a series of these 
approaches, this dissertation research evaluates the use of these various approaches 
within Rumelt’s (2011) concept of “good strategy.” At its most basic level, good strategy 
entails matching appropriate means to desired ends. One would not expect a consensus-
based approach to produce a dramatic policy reform or to overcome the resistance of 
entrenched sectional interests. But, a consensus-based approach could allow for 
incremental changes to policy over a long political career. Rich case study research, 
however, demonstrates that matching means to desired ends is not always a simple 
process and that within the details are both hidden advantages and pitfalls. At the tactical 
level, prime ministers may find that using personal chemistry with the US president to 
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improve bilateral relations is easier to accomplish in theory than in practice. A 
“kamikaze” attack of a problem, likewise, may hinge not simply on the dramatic choice 
of whether or not to pursue the policy, but rather, on whether the basic groundwork for 
the policy change has been set up prior to the dramatic action.  
In other words, the success and failure of strategies depend on a number of basic 
qualities that can only be evaluated in context: the ability to find successful tactics that 
reflect the capabilities of the leader (is the leader good at personal diplomacy; can the 
leader communicate well with the public; does the leader need to rely on his connections 
with members of his or her party); the ability to create coherences in their many 
initiatives; the ability to develop aspects of focus in their approach; the ability to 
formulate proximate goals that are obtainable; and the ability to use unique or 
underutilized resources.  
As discussed earlier, some prime ministers, even entrepreneurial ones, have 
found it necessary to focus their efforts in one or more areas of policy in order to make 
the strongest impact. Thus, finding successful ways of managing other areas—such as 
defense policy—without allowing these issue areas to dominate the agenda creates 
opportunities for interventions into other areas (see Chapter 4, Hashimoto Case Study). 
As Rumelt (2011) points out in his study of strategy, creating important coherences that 
allow focus on crucial areas of policy is one of the most basic elements of good strategy. 
Thus, delegation and frugal intervention into the areas such as defense policy can be an 
important aspect of good overall strategy. As will be seen in the case studies, finding 
“workable solutions” in the area of defense politics or leaving thorny issues to linger with 
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working-level bureaucrats was often an effective way of improving political capital for 
interventions into other policy areas, namely economic and administrative reform.  
As Rumelt (2011) has written, effective strategy is often simple, yet surprising 
at the time. A good strategy must make difficult choices in an environment of constraint, 
have insight on where interventions can make the most difference, have coherence, and 
find the right components for the crucial areas of focus. As Hayao (1993) has written in 
his own study of the prime minister, focus is especially important to the prime minister 
because his sources of power are limited and because the natural tendency in the Japanese 
system is toward dispersion rather than concentration of power (p. 200). Because of these 
restraints, it was important for the prime minister to be able to apply “his limited energy 
to an issue that has resonance, that is, one that elicits “sympathetic vibrations” from other 
actors in the system. The prime minister adds his energy to that which is already being 
applied by other actors, which in turn elicits more energy from still others” (Hayao, 1993, 
p. 194-195). As we will see from the case studies, the degree to which different prime 
ministers have been able to create these resonances has had a major effect on the course 
of Japanese defense policy and politics.   
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CHAPTER 3  
Policy Stewardship and the Triumph of Mundane Strategy:  
The Prime Ministership of Hashimoto Ryutaro 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The prime ministership of Hashimoto Ryutaro (January 11, 1996 to July 30, 
1998, a tenure of 932 days) is an important, but nevertheless, neglected area of study in 
Japanese defense policy and politics. There are several explanations for the absence of 
studies on Hashimoto. First, Hashimoto is often associated with Japan’s “lost decade” of 
the 1990s, a time when Japanese politics was beset by many crises both international and 
domestic and a series of weak governments; second, many of the defense policies of this 
time period, especially in alliance transformation, were driven by bureaucratic initiatives 
that transcended any one prime minister; and third, scholars have instead focused their 
attention on the much more revolutionary leadership of Koizumi Junichiro. Studies that 
have turned their attention to Hashimoto have done so largely interrogate his role in 
administrative and financial reforms (see Shinoda, 2000, 2011; Maclachlan, 2010). 
However, despite being in power for just over two years, Hashimoto oversaw significant 
accomplishments in the area of defense. These accomplishments came about at a time 
when US-Japan alliance managers had serious concerns over the durability and relevance 
of the US-Japan alliance, especially in confronting challenges on the Korean peninsula 
and in facing Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.  
In the areas of defense he was able to: bring about the US-Japan Joint 
Declaration on Security (Joint Declaration); foster the 1997 US-Japan Guidelines for 
Defense Cooperation (Joint Guidelines); negotiate the return in principle of the Futenma 
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airbase in Okinawa; and foster greater ties between civilian and military officials (eroding 
some of the inhibitions against cooperation with military authorities). In addition, 
Hashimoto would also demonstrate a great deal of diplomatic skill in improving relations 
with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Russia. Though his 
efforts to revitalize the security relationship with the US caused significant frictions in 
relations with Okinawa Prefecture and China, Hashimoto was nonetheless able to pivot 
on his success with the US-Japan strategic relationship to manage frictions with these two 
actors. Perhaps more importantly, early success with security-related initiatives helped 
maintain his political power and push forward with financial and administrative reforms.  
Hashimoto was a rarity in that he was both trusted by his party to continue 
traditional practices of patronage and at the same time was skilled at “going public.” Two 
of his greatest attributes were his popularity and charm, qualities that extended to his 
relationship with foreign leaders. Hashimoto was able to build strong relations with 
foreign leaders, including his good working relationship with President Bill Clinton and 
the special relationship he developed with Boris Yeltsin. His skill as a spokesman for 
Japan, coupled with early successes in the realm of defense and alliance diplomacy, 
helped to bolster his public popularity, bring the return to power of the LDP, and led to 
the return of an all-LDP cabinet. These were significant successes, and Hashimoto 
followed up these successes with the pursuit of a comprehensive reform agenda, led by a 
high profile advisory commission.  
As this chapter will demonstrate, if Hashimoto’s approaches to defense policy 
and politics can be characterized as conservative and risk-adverse, they should 
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nevertheless not be mistaken with a lack of vision or strategy. Hashimoto was able to 
make use of “shovel-ready” initiatives such as the Joint Declaration (accompanied with a 
summit meeting between the US and Japan) and SACO to revitalize the US-Japan 
strategic relationship. While these initiatives were essentially the product of dynamic 
interactions between alliance managers acting as policy entrepreneurs on both sides of the 
alliance, Hashimoto was nevertheless an active participant in these negotiations and 
initiatives, pushing them further where he could. In doing so, Hashimoto used a rare skill 
that would be unavailable to other prime ministers in this study. With his extensive 
experience in several ministries over his extensive political career, Hashimoto had 
developed a knack of being able to master the details of issues and being able to argue 
with bureaucrats at their own level14 (Takushiji, 2012, personal interview; Okumura, 
1998a, p. 36; see also, Funabashi, 1999). Through the leadership of his own office, he 
was also able to bypass regular bureaucratic channels and arrange for the agreement on 
the return of Futenma airbase in a way that supported his prime ministerial power and 
ultimately his reform agenda. His administration supported these initiatives, while finding 
ways to manage frictions with Okinawa and China caused by a closer strategic 
relationship with the US.  
Despite the mundaneness of Hashimoto’s tactics, the individual components of 
his approach nevertheless add up to a coherent and effective approach given his 
circumstances and the policy challenges he faced. Each of his actions worked within a 
                                                 
14Biographers of Hashimoto have also noted his distrust of MoFA, stemming from experiences during his 
time as Minister of Transportation where MoFA officials had coordinated poorly with his office (Okumura, 
1998a, p. 33). Hashimoto’s distrust of MoFA was a contributing factor in his proactive approach to foreign 
policy.    
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framework that emphasized bilateral cooperation in revitalizing the US-Japan strategic 
alliance. Rather than re-create new resources to improve defense policy, he instead chose 
to endorse ongoing processes and to use his own office to help smooth the inevitable 
frictions that would occur through his support of a stronger role in US defense strategy. 
Moreover, his use of economic incentives and personal diplomacy to improve relations 
with China and Okinawa, though far-reaching, never threatened the bilateral work that 
was being accomplished through joint working level initiatives like SACO (and its follow 
up components) or the joint meetings to revise the Joint Guidelines. His success in the 
realm of defense (and foreign relations more broadly) allowed him to bring the LDP back 
to power, solidify his own political power, and allowed him to pursue a more expansive 
political agenda.   
However, during Hashimoto’s second term, despite the support of an all-LDP 
cabinet, his own power began to falter and with it his ability to pursue the comprehensive 
reform agenda he prized so dearly. Though his declining political fortunes were not 
directly related to his decisions on defense policy, it is nevertheless an important aspect 
of this study because of the problems it foreshadows for a future prime minister 
(Hatoyama Yukio in Chapter 5). As Hashimoto deferred to party elders such as Nakasone 
Yasuhiro on a key cabinet appointment and to the policy preferences of the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) on the need to raise the consumption tax, the popular base behind his 
reform agenda began to wane. In the latter stages of Hashimoto’s reform initiative we see 
a decreasing willingness to take on risks for his political objectives. Thus, Hashimoto had 
to settle for a more limited form of reform than he had previously hoped for. If 
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Hashimoto had accomplished much, what many believed would be a watershed 
administration ended somewhat anti-climatically.  
This chapter will evaluate the Hashimoto prime ministership in terms of its 
political strategy and policy entrepreneurship. The chapter begins with a background 
sketch of Hashimoto’s political background, highlighting his experience and his opinions 
on defense issues. It then moves on to a description of his operating context and the 
challenges Hashimoto faced. The chapter then parses Hashimoto’s approach to defense 
and what made it unique as a form of strategy—the entrepreneurial insights and actions 
of the prime minister—before concluding the chapter with an assessment of Hashimoto’s 
approach and his relevance to the Japan’s defense trajectory in the post cold war world.  
  
Hashimoto’s Political Background and Security Orientation 
 
 
Like many politicians in Japan, Hashimoto Ryutaro came from a distinguished 
political lineage. His father, Hashimoto Ryogo, had served as Minister of Health and 
Welfare and Minister of Education. Hashimoto would graduate from Keio University in 
1960. He would take up his father’s seat in the Diet three years later. Because of early 
formative experiences dealing with his father’s handicaps from the beginning of his 
political career his primary interests were in social welfare and public health issues 
(Iwami, 1995, p. 50-51; Hashimoto, 1993). In his later career, Hashimoto would become 
very active in the field of environmental security, using Japan’s own experiences (and 
tragedies) in early industrialization to promote sustainable development and 
environmental justice (Hashimoto, 1993; Edstrom, 2008). After years of working his way 
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through the ranks of the LDP, he finally was able to earn his first cabinet seat as Minister 
of Health in 1978. As Minister of Transport under the Nakasone administration in 1986 
he helped oversee one of Prime Minister Nakasone’s most vaunted reforms, the breakup 
of Japan National Railway into six private companies (Iwami, 1995, p. 102-110).  
As Minister of Transportation, he would get his first taste of the difficulties of 
taking what he considered “common sense” measures to protect Japanese interests abroad. 
In his writing, he would lament his inability to send the Martine Safety Agency cutters to 
protect Japanese tankers and the tankers of other countries in the Gulf during the Iran-
Iraq war (Hashimoto, 1994, p. 283-287; Hashimoto, 1993, p. 81). One of his most 
formative experiences in defense would come as Minister of Finance during the Gulf War, 
where Hashimoto saw first hand the limitations of Japan’s financial contributions as a 
means of contributing to international security (Iwami, 1995, p. 195-197; Hashimoto, 
1993, p. 81-82; Edstrom, 2008, p. 67-68). In his 1994 book, Hashimoto would reflect on 
the limits of financial contributions, and the need to provide human contributions to 
international security, including the use of JSDF in peacekeeping missions (Hashimoto, 
1994, p. 290-293).  
As a politician, Hashimoto was an oddity. Despite joining one of the largest 
and most powerful factions, run by a politician known for pioneering Japan’s patronage 
system and perfecting the art of backroom dealings, Hashimoto had reputation for being 
awkward at backroom politics. According to his own account, he hated drinking socially 
and would have to learn this skill as a matter of political survival (Hashimoto, 1994; 
Okumura, 1998a, p. 24). Instead, he was lauded by his peers for his policy acuity, his 
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crisis management skills, and his ability to skillfully use bureaucrats, skills he had honed 
throughout his various ministerial posts (Okumura, 1998a; Funabashi, 1999; Takushiji, 
2012, personal interview). 
Hashimoto came to the fore as a candidate for party president and prime 
minister in the mid-1990s with a reputation that had been earned as Minister of Finance, 
but especially as Minister of International Trade and Industry during the tense trade 
negotiations with US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. Throughout these 
negotiations, Hashimoto would be a hot topic in major newspapers. Newspaper and 
magazine articles would frequently characterize him as a tough negotiator (Okumoto, 
1998, p. 15; Kitamura, 1998; Funabashi, 1999). After serving as MITI minister under the 
coalition cabinet of Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, Hashimoto competed 
for the chance to become the prime minister within the coalition government. 
Hashimoto’s chief competitor was the more pacifist Kono Yohei. Several accounts 
suggest that Hashimoto may have been backed by party elders because of his more 
conservative stance on the issue of Japan’s wartime history (Staveley, 2000, p. 108-109; 
Funabashi, 1999). Whereas Kono was known for his public statements suggesting 
admission of the comfort women issue, Hashimoto was known as a conservative on the 
issue. Hashimoto’s selection as party president was unusual in that he was not a member 
of a major faction. At the time of his selection, the once-dominant faction that had been 
headed by Tanaka Kakuei was only the fourth most powerful, having been weakened by 
scandals and defectors from the faction. Thus, his major asset was popular appeal and his 
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reputation as a candidate with policy substance (Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 25-26; 
Mishima, 1998, p. 970; Shinoda, 2000).   
In the area of defense politics, like many of his fellow LDP politicians, 
Hashimoto was a staunch conservative. Prior to coming to office Hashimoto had a 
reputation as a nationalist. He was chairman of the War-Bereaved Families Association 
(kizokukai), a group that represents relatives of the war dead with over a million 
supporters. The organization is a well known nationalist organization with strong ties to 
the military and regularly supports such actions as visits to Yasukuni Shrine, an act that 
often upsets Japan’s neighbors (such as South Korea and China) who felt victimized by 
Japanese colonialism. This put Hashimoto at odds with prime minister who had preceded 
him, and had taken a more reconciliatory track on the history issue, namely Hosokawa 
Morihiro and Murayama Tomiichi. In his political treatise, published while the LDP was 
out of power, Hashimoto would criticize Hosokawa’s use of the term “invasion war” 
(shinryaku senso) to characterize Japan’s action during the Pacific War, stating that such 
terminology was insensitive to the relatives of fallen soldiers and would invite endless 
claims by neighbors for financial compensation (Hashimoto, 1994, p. 98-100). These 
statements, and similar ones made before becoming prime minister, signaled to the LDP 
right wing that he was not going to abandon the political support of the War Bereavement 
Association. Despite his reputation as a conservative, Hashimoto nevertheless 
demonstrated significant mainstream tendencies that often softened his image (as we will 
see later, Hashimoto would choose to endorse the war apology (in his own words) of his 
predecessor, Murayama Tomiichi).  
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Hashimoto’s favorite Japanese politician was Sato Eisaku, who won the Nobel 
Prize for his three non-nuclear principles and had helped to negotiate the return of 
Okinawa. As a discipline of Sato, Hashimoto was said to have felt regret for the lack of 
progress on the base issue on Okinawa since its formal return, and to have genuinely 
sympathized with the plight of Okinawans (Tamura, 1998, p. 118; Funabashi, 1999). 
Despite his reputation as a conservative, Hashimoto also had the reputation of being 
genuinely sympathetic to the US security presence in Japan. As Funabashi would write, 
even though Hashimoto was someone who could say “no” to US trade demands, he was 
also someone who would say “yes” to the US-Japan Security Treaty (1999, p. 11-14). His 
embrace, then, of many of the sentiments of the Department of Defense’s “Nye Report,” 
for example that the US-Japan security alliance had underpinned the region’s economic 
and political prosperity, never seemed forced or counterintuitive. In his role as MITI 
minister and vice prime minister during the Murayama government, he would lobby the 
Socialist prime minister extensively to seek a close relationship with the US and to 
publicly re-affirm the bilateral security relationship in the back drop of multiple crises 
(the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis, the 1995 rape case, and tensions with China) (Tamura, 
1998, p. 108-109).  
Thus, if Hashimoto can be called a hawk and a nationalist—his visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine demonstrate this much—he was also very pragmatic in his approach to 
foreign policy. Compared to Koizumi, Hashimoto was closer to what would then be 
considered the political mainstream. As this chapter will demonstrate, Hashimoto was a 
sensitive—but also strategic—balancer. Even as Hashimoto strengthened the strategic 
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relationship with the US, he would reach out to assuage China and mollify dissent in 
Okinawa.  
 
The Operational Environment: An Alliance Adrift, Domestic Turbulence 
  
 
One of the key themes of leadership studies is that leaders matter most in times 
of uncertainty. Hashimoto came to power at a time when Japan was still reeling from a 
number of international and domestic shocks. Economically, Japan was still suffering 
from the bursting of the real estate and stock bubble that had left numerous banks with 
bad debt and host of zombie companies. As the economic climate worsened, the failures 
of bureaucracies both to manage the financial crisis and to regulate key industries came to 
light, as did the failure of politicians to oversee the functions of key bureaucracies. 
Political reforms had already taken place in 1993 that many believed would lead to 
greater competition among parties, and thus, politicians with greater policy substance. 
However, there was still a large public appetite for reforms that would remake Japan’s 
financial sector and reshape the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians. 
Successive scandals at bureaucracies only increased this appetite for reform. However, in 
the first days of Hashimoto’s administration, one of the most pressing issues for 
Hashimoto’s cabinet was the fate of several large housing loan companies, known as 
jusen. Jusen companies were investment corporations that were highly involved in the 
speculative bubble during the 90s. These companies had borrowed heavily from banks 
and agricultural cooperatives and then had lent this money to builders, speculators, and 
real estate developers, many with connections to criminal gangs (Shinoda, 1998, p. 715; 
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Okumura, 1998a). The use of public money to help bail out special interests who had 
invested heavily in these companies (most prominently the agricultural interests) drew 
public ire, and thus, was a major issue during the first months of Hashimoto’s 
administration.  
On top of this economic crisis were a number of shocks in the area of 
international and regional security, as well as US-Japan alliance management. Japanese 
elites—especially those tasked with managing the US-Japan alliance—were still 
traumatized by the Gulf War incident and Japan’s perceived failure to contribute to 
coalition forces in any significant way other than with money. The Gulf War episode had 
badly exposed the limitations of bureaucratic-led methods of handling international issues 
and was one of the catalysts for political and administrative reform initiatives that would 
take place during Hashimoto’s tenure (Shinoda, 1998, 2000, 2007). Bureaucrats, 
politicians, and the public still remembered acutely the embarrassment of being left out of 
a thank you letter written by the Kuwaiti government and published in the New York 
Times. This crisis of alliance management and national self-esteem was compounded by 
Japan’s ambivalent support for the US during the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis, where 
alliance mechanisms were seen to have largely faltered15. As a result of these failures, 
                                                 
15 The North Korea crisis occurred during the short-lived Hata administration, which was a continuation of 
the eight-party coalition that had been headed by Hosokawa. Included in the coalition was the Japan 
Socialist Party which had close ties with North Korea. During the Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1994, the US 
provided a very detailed list of issues on which they required assistance. This request included the 
provision of fuel and materiel, as well as assistance in dealing with a possible refugee crisis. However, 
officials on the Japanese side had trouble responding to these requests. A contributing factor to this delayed 
response was the hodge-podge nature of the coalition government which had trouble forming consensus. 
Luckily, the crisis on the Korean peninsula was soon averted by an agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter 
(Shinoda, 2006, p. 30; Soeya, 2005; Tanaka, 2009, p. 62-69). As Tanaka Hitoshi, a high level Japanese 
diplomat, would recall in his memoirs, the failure of the Japanese government to play a major role in 
confronting the challenge would feel similar to the Gulf War shock of several years before (Tanaka, 2009, 
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officials on both sides of the alliance had taken the initiative and were working together 
to more clearly define the nature of the alliance, specifically how and when it could be 
put to use during regional crises.  
Several other events occurred during this time that strengthened the public 
perception that Japan lacked strong crisis management. During the 1995 Hanshin 
earthquake, the government was criticized for its slow response. Criticisms focused both 
on delays in dispatching the Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the government’s 
initial rejection of foreign assistance. The Aum Shinrikyo sarin nerve gas attacks in 
Tokyo in 1995 also brought criticisms of the need for a better crisis management system. 
On top of these crises was also the shock of the rape of a middle school girl in Okinawa 
by three US servicemen. At the time, there was the very real possibility that the incident 
would spark violent riots similar to the Koza incident of 1970, where the property and 
safety of US servicemen had been threatened. The incident put Okinawan base politics 
back on the political agenda and strengthened the arguments of politicians, such as then-
Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide, that the bases in Okinawa should be realigned, 
consolidated, and reduced (with the aim of eventually getting rid of them altogether by 
2015).  
At the very start of his administration, Hashimoto would have to balance the 
duel priorities of a potentially explosive Okinawan situation and the jusen incident. Thus, 
though there was now a window for radical change of the relationship between the US 
                                                                                                                                                 
p. 66). This incident became one of the catalysts for the extensive dialogue between officials on both sides 
of the alliance (later known as the “Nye Initiative”), and especially the revision of the 1978 Joint 
Cooperation Guidelines and the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  
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and Japan, for a conservative like Hashimoto who believed in the US-Japan alliance, the 
more immediate challenge was managing these dual crises. However, as we will see, 
skillful management of these momentary crises would eventually give Hashimoto 
expanded clout to push forward with an ambitious domestic reform agenda. His policy 
agenda was helped in no small part by his reputation as a skillful diplomat and an adept 
manager of the policy process.  
Though his two administration, Hashimoto’s domestic situation would vary 
greatly. In his first administration, he would largely inherit the three-party coalition (that 
included his LDP party, the Socialist Party, and the New Party Sakigake) that had been 
led by Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, along with its proportional 
committee structure arranged on policy issues. However, his own popularity would allow 
him to call for Lower House elections in September of 1996. Though the LDP fell short 
of a majority in this election, its outstanding gains allowed Hashimoto to form an all-LDP 
cabinet. The coalition partners were retained in the Lower House but refrained from 
joining Hashimoto’s cabinet. When this happened, the traditional framework of factions 
came back into play. The party would return to its old habit of running the government 
largely through the inputs of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC) 
structure and through factional balancing on the cabinet (Shinoda, 2000, p. 32-36).  
In Hashimoto’s first cabinet he retained proportional representation of the three 
parties with twelve ministers from the LDP, six from the SDPJ, and two from New Party 
Sakigake. His second cabinet, however, was based on factional representation and left out 
representatives from the coalition parties (Hasegawa and Watanabe, 1996, November 26). 
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Thus, Hashimoto’s support was based on a combination of party and popular support that 
defies easy categorization. Hashimoto was chosen largely because Diet members 
believed that he could return the party to its past electoral glory. Hashimoto had a weak 
factional base as leader of the rump of the once powerful Tanaka faction, which was now 
only the fourth strongest faction (Okumoto, 1998, p. 21; Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 25-26). 
As will be discussed later, however, unlike Koizumi, Hashimoto at crucial points chose to 
govern based on party cohesion and patronage rather than through the strength of his own 
popular persona. This contrasts with Koizumi who used public opinion to confront his 
party at crucial points. Though his choice to use consensus and balance of intraparty 
power is an instinct well followed in Japanese politics, in this case it also cost him his 
most important asset.  
In addition, Hashimoto had a handicap that the other two prime ministers in 
this study did not. Though Hashimoto came to power at a time when public opinion 
supported stronger prime ministerial leadership, he was nevertheless limited by a lack of 
administrative staff, resources, and coordinating power. The 2001 administrative 
reforms—reforms that Hashimoto himself would pioneer—would give future prime 
ministers a vast advantage in terms of administrative resources. For this reason, there was 
even greater reason for him to lean heavily on initiatives that had been “softened up” 
through bureaucratic process.  
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Parsing Hashimoto’s Approach: Bottom-Up Resources, Kantei-Diplomacy, and 
Balancing Techniques  
 
 
On many counts, Hashimoto appeared the consummate political strategist and 
entrepreneur: like Nakasone, he tried to change policymaking customs by sidestepping 
traditional power centers and appealing to public opinion via special advisory councils 
(most notably his Administrative Reform Council (Gyōsei kaikaku kaigi)); he advocated 
policies that changed some of the underlying values and institutions of public finance; 
and, most importantly, he introduced a series of administrative reforms to empower the 
office of the prime minister (Maclachlan, 2010; Shinoda, 2000, 2011; Tamura, 1998). 
Though these initiatives would fall short of the six major reforms he would champion at 
the start of his second administration, Hashimoto’s reforms would nevertheless go a long 
way toward strengthening the office of the prime minister and liberalizing Japan’s 
economy. Moreover, Hashimoto demonstrated a knack for utilizing the power of media in 
sustaining his image as a can-do prime minister. He was especially clever at using his 
diplomatic skill to promote his image as a charismatic politician. Though to an extent this 
was visible with such leaders as Jacque Chirac and Bill Clinton, as well as his “hot 
springs diplomacy” with South Korean President Kim Young Sam in Beppu, Japan, this 
was most visible in the casual and friendly partnership he developed with Boris Yeltsin, 
prompting many to dub the relationship the “Boris- Ryu” relationship (Kitamura, 1998; 
Okumoto, 1998, p. 35). Thus, during his prime ministership, Hashimoto would show 
much of the charisma that has come to be associated with both Nakasone Yasuhiro and 
Koizumi Junichiro.   
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His success in defense policy and politics, though no less important, were 
accomplished through largely conventional resources and approaches. Hashimoto’s skill 
in security initiatives was shown not through bold policy stances and adept policy 
maneuvers (as we will see in the Koizumi administration in Chapter 5), or by confronting 
his own party, but rather through stewardship of a policy process that had been evolving 
since before his administration—in short, by endorsing bottom-up bureaucratic 
initiatives. However, in endorsing these bottom-up initiatives, Hashimoto used one 
resource that would be unavailable to the other two prime ministers examined in this 
study. Having had experience in four separate ministerial positions, and having 
established his own contacts in several ministries, Hashimoto displayed a rare knack for 
grasping policy issues and debating bureaucrats on their own turf.  
Kantei Diplomacy was also a conspicuous aspect of Hashimoto’s tenure. 
Much like Nakasone during his tenure, Hashimoto demonstrated talent in developing 
special relationships with leaders. In at least one case—negotiations over the return of 
Futenma Airbase—centralizing negotiations in the prime minister’s office and 
maintaining the secrecy of negotiations would bear substantial political fruit (even if the 
implementation of the agreement would eventually run into problems).  
Hashimoto would also demonstrate a knack for reconciling and managing key 
relationships. This tendency was especially evident in his relationship with China and 
Okinawa. Hashimoto’s early embrace of initiatives to improve relations with the US 
would not be cost-free. Key language in both the US-Japan Joint Declaration would 
commit to the US’s numerical target of maintaining about 100,000 US military personnel 
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in the Asia Pacific region, with roughly the current number of personnel in Japan. In 
addition, the US-Japan Guidelines for Cooperation would state Japan’s responsibility to 
cooperate with the US in “situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and 
which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan” (MoFA, 
1997). Not surprising, China would point to this language as evidence that Japan and the 
US were colluding to contain Chinese power. Japanese-Chinese relations had already 
been deteriorating significantly since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Relations 
would continue to deteriorate for other reasons (including Hashimoto’s visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine on his birthday). However, unlike Koizumi who would neglect Chinese relations, 
Hashimoto would pivot on his success with US-Japan alliance relations to improve ties 
with China, offering China reassurances that Japan was not remilitarizing and that key 
language in the documents was not meant to specify any particular country or region.  
Similarly, improved relations with the US would also increase tensions with 
Okinawa Prefecture. Though the SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) process 
had led to the agreement in principle of the return of the dangerous Futenma Airbase as 
well as the return and consolidation of a number of other key facilities, Futenma’s base 
functions were to be moved to a less populated location within the prefecture. Just as 
important, Hashimoto had endorsed roughly maintaining the current level of US troops in 
the East Asia region and Japan through the Joint Declaration and his summit meeting 
with President Clinton. Though Hashimoto tried to take a middle course between 
Okinawa and the US, in one key respect Hashimoto would maintain a strict pro-US 
orientation. At important moments throughout his administration, Hashimoto would 
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support maintaining the marine presence in Okinawa, justifying their presence in terms of 
their deterrent value. Throughout his administration, Hashimoto would attempt to assuage 
Okinawan fury over the bases, while at the same time sticking to his commitment to 
maintain the current level of US forces in Japan. In addition to his personal efforts on 
Futenma, Hashimoto would also use personal envoys, and extensive personal 
consultations with the Governor of Okinawa to help make his case—tactics that allowed 
him to maintain a sympathetic image in Okinawa.  
Though these episodes demonstrate Hashimoto’s tendency to reconcile 
different positions and his ability to marshal various party and bureaucratic resources to 
deal with crises, the legacy of this incident is perhaps the most ambiguous of all of his 
initiatives during his time in office. In the end, SACO would serve as a mechanism for 
maintaining the approximate level of US forces in the Okinawa region while taking token 
measures to alleviate the base burden. Though accounts of Hashimoto’s administration 
often cast him as someone who tried to steer a middle path in relations with Okinawa and 
the US (Brooks, 2010; Tanaka, 2009; Funabashi, 1999), in reality his approach was based 
on a solid commitment to the current level of troops in Japan and the current level of US 
extended deterrence.  
Hashimoto would also make small, but meaningful, changes to defense 
precedents while in office. He would take the symbolic steps to improve governmental 
ties with the military, allowing uniformed officers to visit the prime minister’s residence 
and repealing legislation the prohibited contacts between the military and politicians. In 
many ways, this was the beginning of a more pronounced form of “salami slicing” 
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(Samuels, 2007a, 2007b) of Japan’s anti-militarist institutions. Though closer alignment 
with the US had created the institutions for greater moves to the right, it was this step that 
continued the erosion of post-war norms of antimilitarism. At the same time, Hashimoto 
would also demonstrate the importance symbolic pacifism and antimilitarism. Despite 
his image as a nationalist before the administration, several initiatives would soften his 
image in the public eye. In addition to abandoning his trips to Yasukuni as prime minister 
after 1996, he would also endorse the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama’s apology for 
Japan’s wartime atrocities and endorse the Asian Women’s Fund, a fund to distribute 
money to victims of Japan’s wartime comfort women policy. 
  
Endorsing Bottom-Up Security Initiatives: Political Leadership in the Bureaucratic 
Process 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the alliance had been stumbling from one crisis to 
another16. Alliance managers on both sides were worried that the alliance framework was 
becoming obsolete. Thus, bureaucrats on both sides of the relationship shared the belief 
that US-Japan defense cooperation had to be “reconfirmed” or perhaps even “redefined.” 
For their part, alliance managers on the US side wanted a more direct definition of what 
Japan could do to contribute to the US in case of an emergency in the region. For its own 
part, Japan wanted a framework to reduce the base burden on Okinawa to decrease the 
impact of pollution, noise, and crime on the local communities. However, the most 
important issue that needed to be dealt with was the turmoil that had erupted in the 
                                                 
16 Throughout the 1990s, bureaucrats on both sides of the alliance had suffered through the Korean nuclear 
crisis and soon would suffer through a crisis involving China’s use of ballistic missiles to influence 
Taiwanese elections. At the initiative of Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye and Director General of 
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aftermath of the 1995 gang rape of a middle school girl by US marines (Funabashi, 1999; 
Akiyama, 2002; Nye, 1995). Though the turn-style leadership between 1993-1996 had 
not helped the alliance process, in a sense it had also produced an environment where 
bureaucrats could take over as policy entrepreneurs. As all parties realized, however, two 
things were needed: steps would need to be taken—something with symbolic force—to 
reduce tension on Okinawa, and the US-Japan alliance desperately needed the 
endorsement of the two nations’ top leadership.  
In many ways, Hashimoto’s role can be described not as a defense policy 
entrepreneur, but rather, as a steward of the alliance. As a leader, he pioneered very little 
of what would become some of the most important policy frameworks for the US-Japan 
alliance in the post cold war era. Instead, he would inherit a process and initiatives that 
only needed the push of national leadership raise their profile. As MITI Minister and 
Vice Prime Minister during the Murayama administration, Hashimoto would have 
intimate knowledge of the processes underway. The institutional resources that had been 
created included: SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa)—the joint framework 
for working out plans to reduce and consolidate the bases on Okinawa; the bilateral 
process for working out a Joint Declaration prior to the summit that was supposed to 
occur between President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama (which the US had 
canceled because of a standoff over the US budget); in addition, Hashimoto would also 
inherit the ideological inputs of both the “Nye Initiative” as well as the consensus that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Defense Policy (JDA) Akiyama Masahiro, the two governments would begin a joint dialogue on defense 
that would bridge the Murayama (1994-1996) and Hashimoto governments.  
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had been established by the Higuchi and Nye Reports17. These initiatives came on top of 
other initiatives such as the revision of the ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement), an agreement that allowed for Japan to supply the US with fuel and parts for 
weapons under specified circumstances like UN peacekeeping operations and joint 
military exercises. 
At a time of deep uncertainty, Hashimoto’s key successes came in carving a 
space in the pragmatic political center. The space he would create was one where he 
could demonstrate a level of even handedness while at the same time clearly supporting 
the US as a partner. At the same time that Hashimoto was allowing joint initiatives like 
SACO, the Nye Initiative, and preparations for the upcoming summit with the US to 
                                                 
17 The “Nye Report” had famously described security as “like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until 
you begin to lose it. The American security presence has helped to provide this ‘oxygen’ for East Asian 
development” (EASR, 1995; Nye, 1995, 2001). The logic of the argument was that US military power—
which was politically withdrawn from the territorial and historical disputes of the region—had prevented a 
costly arms buildup by competing countries, and thus, underpinned peace in the region and allowed for 
economic growth. The report also suggested that the US security guarantee in Asia has been a positive 
force for democracy. The “Nye Report” would also set rough numerical targets for how many troops to 
maintain in the East Asian region: 100,000 overall and 47,000 in Japan (EASR, 1995). These numerical 
targets would be looked on with horror by Okinawan politicians such as Governor Ota Masahide, who had 
set his own target dates for the complete withdrawal of US troops from the prefecture.  
The Higuchi Report, the report commissioned under the Hosokawa government (1993-1994) and 
chaired by Higuchi Hirotaro the president of Asahi Beer, also based the Japanese defense strategy on the 
continuation of the US alliance. However, this report also put a great emphasis on multilateral security 
under the UN (Commission on Security and Defense Capabilities, 1994). Since the passage of the 
peacekeeping law in 1992, Japan had engaged in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, and the Golan Heights. Reports differ on the reception of the Higuchi Report by the US Defense 
Department. Funabashi’s account suggests that while many in the DoD were encouraged by Japan’s 
proactive approach to redefining its defense policy and the value it placed in the US-Japan alliance, some in 
the Defense Department were alarmed by its “excessively” multilateralism, including the emphasis on the 
UN (Funabashi, 1999, p. 228-230). Akiyama Mashiro, the then Director General for Defense Policy in the 
JDA, recounts in his book how he believed that the reason US officials were so obsessed with including the 
specific numbers of the Nye Report (100,000 military personnel in the Asia Pacific, and about 47,000 in 
Japan) in the Joint Declaration was because they were worried about the multilateral security language in 
the Higuchi Report, and thus, wanted a firm commitment on the part of Japan (Akiyama, 2002, p. 219).  
Regardless, as a result of both the Higuchi Commission and the Nye Report, and the renewed 
interest in security and defense these two reports inspired, the US and Japan would engage in an intensive 
dialogue that would last over a year and span the Murayama and Hashimoto governments. Thus, Hashimoto 
 94 
proceed apace, he was also working to establish better relations between the central 
government and Okinawa. In the early days of his administration, Hashimoto would take 
the time out to get to know Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide on a personal basis and to 
establish a positive working relationship with him18. Later, on Ota’s recommendation, 
Hashimoto would appoint Okamoto Yukio as his special advisor on Okinawa (Funabashi, 
1999, p. 183). Okamoto, a former MoFA official with extensive connections, was known 
for his sympathetic view toward Okinawa. In the run up to his summit meeting with 
President Clinton, Hashimoto’s office would also secure an agreement for the return of 
Futenma Airbase, although on the stipulation that a replacement site would be found 
within Okinawa. The surprise announcement of the return at a special press conference 
was a public relations success and helped elevate the profile of the upcoming US-Japan 
summit. 
Four days after the official return of Futenma Airbase was announced, and only 
several months into Hashimoto’s prime ministership, President Clinton’s state visit took 
place as planned from April 16-April 17, 1996. During the meeting, both Hashimoto and 
Clinton signed the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century 
and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). What is clear from both the 
Joint Declaration and the US-Japan Cooperation Guidelines that would follow nearly a 
year later is that many of the important building blocs were the ideas and language of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
inherited not only the ready-made concepts of these two reports, but also, the joint consultation process that 
was driving the re-affirmation and re-definition of the alliance.  
18 Hashimoto would meet with Ota eighteen times during his administration. One of the ironies of the 
negotiations between Tokyo and Okinawan Prefectural Government is that Hashimoto, a conservative with 
somewhat nationalist tendencies, would fair better in establishing a personal relationship with the the leftist 
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“Nye Report” (EASR) that linked the US-Japan Security Treaty with peace and 
prosperity in the Asia Pacific Region (MoFA, 1996; Funabashi, 1999; Tanaka, 2009). 
The Joint Declaration affirmed many of the themes of the East Asian Security Review, or 
the “Nye Report.” Like the Nye report, the document stated that the US-Japan alliance 
had underpinned the East Asia region’s extraordinary economic growth. The document 
also reaffirmed maintenance of “about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in 
the region”. More importantly, the document created a bridge to the revision of the Joint 
Guidelines by committing Japan and the US to “studies” of “situations that may emerge 
in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace 
and security of Japan” (MoFA, 1996). Though reference to maintaining about 47,000 
troops in Japan had been left out in consideration of Okinawa, the language of 
“maintaining the present scale” of US forces (Funabashi, 1999, p. 79; MoFA, 1996) was 
included. In addition, the SACO Interim Report confirmed what had already been 
announced several days earlier, the two parties had agreed to the return of Futenma 
Airbase within 5-7 years provided that an “adequate” replacement facilities were found, 
including the building of a new helipad in Okinawa (Brooks, 2010, p. 16).  
In addition to the re-affirmation of close cooperation and consultation, Japan 
would pledge to maintain its Host Nation Support. The two countries also agreed to 
review the Guidelines for Cooperation, work on agreement for joint logistical provisions, 
and explore cooperation in the vicinity around Japan in times of contingency. In terms of 
the base issue in Okinawa, the two countries endorsed the SACO process of realignment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ota than his predecessor, Murayama Tomiichi, the first Socialist Prime Minister (see Ota, 2000; Akiyama, 
2002; Funabashi, 1999). 
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reduction, and consolidation of bases on Okinawa with the objectives of the Security 
Treaty in mind; and that the two countries would develop multilateral forums and engage 
China in a cooperative and constructive manner (MoFA, 1996; Funabashi, 1999, p. 97; 
Okumura, 1998b, p. 168-169). As critics of the summit would argue (see Chalmers and 
Keehn, 1996; Carpenter, 1996), despite the end of the Cold War era, nothing 
revolutionary changed about the US-Japan alliance. Indeed, the revolutionary aspect of 
the arrangement was how little had changed despite the great fanfare in which the summit 
was conducted.  
If the summit can be called the product of Japan’s bottom-up process, one that 
privileges incremental change over grand strategic maneuvering, it was also effective 
political theater (following, the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, Hashimoto’s public 
popularity increased by about twelve percent, from 36 percent to 48 percent, according to 
a Nikkei Shimbun poll (Nikkei, 1996, April 29; Brooks, 2010, p. 17)). There was still 
much that needed to be done on a working level. In particular, there was still the hard 
work of revising the US-Japan Joint Guidelines and the thorny details of concluding 
SACO. The decision to specifically acknowledge the maintenance of 100,000 troops in 
the East Asian region came as a severe blow to Okinawan expectations (even if the 
number of 47,000 troops in Japan had been left off the declaration). In addition, the 
declaration also heightened tensions with China, which looked with suspicion on the 
entire process of re-affirming the strategic relationship. If endorsement of the nations’ top 
leadership had brought a sense of relief to the drift in alliance relations, the hard work of 
day-to-day management still remained.  
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Ameliorating Tensions with China 
 
 
Since the Tianamen Square Incident of 1989, there had been a noticeable chill 
in Japanese-Chinese relations. However, the time between May of 1995 and the end of 
1996 was an especially difficult one for bilateral relations. The strains on relations came 
after a year-long stretch where China had conducted underground nuclear tests, had shot 
missiles across the Taiwan Straits, and in which Japan had suspended economic aid in the 
form of yen loans. Hashimoto himself had made relations between the countries more 
difficult through his decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine on his birthday (June 29, 1996). At 
the time of Hashimoto’s visit almost eleven years had passed since Nakasone Yasuhiro 
had visited the shrine in his role as prime minister. Nakasone had ceased his visits as 
prime minister in order to smooth relations with both China and South Korea. No doubt, 
Hashimoto’s visit was a way of appeasing one of his core constituencies, The Bereaved 
Family Society, a conservative organization that boasted an extremely conservative view 
of history, had ties to the military, and had the ability to mobilize around one million 
votes. The organization had an especially conservative view of Japan’s wartime past and 
regularly pressured prime ministers to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Before becoming prime 
minister, Hashimoto had served briefly as the organization’s chairman. During his visit to 
the shrine, he would sign his name on the visitor registry as “Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Ryutaro” (naikaku soridaijin) (Kitamura, 1998, p. 80-81)19. The visit would, predictably, 
set off a rash of demonstrations in both China and South Korea. 
                                                 
19 Mirroring the language of Koizumi Junichiro several years later, Hashimoto would state that the decision 
to visit was “a personal issue of the heart” (Kitamura, 1998, p. 81).  
 98 
To make matters worse, the renaissance in Japan-US security ties that occurred 
in 1996, including the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration and the decision to revise the Joint 
Guidelines, was viewed by China largely as a way of containing Chinese power in the 
region. The controversial phrase contained in the Joint Guidelines, that Japan would 
cooperate with the US in “areas surrounding Japan” that impacted Japanese security, 
would expand the framework of the alliance to include not only the defense of Japan, but 
contingencies throughout the Asia Pacific region. In response to the Joint Declaration and 
the bilateral work on the Guidelines for cooperation, China began an intense public 
relations campaign that argued that the Guidelines were a sign of Japan’s return to 
“militarism” and a method for containing Chinese power (Funabashi, 1999, p. 420-423). 
The ferocity of China’s public response seemed to catch both Japan and US officials by 
surprise (see Funabashi, 1999, p. 420). 
However, having improved strategic relations with the US, Hashimoto now 
saw an opportunity to improve relations with China, especially as the 25th anniversary of 
the normalization of ties between the two countries approached. Following his re-election 
as prime minister after the Lower House elections of 1996, Hashimoto declared in the 
press conference that would launch his second administration that he would make 
repairing relations with China a top priority (Kitamura, 1998, p. 78). He would also—
much as Nakasone had done during his prime ministership—pledge to refrain from 
visiting Yasukuni Shrine for the remainder of his term as prime minister. The 
groundwork for repairing relations would first be laid out at meeting of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in November, where he would officially support China’s 
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bid for entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Kitamura, 1998, p. 84; 
Yomiuri, 1996, November 22).  
Perhaps the most important step Hashimoto took to assuage China was to make 
the process of re-evaluating the Joint US-Japan Guidelines for Cooperation as transparent 
as possible. Throughout the process, working groups would put out reports, and officials 
would make public their progress on the Joint Guidelines. Throughout the revision 
process, the Hashimoto government would take measures to soften the implications of the 
revision. In particular, the Hashimoto himself would make it a point of denying that the 
concept of “areas surrounding Japan” had any specific geographic content and was 
targeting China directly. Hashimoto used his diplomatic skill to assuage China at every 
turn. When Hashimoto's Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS), Kajiyama Seiroku was caught 
saying that new guidelines meant that Japan would support the US in any emergency in 
the Taiwan Straits, Hashimoto countered his CCS quickly, assuring Chinese Prime 
Minister Li Peng that the guidelines were not aimed at “any particular country or region, 
including China” (Garran, 1997, September 5; Kyodo, 1997, September 8; Nikkei 
Weekly, 1997, September 1). Though this official stance on the guidelines was a tricky 
balancing act—one that risked stripping these new Joint Cooperation Guidelines of their 
meaning—it also provided an opportunity for improved ties with China. 
In his visit to China on September 4, 1997, a visit that celebrated the 25th 
anniversary of the normalization of Japanese ties, Hashimoto called for increased mutual 
understanding, dialogue, cooperation (Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 31-32; Kitamura, 1998, 
p. 77-78; Ash, 1997). Though there were limits to what Hashimoto could do to assuage 
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China on the revision of the US-Japan Joint Guidelines, the trip was nevertheless 
successful. Economic incentives played an important role in making this diplomatic effort 
work. Hashimoto came offering yen loans valued at approximately 2.3 billion dollars. 
Just as important was the political message that Hashimoto carried. Hashimoto would 
acknowledge the suffering and losses caused by Japanese aggression, a step that would 
help set a precedent for future prime ministers (even ones with conservative leanings). As 
we will see in Chapter 5, future conservatives would largely follow Hashimoto’s example 
of articulating the Murayama apology in their own words. Though Hashimoto did not 
improve on the official apology of Murayama Tomiichi, he did find an important 
symbolic mechanism for expressing regret for Japan’s wartime activity. Hashimoto 
would be the first Japanese leader visit Manchuria since the end of Japan’s war with 
China in 1945. He visited a museum dedicated to the 1931 Manchuria incident (setting a 
precedent that would be followed by Prime Minister Koizumi, see Chapter 4) (Garran, 
1997, September 5). Hashimoto also continued to emphasize that the Joint Declaration 
and the Joint Guidelines were not targeted toward any specific country or region 
(Kitamura, 1998, p. 89; Ash, 1997). Hashimoto was met with a remarkably friendly 
reception. Two months later, Prime Minister Li Peng would reciprocate the visit and 
receive a warm welcome from Tokyo, despite his well-publicized role in the 1989 
“Tiananmen massacre” (Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 31). Perhaps one of the most 
impressive accomplishments of Hashimoto’s visit was the scheduling of regular meetings 
between defense officials. This was an important, if small, step forward for the countries, 
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given that increasing defense-to-defense ties was a priority for both Washington and 
Tokyo in their quest to reduce the chances of accidental conflict. 
 
Managing Tensions with Okinawa: The Return of Futenma 
 
 
One of the most memorable events of the Hashimoto administration in security 
affairs was the agreement in principle of the return of Futenma Airbase, as well as 
Hashimoto’s handling of the various issues that would arise as a result of base politics on 
Okinawa. Very little about Okinawan base politics has gone uncontested, and Hashimoto 
would hold the office of prime minister at a time when the controversial agreement was 
made to relocate US Marine Corps Airbase Futenma’s functions within Okinawa, at a 
time when land leases for the US bases would fall into a legal vacuum because of 
Governor Ota’s refusal to sign the appropriation papers, and when a local referendum in 
Nago (the proposed site for the relocation of the base) would pit local sentiment against 
the national government. If Hashimoto can be criticized for failing to come up with a 
durable solution to the base issue in Okinawa, at the very least he managed the situation 
in a way that took the issue off the national agenda and allowed him to pursue his reform 
initiatives. At the time, Hashimoto’s accomplishments were seen largely as a political 
success. As can be discerned from the advice of his bureaucratic advisors from the JDA 
and MoFA during this time (see Akiyama, 2002; Tanaka, 2009), few in defense policy 
circles thought the agreement would be possible given the regional security environment 
at the time. More conspicuously, the incident also demonstrates the possibilities (as well 
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as the limitations) of “kantei-led policy-making” (kantei shudo) for making major 
breakthroughs in defense policy.  
Futenma Marine Corps Air Station is one of the largest U.S. Military bases in 
the Far East and is located in the congested residential area of central Okinawa, Ginowan 
City. In 1995, during the Murayama administration, the Okinawan base issue came to the 
forefront as the result of the rape of a 12 year old girl by three US Marines. This event 
sparked massive protests on the island, and marked a new low point in US-Japan 
relations. That year, a summit meeting between Clinton and Murayama would be 
cancelled. Though the cancellation had been based mainly on the shutdown of 
government because of a standoff between President Clinton and the Republican 
Congress over the budget, the intensity of protests at the time may have also played a 
small role in Clinton’s decision. Murayama would instead meet with Vice President Gore 
and the leaders would set up SACO to negotiate the particulars of the “reorganization, 
consolidation, and reduction” of US bases in Okinawa (Funabashi, 1999; Tanaka, 2009). 
Following his departure from office, Murayama personally asked Hashimoto to see to it 
that he address the festering Okinawa issue. The Okinawan base issue encompassed more 
than just the short-term tension of the 1995 rape case. Anti-base governor Ota Masahide 
had been advocating for the complete removal of the bases for some time, and the 
Okinawan Prefectural Government had called for the phased removal of US bases by 
2015 (Brooks, 2010; Inoue, 2007; Gabe, 2003).  
Despite the many problems that remain with the military base issue in 
Okinawa--including lingering resentments in Okinawa about the small scale of the 
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reduction of the base burden, and the problems with finding an alternative site for the 
functions of Futenma--Hashimoto’s actions with regard to the base are important because 
they demonstrated the power of the prime minister’s office in diplomatic affairs (as well 
as important limitations). In a way reminiscent of Nakasone’s “tezukuri gaiko” (hand-
crafted diplomacy), and in a way that would foreshadow Koizumi’s “kantei diplomacy,” 
Hashimoto negotiated the return of Futenma largely through his own office. For this 
reason Okumura (1998) calls the event a “top-down” diplomatic success, while 
Funabashi (1999) has referred to the event as “the prime minister’s play.” The issue of 
the return of Futenma had come up at the first meeting between Clinton and Hashimoto 
in the Santa Monica Summit on February 23, 1996. At the time, Hashimoto was hesitant 
to bring up the issue of Futenma. Funabashi’s (1999) stylized depiction of this summit 
frames the decision as an existentialist moment similar to Hamlet’s monologue: to bring 
up the issue, or not to bring up the issue. Key officials from MOFA and the JDA, as well 
as LDP Defense zoku members, had advised Hashimoto not to bring up the matter in his 
meeting. The rationale was that if the US president dismissed the idea, there would be 
little room to explore the possibility in the future.  
Chief among bureaucratic advisors who would advise against brining up the 
issue of Futenma were Tanaka Hitoshi of MoFA and Akiyama Masahiro of the JDA who 
would play a significant role in the Joint Declaration, Joint Guidelines, and SACO 
negotiations. As detailed in the first person accounts of both Akiyama and Tanaka, they 
would both advise Hashimoto against bringing up Futenma during his meeting with 
President Clinton. Foremost among their reasons was the possible effect a return of 
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Futenma would have on US deterrence in the region (for a more detailed account of this 
conversation, see Tanaka, 2009, p. 74-76; also, Akiyama, 2002, p. 196; Funabashi, 1999, 
p. 6-8). However, Hashimoto also received word in a round about way that Governor Ota 
of Okinawa would be pleased if Hashimoto brought up the Futenma base issue. In the 
end, Hashimoto would bring up the Futenma base issue in his first meeting with Clinton, 
though without explicitly asking for Futenma’s return (Funabashi, 1999, p. 21-22; 
Okumura, 1998b, p. 162-167; Tamura, 1998, p. 119)20. 
Hashimoto’s decision to bring up the matter at the Santa Monica Summit 
jump-started a dialogue on the possible return of the base. A conspicuous element of 
negotiations on the return of Futenma was the degree to which negotiations were kept a 
secret, even from top bureaucrats. The rationale, as surmised by accounts of this period, 
is that Hashimoto knew that given the risk involved in the initiative, negotiations would 
need to be the responsibility of the prime minister, not the bureaucrats. In addition, 
accounts make clear that Hashimoto knew full well that all measures would need to be 
taken to prevent leaks to the press (Tanaka, 2009, p. 75-76; Akiyama, 2002, p. 198-200; 
Funabashi, 2009)21. As discussed in Chapter 2, on issues of great importance, the prime 
                                                 
20 Hashimoto’s statement on Futenma in the Santa Monica summit with President Clinton is in some ways 
a microcosm of the Hashimoto administration’s approach to US-Japan-Okinawan trilateral relations. 
Hashimoto would advocate for measures to relieve Okinawa’s burden on the supposition that US 
deterrence should be maintained. Funabashi translates Hashimoto’s statement as such: “Were I to pass on 
the demands of the Okinawan people, it would be for the complete return of Futenma. However, bearing in 
mind the importance of US-Japan security and maintaining the functionality of the US armed forces, I 
realize that that is extremely difficult” (Funabashi, 1999, p. 21). This statement would cause much 
confusion on the US side, as officials argued whether Hashimoto had requested the return of Futenma or 
whether Hashimoto had acknolwedged that the return of Futenma would be difficult (Hashimoto had in 
reality done both) (Tanaka, 2009, p. 76).  
21 In his account of meetings during this time, Tanaka Hitoshi depicts Hashimoto as someone who was 
deeply involved with the specifics of the Futenma negotiations (2009, p. 74-83). 
 105 
minister sometimes has an incentive to get deals done before they can be made subject to 
the centrifugal forces of Japanese politics, including the inputs of party backbenchers, 
coalition partners, and the press22. 
On April 12, 1996, Hashimoto was able to call a press conference after 
discussions with Ambassador Walter Mondale to announce the return in principle of 
Futenma Airbase under the stipulation that a replacement site be found within Okinawa 
Prefecture. Preceding that press conference, Hashimoto had called Governor Ota and told 
him personally the good news about the return of Futenma. Governor Ota, for his part, 
expressed his pleasure with the effort taken by Hashimoto and Ambassador Walter 
Mondale, but also brought up his reservations about moving the base’s functions within 
Okinawa (see, Ota, 2000, p. 51-52; Funabashi, 1999)23. If the agreement on the return 
was well-timed (it came four days before the US-Japan summit where the Joint 
Declaration would be signed) and orchestrated in a way to boost Hashimoto’s popularity 
by demonstrating his initiative and policy competency, from the beginning it was 
understood that this would be a qualified victory. The return of Futenma would come at a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 No doubt the example of Sato Eisaku, Hashimoto’s political mentor must have crossed his mind as well. 
In his negotiations for the return of Okinawa to Japan in the early 70s, then-Prime Minister Sato had used 
secret emissaries to negotiate with the US the details of Okinawa’s return. This method had helped to keep 
the details of the negotiations—many of which were controversial—out of the press. Tanaka Hitoshi, a key 
participant in the early negotiations over Futenma, would compare the method of negotiations to those used 
during the Koizumi administration to arrange for Koizumi’s meeting with Kim Jong Il (2009, p. 81; see 
Chapter 4).   
 
23 An important element to the agreement over the return of Futenma was also the leadership of US 
Secretary of Defense William Perry. As Funabashi’s (1999) account of the days leading up the 
announcement of the return of Futenma demonstrates, without Perry’s willingness to take on the vested 
interest of the various military services, even this basic agreement would not have been possible (see also, 
Tanaka, 2009; Akiyama, 2002).  
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price--the functions of the base would have to be relocated in a less-populated part of 
Okinawa. It was also understood from the beginning that Japan would likely be asked to 
shoulder a great deal of the cost of this relocation (Okumura, 1998b, p. 160-162; 
Funabashi, 1999). For those political groups, especially on Okinawa, who had hoped to 
be rid of the bases, the agreement seemed like little more than a continuation of the status 
quo of the US-Japan Security Treaty.  
Over the course of the remainder of the SACO negotiations, US and Japanese 
officials would struggle over the specifics of the replacement sight. Sites on the mainland 
such as Iwakuni would soon be ruled out because of the staunch local resistance. Areas in 
Koichi Prefecture and Hokkaido Prefecture would be ruled out by the US because they 
were seen as slowing the possible response time of Marine forces to contingencies in East 
Asia (Moriya, 2010, p. 192-193). Japanese officials would push hard for the 
consolidation of Futenma’s functions into Kadena Airbase (a US Air Force Base), an 
option that would be vigorously opposed by the US and the surrounding townships. The 
two sides would also debate the manner of construction of the replacement facility and 
how the various functions of Futenma would be divided up (for a detailed recounting of 
these negotiations, see Brooks, 2010; Funabashi, 1999; Morimoto, 2010).  
The final SACO report was issued on December 2, 1996, and confirmed the 
return of some 21 percent of all US facilities on Okinawa. In terms of the replacement 
site for Futenma, a sea-based facility was approved, that would be removed when it was 
no longer needed. The construction site would be determined no later than 1997, the 
report stated (Funabashi, 1997, p. 214; SACO, 1996). SACO would recommend the 
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return of Futenma on the condition that a replacement facility be built off the waters of 
Camp Schwab in the less congested Henoko District (1,400 population), the eastern 
district of Nago City (55,000 population) (Inoue, 2007, p. 127; SACO, 1996). This would 
decrease the likelihood of a military accident and help to create a more sustainable 
alliance. 
If some of the details of the return were less than desirable, Hashimoto 
nevertheless also received praise for his respectful handling of Okinawan sentiment, as 
well as the pains he took to consult with his Okinawan counterpart in Governor Ota 
(Tanaka, 2010; Inoue, 2007, p. 136; Honda, 2008; Tamura, 1998). Throughout his tenure 
as prime minister, Hashimoto would hold eighteen meetings with Governor Ota and 
appoint a special representative, Okamoto Yukio, to take into account the sentiment of 
Okinawans. The appointment of Okamoto Yukio came with the approval of Governor 
Ota. As special representative, Okamoto went about establishing a relationship of trust 
with the mayors of Okinawa, visiting the prefecture 53 times during Hashimoto’s 
administration (Funabashi, 1999, p. 184-185; Brooks, 2010, see also, Okamoto, 1996)24. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The literature on the Futenma negotiations is extensive. Over the course of negotiations, officials would 
have to work out the knotty problems of where to relocate the functions of Futenma and what type of 
construction method should be used to create the facility. Debates would rage over the various merits and 
demerits of land reclamation versus an offshore helipad. Later these issues would evolve into debates about 
the length of the runway and what shape the runway should take. Meanwhile, officials from Tokyo would 
have to figure out new development schemes to ameliorate local opposition (see Morimoto, 2010; Brooks, 
2010; Inoue, 2007). 
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Managing Tensions with Okinawa: Land Leases and the Local Referendum 
 
 
If Hashimoto’s approach can be described as respectful and proactive, at times 
he would also have to be heavy-handed, using back-room maneuvering and the political 
process to override local sentiments. Two incidents in particular demonstrate the complex 
relationship between Okinawa, US bases, and national-level politics—and in particular, 
Hashimoto’s own dubious role in the affair. The first issue is the referendum held in 
Nago regarding the relocation of Futenma Airbase to the Henoko region of the city. The 
second is Hashimoto’s handling of Governor Ota’s refusal to sign papers authorizing the 
appropriation of land leases for areas occupied by US bases.  
In late 1997, the local residents of Nago city would hold a non-binding 
referendum on the relocation of the Futenma Airbase to the Henoko region of Nago city. 
As described extensively in Inoue’s (2007) study of the incident, the referendum pitted a 
wide range of anti-base activists, environmentalist, and anti-militarists against pro-
business and pro-LDP forces in the city. In order to win over the population, the LDP 
would flood the city with money explicitly linking the building of a replacement facility 
with the future of development funds to the area. In late 1997, the local residents of Nago 
city would vote in a non-binding referendum 54 percent to 46 percent not to accept the 
replacement base in the Henoko area of Nago city. In the face of this public opposition, 
the Mayor of Nago, Higa Tetsuya, pledged not to allow the relocation of the base. This 
was a significant blow for the LDP and Hashimoto, who had invested so much in 
negotiating the return of Futenma.  
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However, in a bizarre turn of events, the mayor of Nago would fly to Tokyo 
several days later, pledge his support for the relocation of the base, calling it “a step 
forward for the reduction of the U.S. Military presence in Okinawa,” and then resign in 
front of Hashimoto (Economist, 1998, January 3; Inoue, 2007, p. 193; Okumura, 1998b, 
p. 166-167) Hashimoto reportedly shed tears of happiness (Inoue, 2007, p. 193; Honda, 
2008, p. 238-239). What was specifically said to Mayor Higa to make him accept the 
relocation of the bases remains unknown (or at the very least, the author has found no 
account of what deals were made in the backdrop of this incident)25. On February 1998, 
several months after the referendum, Governor Ota would withdraw his support for the 
agreement to move Futenma Airbase’s functions to the Henoko region of Nago city, 
citing local sentiments and the impact of the new base construction on the environment.  
Another major issue that demonstrates the troubled relationship between the 
mainland and Okinawa over the bases was the issue of land leases that began during the 
Murayama government and extended into Hashimoto’s administration. The issue was a 
technical and legal issue that had created the conditions for a unique form of political 
resistance. While most of these land-holders were more than willing to accept rents from 
                                                 
25 There is more to this story, especially with regard to the relationship of Okinawan activism, national-
level politics, and development spending in Okinawa. After the referendum in Nago, the links between 
mainland development money and acceptance of local bases became more explicit. Governor Ota 
Masahide—the politician who had most adamantly fought against the presence of the bases—would be an 
unfortunate casualty of these politics. Despite the public consensus in Okinawa on reducing the bases, 
progressive governor Ota Masahide (1990-1998) lost a tight election in 1998 to Inamine Keiichi, a more 
conservative, pro-Tokyo candidate. The defeat was the result of “a perception, accurate or otherwise, that 
the determined stand of Ota against the bases threatened the economic future of the prefecture” (Hook and 
Sidle, 2003, p. 11). The future governor, Inamine Keiichi, a local business man, would be rewarded with a 
larger development package from the central government, and the 2000 G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit was 
held in the city of Nago, with all the financial benefits that came with it. For more on Okinawan base 
politics, see Cooley and Martin (2006), Inoue (2007), and Gabe (2003). Former Governor Ota Masahide 
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the central government (typically at above market price), there was nevertheless a small 
but principled group of land owners who would refuse to lease their land to places 
occupied by US bases (this group represented less than one percent of base-occupied 
land). To resolve this issue, the governor of Okinawa would periodically have to sign 
documents to appropriate the land (Inoue, 2007; Shinoda, 1998, p. 717-718; Akiyama, 
2002, p. 189-190). Governor Ota, however, had been elected for his resistance to the 
bases in Okinawa. On November 4, 1995, two months after the infamous rape incident on 
the island, a high profile confrontation between Ota and Prime Minister Murayama would 
ensue where Ota refused to sign the documents that would renew the leases of the 
unwilling land owners. The issue would go unresolved and on March 1996, under the 
Hashimoto administration, US bases on the land would fall into a legal vacuum.  
In response to this event, the Hashimoto administration proposed a revision of 
the 1952 Special Law Governing Land for Armed Forces Stationed in Japan. The revision 
would give the central government the authority to override local governments and 
landowners and renew the leases for US bases when necessary. The incident is an 
important one because of the legislative process used to enact this controversial 
legislation (the example will also provide an important contrast for Chapter 5 and 
Hatoyama’s handling of issues regarding Okinawa). At the time, the LDP was still in a 
three-party coalition with the Socialist Party and the New Party Sakigake (though none of 
these parties were represented on the cabinet at this point). When the Socialist Party 
refused to cooperate in the revision of this law, Hashimoto contacted then-New Frontier 
                                                                                                                                                 
also continues to write extensively on the Okinawan base problem in such publications as Sekai (see for 
example, an early interview Ota (1996), as well as Ota and Satou, 2010).  
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Party president Ozawa Ichiro. Sensing that Ozawa was hungry for a way to remain 
relevant in national policy, Hashimoto would put aside his own personal rivalry with 
Ozawa to pass this crucial piece of legislation. With NFP support, the Taiyo party, 
Democratic Party, and Sakigaki party also joined the coalition to pass the bill in the Diet 
in April 1997 (Brooks, 2010; Funabashi, 1999). As we will see in Chapter 4 (the Koizumi 
case study), flexibility in courting opposition parties can be a powerful tool for achieving 
policy successes. A lack of flexibility, however, (as we will see in Chapter 5, the 
Hatoyama case study), can often lock prime ministers into policy quagmires with small 
parties or factions within the party that oppose a particular piece of legislation.  
Even after the end of Hashimoto’s administration in July 1998, the imbroglio 
over Futuenma would continue. Though Governor Ota would lose the 1998 election to 
the LDP and Okinawa business community-supported candidate Inamine Keiichi, this 
would not make the implementation of the agreement over Futenma easier. Inamine 
would eventually come out with his own proposal for the replacement facility in the 
Henoko region of Nago. His proposal would call for a facility with a significantly 
lengthened runway that could accommodate both civilian and military aircraft. 
Furthermore, Inamine would agree to the plan only on the condition that the airport 
would revert to Okinawa within fifteen years (Brooks, 2010, p. 34-35). Thus, the 
Futenma issue would drag on long after Hashimoto left office.  
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Symbolic Contributions: Setting the Way for Greater Political-Military Ties and Outward 
Antimilitarism 
 
Hashimoto would also make important symbolic contributions to defense 
politics. Surprisingly, he contributed both to eroding the barriers of domestic anti-
militarism and in defining the contours of a new outward-looking pacifism. As chairman 
of the Bereaved Family Association prior to becoming prime minister, Hashimoto had 
courted the support of the military and military families. As prime minister, he would 
take important steps toward acknowledging the legitimacy of the military in Japan. One 
important symbolic act was his decision to meet regularly with military officers in the 
prime minister’s residence. Another important step was his abolition of the 1952 directive 
that forbade military staff officers from having direct contact with Diet members or 
officials of government without the presence of a civilian member of the JDA (Samuels, 
2007a, p. 101; Okumura, 1998b, p. 178-182). Though these steps may seem trivial, they 
were important “early slice” in Japan’s anti-militarist tradition (see Samuels, 2007a) that 
would pave the way for much bolder moves during both the Koizumi and Abe 
administrations in the 2000s 26. 
However, in spite of his reputation as a conservative on defense issues, 
Hashimoto would also make important contributions to Japan’s outward focused pacifism. 
Prior to Hashimoto’s administration, two non-LDP prime ministers (Hosokawa Mihiro 
and Murayama Tomiichi) had actively pursued a course of recognizing and apologizing 
                                                 
26 Discussion regarding the upgrading of the Japan Defense Agency to the status of a full ministry was also 
discussed during the Hashimoto administration. However, one of the reasons plans to upgrade the Defense 
Agency were shelved was diplomatic consideration for China (see Kyuma, 2009, p. 54-55).  
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for Japan’s past wartime crimes, including the infamous state-sanctioned comfort women 
system. In his own political treatise, Hashimoto had criticized Hosokawa’s 
acknowledgement of war guilt, suggesting that it would bring endless claims for 
compensation from Japan’s neighbors (Hashimoto, 1994, p. 98-100). And yet, it was 
Hashimoto’s tacit support while vice-prime minister in the Murayama government that 
allowed the official government apology for Japan’s wartime crimes to come about. 
Moreover, his support for the Murayama apology came in spite of his role as Chairperson 
for the Bereaved Family Association (Tanaka, 2009, p. 148). Hashimoto would set a 
precedent for Japan’s evolving outward-focused pacifism through his endorsement of the 
Murayama’s official apology (articulated in his own words) and his personal support of 
the Asian Women’s Fund, a government established but privately funded foundation to 
compensate living victims of Japan’s comfort women program during the war. 
 Like Hashimoto’s influence in other policy areas, Hashimoto’s influence with 
the official Murayama apology reached far beyond his role as prime minister. While 
serving as MITI Minister under the Murayama cabinet, Hashimoto also been served as 
the Chairperson for the Bereaved Family Association. Without Hashimoto’s support, the 
official government apology would have been void. Despite his ties to the conservative 
organization, he would also strengthen the apology by recognizing and rearticulating it 
during his prime ministership (Tanaka, 2009, p. 148). Hashimoto’s support of the Asian 
Women’s Fund was also important. Hashimoto would endorse the fund in an official 
letter on behalf of the Fund, offering his personal apology to that of the government’s 
official apology for the Comfort Women issue (Hashimoto, 1996; Economist, 1996, May 
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18). This letter would be sent to each of the three hundred women in South Korea, 
Taiwan, and the Philippines where atonement projects were to be implemented. In 
addition, in his trip to China in 1997, Hashimoto would express his “remorse and 
heartfelt apology”—an iteration of the official Murayama apology—that would serve as a 
template for even anti-mainstream conservatives such as Koizumi Junichiro (McCormack, 
2007, p. 15; Kitamura, 1998). These initiatives came on top of his already well-known 
endorsements of environmental security and sustainable development at international 
forums, and his efforts to expand Japan’s profile with neighbors such as ASEAN and 
Russia through personal diplomacy.  
 
Hashimoto’s Fall from Power: A Retreat from Popular Politics to Party Patronage 
 
Though not directly related to his approaches to defense policy and politics, 
Hashimoto’s fall from power is worthy of analysis because of what it teaches us about the 
nature of the position of the prime minister and his strategic choices. In many important 
moments during his administration, Shinoda describes Hashimoto as a “grandstander” 
politician (2000, p. 210). In Shinoda’s characterization he was a lone wolf within the 
party who was willing to use public support to pursue an ambitious reform agenda. He 
had appointed himself chairman of his own advisory committee on administrative 
reforms. At the height of the reform movement in 1997, his popularity hit its peak of 59 
percent. In September of 1997, Hashimoto and the advisory council released the Interim 
Report, which set out an ambitious agenda to privatize postal savings and insurance 
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services, scale back the number of ministries from 22 to 13, and drastically increase the 
power of the prime minister’s office. Throughout the process, Hashimoto maneuvered 
around the bureaucracies and protected the council from the attacks of the LDP policy 
zokus (Shinoda, 2000, 2011; MacLachlan, 2010).   
However, just as important were the aspects of Hashimoto’s leadership that 
made him similar to “party-beholden” or consensus-style prime ministers. Like most 
Japanese prime ministers, Hashimoto paid close attention to the balance of power among 
his party factions and created his cabinet with this balance in mind. In addition, at crucial 
points Hashimoto risked his popular support by adhering to norms of party patronage. 
This can be seen especially when it came to the controversial appointment of Sato Koko, 
a politician convicted in 1986 of taking a bribe in the famous Lockheed scandal, to the 
position of Minister of Management and Coordination. The appointment was a “gift” to 
the conservative wing of the LDP and to faction leader Nakasone Yasuhiro in particular 
(Economist 1997, September 25). In addition, Hashimoto hoped that Sato’s clout as a 
party insider would help him suppress opposition to his reform agenda (Shinoda, 2000, p. 
187). However, Hashimoto’s reputation changed dramatically after his appointment of 
Sato. Hashimoto knew that this appointment was risky given Sato’s involvement in the 
highly publicized Lockheed scandal. Despite his reservations, Hashimoto faced relentless 
pressure from Nakasone to make the appointment (Shinoda, 1998, p. 719; Shinoda, 2011, 
p. 56). It was a classic choice between public opinion and party patronage. The negative 
impact of the appointment on Hashimoto’s popularity, however, was beyond anything he 
could have expected. As a result of the appointment, Hashimoto’s approval rating would 
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drop from 59 percent to 28 percent according to a Kyodo poll (Shinoda, 1998; 
Economist, 1997, September 25; see also, Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 25-26). As a result 
Sato would resign shortly afterwards and Hashimoto would bow his head in apology to 
the public. As a result, his public image as a strong political leader willing to stand up to 
his own party was damaged.  
As a result of his declining popularity, Hashimoto had to make many political 
compromises from his original interim report. Some of his most important reforms, for 
example, on postal privatization, were greatly limited by party pressure as his popularity 
ratings began to fall (as was described in Chapter 2, if it were not for the risky political 
gambit of an ambitious cabinet minister by the name of Koizumi Junichiro, there might 
not have been any move on postal privatization at this point; see, MacLachlan, 2010, 
2011). In addition, Japan’s economic recovery suffered a major setback. Hashimoto’s 
decision to raise the consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent, a measure that had 
been suggested by the powerful Ministry of Finance (MoF), was primarily blamed for 
this setback (Fukui and Fukai, 1998, p. 29). Thus, it seemed as if the once “lone wolf” 
was giving into the most entrenched and conservative bases of power, the need to 
appease LDP elders and the powerful MoF.  
As a result of poor showings in the 1998 Upper House elections, Hashimoto 
would have to resign as prime minister and party president. He would be replaced by his 
foreign minister, Obuchi Keizo. However, under the Obuchi administration, Hashimoto 
would be retained as a special foreign affairs advisor to help maintain the progress in 
Russian-Japanese affairs. This moves demonstrated the standing and trust that Hashimoto  
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Table 3: Hashimoto Ryutaro: Approaches to Defense Policy and Politics 
Approach Characteristics Results 
   
Personally Endorse the Alliance/
Push Joint Declaration and Joint 
Guidelines 
*Bottom Up/ US-Japan 
alliance managers as key 
players  
*Nye Initiative as key 
intellectual input 
*Successful Summit 
with President Clinton in 
April 
*Approximately 20 
points boost in 
popularity ratings 
Pursue the Return of Futenma *Top Down *Limited 
Involvement of 
Bureaucrats and Party 
Officials 
*Agreement for Return 
in Principle of Base 
(with the stipulation that 
bases functions are 
relocated in Okinawa) 
*Public recognition of 
his role in agreement 
Pivot towards China *Top-Down Diplomacy  
*Re-start of Yen loans  
*An uptick in relations 
with China, reduction in 
tensions 
Allowing Military Officers  
into the Prime Minister’s 
Residence 
*Symbolic Gesture *Would serve as an 
important step toward 
breaking down barriers 
between civilian 
policymakers and 
military 
Endorse Murayama Apology and 
Asian 
Women’s Fund 
*Symbolic Gesture *Created diplomatic 
possibilities with South 
Korea and China, 
softened Japan’s image 
in the reason 
*Risked his credibility as 
a nationalist with LDP 
right wing  
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had established with other foreign leaders, especially Russian leader Boris Yeltsin. He 
would also later take up the position of the Minister of Administrative Reform in the 
Mori Yoshihiro cabinet to help see his reform plan through (Shinoda, 2007, p. 77). Thus, 
at the very least Hashimoto was able to continue to exercise influence on the policy 
issues he had helped create as prime minister.  
As will be discussed in other case studies and the conclusion, the downfall of 
Hashimoto—though not related to security issues—demonstrates a persistent aspect of 
Japanese politics in the post cold war era. In a time where many voters are non-aligned 
and there is a strong appetite for reform, prime ministers will frequently fall from power 
when they appear even the slightest bit ineffectual or when they seem to privilege 
intraparty management over their own stated policy agenda.  
 
Conclusion: The Triumph of Pragmatic, Mundane Strategy 
 
At a time of deep uncertainty, Hashimoto was able to succeed in defense policy 
and politics by balancing the needs of different stakeholders from the political center. 
Having inherited the resources of his predecessor—SACO, the Nye Initiative, and a draft 
for the Joint Declaration—he was able to innovate these institutions by reaching out to 
Okinawa and pivoting on a revitalized alliance to improve relations with China and 
broaden relations with other actors (noticeably Russia and ASEAN). If Hashimoto’s 
tenure was a triumph of mundane strategy, then it was a triumph that was facilitated by 
his astute attention to detail. It was, however, an approach that had important limitations. 
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As was seen in the latter part of Hashimoto’s administration, a defense strategy based on 
a revitalized US-Japan strategic alliance also created natural barriers to better ties with 
Okinawa and China. Hashimoto was able to overcome some of these barriers through his 
use of financial incentives (development spending and public works in the case of 
Okinawa; yen loans in the case of China) and sincere efforts to build personal relations 
with their respective leaders. However, these efforts could only reach so far. Much of the 
improvement in relations with China and Okinawa (with Russia as well) would be short-
lived.  
Hashimoto’s greatest triumphs would remain his domestic reforms. Indeed, one 
of the ironies of history is the interdependence of the histories of Kozumi Junichiro and 
Hashimoto Ryutaro. Despite all of Hashimoto’s successes—his reorganization of the 
bureaucracy and the introduction of new executive institutions designed to empower the 
prime minister—it was his stubborn insistence on being a good party-man and following 
the dictates of the powerful Ministry of Finance that eventually led to his fall from power. 
As we will see in the next chapter, these were choices that Koizumi, with his eye 
constantly on public opinion, would never have made. Koizumi would eventually beat 
out Hashimoto in 2001 in the race to become party president, and thus, to be the next 
prime minister. Hashimoto, who was favored to win that race because of his popularity 
with the LDP party elders, lost partly because of changes in rules governing the selection 
process of prime ministers. Ironically, the former prime minister once chosen to lead 
based on his popularity was beaten out by a candidate that embraced his lone wolf 
precepts more adamantly than he had. Koizumi would go on to have the longest tenure of 
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any prime minister in the post cold war era. A host of academic studies, popular books, 
and dissertations would be written about Koizumi, whereas the study of Hashimoto has 
been largely relegated to a few studies of political reform in Japan. Yet, without 
Hashimoto’s reforms, Koizumi would have lacked many of the administrative tools he 
needed to conduct his famous “kantei diplomacy” that made his administration so 
effective (see Chapter 4). 
In terms of his contributions to security policy and politics, Hashimoto will 
mainly be remembered for his stewardship—for placing the US-Japan security 
relationship on a secure footing and for managing the Okinawan protests and Chinese 
objections adeptly in a way that protected the alliance and largely maintained the status 
quo. US-Japan security cooperation was strengthened, a large contingent of US troops 
was retained on Japanese soil, and working-level meetings on how to move Futenma 
Airbase and make the US presence more manageable for local communities continued. 
Most significantly the revised guidelines expanded the purview of the alliance to cover 
regional contingencies and opened the door for a more global alliance. In addition, 
Hashimoto was also able to make small innovations, expanding ties with ASEAN, 
making some headway on negotiations with Russia, and changing precedents for the 
interaction between civilian and military leaders.  
In some crucial ways, however, Hashimoto’s tenure might be considered a 
failure. He may be faulted, for example, for not resolving the Okinawa base issue in a 
way that was politically sustainable. Indeed, despite the great fanfare in which the return 
of Futenma was announced, the airbase still sits in the same crowed place it did in 1996 
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when the reversion was agreed to in principle. One may frame this as a failure to manage 
more skillfully the bottom-up policy process. One may fault him, for example, for 
allowing the key stipulation, early in the agreement, to relocate Futenma’s functions 
within Okinawa Prefecture without consulting with a wider range of actors. One could 
also fault him for settling too quickly on the option of moving the functions of Futenma 
to the Henoko area of Nago. Those on the far left of the political spectrum might even 
fault Hashimoto for not embracing Okinawa’s plan for a gradual phase out of the bases, 
with a total demilitarization of the island chain by 2015. These criticisms, however, tend 
to miss much of the historical context of Hashimoto’s situation. At a time when his 
political position was tenuous, even attempting to find a resolution to the problem took an 
enormous amount of political courage (and significant political risk). Moreover, even a 
conditional return of Futenma was beyond the imagination of many national-level 
politicians and bureaucrats. For this reason, even anti-base activists like former Governor 
Ota give Hashimoto high marks for his leadership (Funabashi, 1999; Ota, 2000).  
Another potential criticism of Hashimoto is that he did not fight the 
sectionalism of the defense subgovernment effectively enough. At a time when “security” 
was in the process of being radically reshaped following the end of the Cold War, there 
was a substantial opportunity to chart a new course that would have allowed Japan—one 
way or another—to come to terms with the legacy of the Pacific War. Instead, as critics 
have written of the legacy of the “Nye Initiative,” Hashimoto helped endorse a process of 
“ossification” that has kept the US base structure intact and has changed very little of the 
fundamental dependence of Japan on the US for defense (see Johnson and Keehn, 1995; 
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Carpenter, 1996). Alternative approaches were possible and alternative resources were 
available. The Murayama apology had created one political opportunity for better 
relations with neighbors. New processes for managing the history issue with China and 
South Korea could have been created with a more adamant push from national leaders 
and may have allowed Japan to sustain its anti-militarist posture, instead of drifting 
further into the US-Japan alliance. In addition, Hashimoto could have countered the “Nye 
Initiative”—a bureaucratically-led process—with a full democratic dialogue with the 
people of Japan. Instead, Hashimoto allowed, and indeed enabled, bureaucratic alliance 
managers to reshape a new consensus on defense without greater democratic inputs.  
These critics, I would argue, have placed blame in the wrong figure27. As a 
conservative and pragmatist, Hashimoto was always the ideal figure to promote this 
ongoing process, and all biographical evidence supports the idea that Hashimoto 
approved of the bottom-up bilateral work on defense he would eventually endorse. 
Hashimoto, one of the most entrepreneurial prime ministers of the post cold war era 
(behind Koizumi), chose a conservative path and mundane resources for a reason. 
Financial issues, especially the issue of what to do with troubled Jusen company loans, 
                                                 
27 In a sense, Hashimoto’s promotion of the revitalization of the US-Japan alliance and its ideological 
overtones had been softened up not only by the bureaucracy, but also the actions and non-actions of three 
short-lived prime ministers. In addition, evidence suggests that China and South Korea further enabled this 
process by failing to reciprocate the olive leaf of the Murayama apology. There was a sense within the 
bureaucracies and government that during the past three years, both China and South Korea had stopped 
taking Japan seriously (Funabashi, 1999, p. 28). Clearly, if there had been any chance for an explicit 
challenge to the US-Japan alliance, it had been missed in the Murayama administrations (1994-1996). As 
part of the coalition, Murayama Tomiichi became the first Socialist Prime Minister of Japan. Historically, 
the Socialist Party had been opposed not only to the constitutionality of the SDF, but also, the US-Japan 
Security Treaty. As a condition of joining the coalition, however, Murayama had given up his opposition to 
both of these issues (and in doing so would eventually lead to the implosion of his party). In a sense, it was 
Murayama’s tacit acceptance of the terms of the alliance that opened up the political space for greater 
entrenchment in US regional strategy.  
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and other government reforms were of much more immediate concern to him and the 
public at large. At issue, as well, was the rehabilitation of the LDP party as a whole.  
On another level, Hashimoto might also be criticized for neglecting the 
multilateralism and antimilitarist trend that had been evolving around the debate over 
“international contributions” since the 1991 Gulf War shock. The Higuchi Report that 
had been a product of the expert panel established by the Hosokawa administration had 
advocated a stronger role for Japan under UN-led multilateralism. In a sense, the Nye 
Initiative (and the Nye Report) had been aimed at drawing Japan more squarely into a 
US-led security agenda. By embracing many of the precepts of the Nye Report in the 
Joint Declaration during the Hashimoto-Clinton summit, it seemed as if Hashimoto had 
rejected Japan’s multilateralism and UN-centric trajectory (see Shibata, 2011, p. 201). In 
a sense, one might argue that this was the inevitable result of the crises in the immediate 
vicinity of Japan—the Korean nuclear crisis and the China-Taiwan standoff—in which 
the UN had little role, as well as a year-long process between bureaucrats whose purview 
was “defense,” not security in its larger forms.  
It is crucial to recognize that Hashimoto’s approach to defense politics did not 
make a key mistake that another prime minister (Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, see 
Chapter 5) would make. In short, though antimilitarist and UN-led multilateralism could 
be powerful supplements to Japan’s defense policy, it could not displace the functions of 
the US-Japan Security Treaty. Though Hashimoto’s tenure as prime minister was largely 
dominated by issues of revitalizing the US-Japan strategic partnership and the Okinawan 
base issue, Japan’s UN-based multilateral security policy would survive the deepening of 
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the US-Japan alliance. At the same time that Hashimoto and defense bureaucrats were 
pursuing closer relations with the US and its security objectives, Hashimoto’s foreign 
minister, and next prime minister, Obuchi Keizo was continuing Japan’s UN-based and 
multilateralist security policy through his exploration of human security initiatives like 
the Ottawa Treaty against Landmines. Human Security initiatives would be a strong 
feature of Japan’s foreign policy from 1998-2003 (and have had some staying power 
beyond) (see Edstrom, 2008). Indeed, these initiatives arose very little concern in 
Washington because alliance issues were being met not only with a strong working-level 
process, but also, were being addressed by Japan’s top leadership.  
If Hashimoto cannot be said to have pioneered new processes or ideas on 
defense, at the very least his approach to defense demonstrates aspects of effective 
strategy as defined by Rumelt (1993, 2011). Hashimoto demonstrated a good 
understanding of his operational environment and its resources (an ongoing bureaucratic 
process, a chance for leader-to-leader diplomacy on many levels, as well as some 
opportunities to alleviate the base burden in Okinawa) and its challenges (the need to 
balance the tensions of the US-Japan alliance with the needs of China and Okinawa); he 
understood the benefit of proximate achievements (the Joint Declaration, the Guidelines, 
and an agreement on Futenma); he understood the linkage of different aspects of his 
approach (proximate successes in area of defense could help solidify the LDP’s power); 
and he understood overall design (a revitalized US-Japan strategic relationship could be 
used as a resource to pursue better relations with China, as well as Russia and ASEAN).  
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As this dissertation explores the much more robust leadership of Prime 
Minister Koizumi, it is important to remember that Hashimoto’s situation was much 
different than Koizumi’s. In the early days of his prime ministership, Hashimoto came to 
power as a result of a three party coalition that privileged consensus and a committee 
structure. With much more circumscribed authority than Koizumi, he was nevertheless 
able to push through much needed financial and administrative reforms. Despite several 
major slip ups during his time in office, many considered him a shoe-in to take the prime 
ministership yet again. Yet, it was not to be. Instead, Koizumi would win the election by 
appealing to popular sentiments for greater reform.  
 
Chronology of Key Events: Hashimoto Ryutaro Administration 
 
Sep. 4, 1995: Rape case occurs in Okinawa involving 3 marines that spark intense 
protests 
Sep. 29, 1995: Governor Ota refuses to sign the papers as a replacement for land owners 
Nov. 19, 1995: Vice President Gore and Murayama meet and establish SACO 
Nov. 20, 1995: SACO commences its first meeting 
Dec. 7, 1995: Prime Minister Murayama files suit against Governor Ota in the Fukuoka 
Higher Court for failing to sign the papers authorizing the land leases 
January 11, 1996: The Hashimoto Administration begins 
January 23, 1996: Hashimoto’s first meeting with Governor Ota to discuss the base issue 
Feb. 9, 1996: Proposal released to use public funds to help “Jusen” financial institutions 
Feb. 23, 1996: Hashimoto Meets Clinton in Santa Monica, where the Futenma Base issue 
is discussed.  
March 8-25, 1996: Standoff between China and Taiwan over elections; dispatch of USS 
Independence to calm situation 
March 25, 1996: The Fukuoka High Court finds in favor of the Prime Minister on case of 
Okinawan land leases 
April 1, 1996 : Ota appeals the decision to the Japanese Supreme Court 
April 12, 1996 : The US and Japan agree in principle to the return of Futenma (within the 
next 5-7 years) and to work toward the reorganization, reduction, and consolidation of 
bases on Okinawa. 
April, 15, 1996: The interim report for SACO is released 
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April 16-17, 1996: Hashimoto and Clinton Meet; they sign the Joint Statement 
reaffirming the alliance. 
April 19, 1996:  Hashimoto visits Russia and meets with President Yeltsin.  
April 23, 1996 : A Nikkei Survey finds that Hashimoto’s approval rating rose from 36% 
to 48% 
June 18, 1996: Hashimoto announces his Administrative Reform Vision 
June 23, 1996: Hashimoto expresses his apology for comfort women issue at joint press 
conference with President Kim Young Sam in South Korea.  
June 29, 1996: Hashimoto visits Yasukuni Shrine on his birthday; signs the register as 
“the Prime Minister” (the first visit by a prime minister in 11 years).  
Aug. 28, 1996: The Supreme court finds in favor of the Prime Minister (orders Ota to 
sign the lease forms) 
Sept. 9, 1996: Second Meeting between Hashimoto and Governor Ota    
Sept. 13, 1996 : Ota signs the documents that specify the forced leasing of land to the US 
military; Hashimoto orders lawsuits against Ota to be dropped  
Sept. 17, 1996: Hashimoto’s first visit to Okinawa 
Sept. 27, 1996: Dissolution of the Lower House 
Oct. 20, 1996: LDP gains 28 seats in the Lower House Elections (239 in total), twelve 
short of a majority.      
Oct. 21, 1996:  LDP, SDPJ, and Sakigake announce that they will maintain their three 
party alliance.  
Nov. 11, 1996: Hashimoto is reconfirmed as president of the LDP and Prime Minister. 
The Second Hashimoto administration begins.  
Nov. 11, 1996: Hashimoto forms a new cabinet (made up entirely of LDP) and announces 
his six major reforms: administrative reform, government finance reform, economic 
structural reforms, financial system reforms, social security reforms, and educational 
reforms. 
Nov. 28, 1996: The First Meeting of the Administrative Reform Council  
Dec. 2, 1996:  A final report compiled by the U.S. and Japanese Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa calls for a 21 percent reduction in U.S. military bases in Okinawa 
and construction of an offshore facility to replace the heliport at Futenma base. 
Dec. 17, 1996 : Peru Hostage Crisis Begins 
Jan. 25, 1997: Hashimoto and President Kim Young Sam from South Korea meet in 
Beppu 
February 1, 1997: Hashimoto meets with Peruvian President Fujimori in Toronto, Canada. 
Feb. 12, 1997:  Asahi Shimbun popularity polls show that he has slipped 13 points to 42 
percent from December 
March 24, 1997: Hashimoto tells Vice President Gore in meeting that he will not be 
asking for troop reductions on Okinawa 
March 25, 1997: Hashimoto tells Governor Ota that he will not ask for a reduction in 
troop presence in Okinawa 
April 1, 1997: Start of the change from 3 percent to 5 percent consumption tax.  
April 3, 1997:  Hashimoto holds meetings with Ozawa (Shinshinto) 
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April 17, 1997: Diet passes law with help of Ozawa’s party that amends Special 
Measures for Land for the US Military. The central government will have the legal power 
to continue using Okinawan land plots for US forces even after leases involving 12 US 
bases and some 3,000 anti-base landowners expire on May 14. 
April 23, 1997: The Peru Hostage is resolved through military action (Peruvian 
Commando Forces). 
April 25, 1997 : Hashimoto visits the US for a third time  
April 26, 1997: Hashimoto meets with President Clinton 
June 18, 1996: The “Junsen” Bill becomes law 
July 12-13, 1997- Kyodo Poll shows Hashimoto support rate at 59 percent 
August 17, 1997 :  Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama remarks that “shuhen jitai” 
(situations around Japan) language of new Joint Guidelines does include Taiwan Straits. 
Chinese officials react harshly. 
August 25, 1997:  The Committee on Reform Begins. 
August 28, 1997: In a speech, Hashimoto says that he shares the sentiments of the 
Murayama apology and offers his “heartfelt apology” for wartime atrocities 
September 4-8, 1997:  Hashimoto makes first visit to China; emphasizes that Joint 
Security Declaration and US-Japan Joint Guidelines are not targeting any specific region 
or country 
September 11, 1997: Hashimoto reshuffles his cabinet. In deference to Nakasone, 
Hashimoto appoints Sato Koko as Minister of Management and Coordination       
September 16, 1997: Members of coalition government request Sato Koko’s resignation 
September 22, 1997: Sato Koko resigns; As a result of the appointment, Hashimoto’s 
approval rating would drop from 59% to 28% according to a Kyodo poll 
Sept. 23, 1997 : Security Consultative Committee (2 plus 2) agrees on new guidelines 
Nov. 11, 1997:  In Hashimoto-Yeltsin meeting parties agree to try to conclude peace 
treaty by 2000. 
Nov. 11-16, 1997:  Premier Li Peng visits Japan and calls for “dialogue and cooperation” 
December 3, 1997 : Final Report of Administrative Reform Council 
December 12, 1997: Hashimoto survives no confidence vote in the Lower House. 
December, 21 1997: Referendum for Nago on relocation of base takes place. The results 
show that the city prefers not to have the base relocated to the Henoko region of Nago 
(52.85 percent vote against the relocation).  
January 20, 1998 : In effort to shore up confidence in the banking system, Hashimoto 
Administration announce plan to use public funds.        
February 6, 1998: Okinawa Gov. Masahide Ota announces his opposition to the proposed 
offshore heliport facilities. 
February 8, 1998: Kishimoto Tateo, supported by those in favor of the offshore heliport 
plan, is elected mayor of Nago. 
February 8, 1998: Kyodo Poll finds Hashimoto approval rating at 34 percent 
April 1, 1998 : The Start of “Big Bang” in Financial Deregulation. Hashimoto announces 
that this will make Japanese financial markets “fair, free, and global” 
April 19, 1998: Hashimoto meets with Boris Yeltsin in Shizuoka Prefecture to discuss the 
Northern Territories.  
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April 28, 1998:  Hashimoto administration submits two laws related to the new US-Japan 
guidelines.  
May 18, 1998: Hashimoto dispatches ASDF planes to Singapore in case they are needed 
to evacuate Japanese citizens from Indonesia.  
June 1, 1998: The LDP’s two coalition partners announce they will be leaving the 
coalition 
June 9, 1998: Hashimoto’s administrative reform bill clears Diet 
July 17, 1998: In the Upper House Elections, the number of LDP seats in the Upper 
House falls from 61 to 44. Hashimoto Ryutaro announces he will resign to take 
responsibility.  
July 24, 1998: Obuchi Keizo is chosen as new prime minister for Japan. Hashimoto to 
take up position as foreign policy advisor.  
 
Timeline adapted from newspaper articles from Nikkei Shimbun, Japan Times, and 
Asahi Shimbun (also Funabashi, 1999; Tamura, 1998)  
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CHAPTER 4:  
The Strategist and the Policy Entrepreneur: The Prime Ministership of Koizumi Junichiro 
(2001-2006) 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Koizumi Junichiro (April, 26 2001-September 26, 2006) is the most studied 
Japanese prime minister of the post cold war era, and ranks alongside Yoshida Shigeru, 
Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka Kakuei, and Nakasone Yasuhiro as one of the most interesting 
and enigmatic prime ministers in Japanese history. In the post cold war era, Koizumi has 
had no equal in terms of his leadership prowess. Indeed, much of the scholarly literature 
shows that Koizumi was an exemplar of prime ministerial leadership in a setting where 
the general public had become used to weak, consensus-based leaders (Mishima, 2007; 
Shinoda, 2003, 2007; Hayao, 1993). Much has already been written about the style of 
Koizumi politics—books on his leadership often note his skillful use of mass media, his 
talent as a political entertainer, and his use of simple expressions (“one phrase politics”) 
and appeals to citizens’ common sense (Mikuriya, 2006; Iijima, 2006; Otake, 2006; 
Horiuchi, 2009; Uchiyama, 2010). For some, Koizumi’s style of politics was populism of 
the worst kind (McCormack, 2007; Hosaka, 2005), a form of theater that played on the 
deep insecurities of the Japanese public rather than addressing the public’s true dilemmas. 
However, beyond the style of Koizumi politics, what this chapter calls attention to are the 
fundamental ideas that gave Koizumi’s policies coherence.  
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As Rumelt (2011) argues, good strategy frequently coalesces around a single 
idea, an entrepreneurial insight, that is simple yet surprising that becomes the basis for 
coherent strategic action. In the previous chapter we saw that the key insight of 
Hashimoto’s administration was that available bureaucratic resources could be used to 
revitalize the alliance--and that within a revitalized framework, actions could be taken to 
improve relations with Okinawa Prefecture and China. Koizumi’s key insight was 
necessarily different because the aims of his prime ministership were more revolutionary 
and his power base within the party was weaker than even Hashimoto’s. Insider accounts 
and personal testimony suggest that Koizumi understood that in order to enact 
controversial policies, like his postal reform agenda, he would have to draw on resources 
outside of his party (Mikuriya, 2006, p. 32; Iijima, 2006; Tawara, 2006).  Koizumi’s 
ambitious reform agenda necessitated that Koizumi look for support from the public 
through very visible policy successes.  
Though his most dramatic accomplishment was in the area of postal reform, his 
successes in the area of defense politics were also significant; indeed, much like with 
Hashimoto, successes in the area of defense and alliance management would serve as a 
precursor for high-profile domestic reforms. Despite having a weak power base within 
the LDP, Koizumi was able to improve ties with the US, enacting legislation to support 
US missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and lead a dramatic mission to North Korea that led 
to the return of five of the abductees and their families. In addition, Koizumi was able to 
help establish a long-term course for greater cooperation and interoperability between US 
and Japanese military forces. Within the US-Japan alliance framework, Koizumi was able 
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to significantly improve Japan’s military capabilities, allowing the military to move 
toward an operational ballistic missile shield. These moves alone would be impressive. 
What is most conspicuous, however, is the way Koizumi used these defense initiatives to 
change the nature of defense politics, enacting significant changes in domestic culture 
and policy making institutions. Koizumi was able to use changes to defense policy to set 
the stage for greater participation of the military in policy formation (and the eventual 
creation of a Ministry of Defense during the Abe Shinzo administration) and a more 
profound sense of respect for the JSDF among the public. Even though defense policy 
measures were in large part done under the umbrella of military realism (realism within 
the confines of the US-Japan Security Treaty), the domestic transformations were toward 
self-confident nationalism. Thus, as an incremental Gaullist, we might also characterize 
his defiant trips to Yasukuni Shrine as another form of domestic policy “success.” While 
his trips to North Korea for normalization talks and frequent messages of peace during 
trips abroad have had a less significant impact, we should nevertheless also see these 
policies as part of a coherent political strategy set on maximizing Koizumi’s political 
power while minimizing political costs.  
Authors such as McCormack argue that Koizumi’s “performance made up in 
emotional force what it lacked in intellectual consistency” (2007, p. 192). However, what 
this chapter finds is that what seem like disparate and incoherent actions were actually 
part of a consistent and coherent strategy. Each policy act helped the prime minister keep 
the population engaged, supported his image as a reformer and maverick, and 
demonstrated his skill in achieving short-term policy gains, thus boosting his support 
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among the population. While the focus of this case study is Koizumi’s defense policy, the 
chapter also argues that these policies were not separate from an overall political strategy 
set on maximizing the prime minster’s political support outside of his party.  
This chapter will evaluate Koizumi’s prime ministership in terms of his 
political strategy and his policy entrepreneurship. The chapter begins with a background 
sketch of Koizumi’s political background, highlighting his experience and his opinions 
on defense issues. It then moves on to a description of his operating context and the 
challenges he faced. The chapter then parses Koizumi’s approach to defense, examining 
the ideas that underpinned the individual actions on defense during his administration, 
before concluding the chapter with an assessment of his approach and his relevance to 
Japan’s defense trajectory in the post cold war world.  
  
Koizumi Junichiro’s Political Background and Security Orientation 
 
 
Koizumi Junichiro was known as maverick and rule-breaker long before he 
assumed the position of prime minister in 2001. As a third generation politician, he 
entered politics in 1969 at the age of twenty-seven shortly after his father’s death28. He 
would lose his bid for Kanagawa’s second district seat partly because of fierce 
competition, but also because of his failure to consult with the local koenkai (local 
political support group) leaders or senior members of his own party. Some evidence 
suggests that Koizumi’s obsession with postal reform had its origin in this early electoral 
                                                 
28 His father had served as the Minister in charge of the JDA in 1960. The author could not find any 
biographical reference to whether or how his father might have influenced his ideas on defense.  
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defeat, as the defeat may have been partially attributed to the desertion of postmaster 
support for his campaign bid (Maclachlan, 2010, 2011). His 1972 bid for a Lower House 
seat, however, would prove successful and Koizumi would begin his parliamentary career. 
In 1988, he was named Health and Welfare Minister under Prime Minister Takeshita 
Noboru and was reappointed to the same post six months later under new Prime Minister 
Uno Sosuke. In 1991, he was named to the powerful post of chief deputy secretary 
general of the LDP (Iijima, 2006; Mikuriya, 2006). 
Throughout the years, Koizumi’s reputation for political defiance would grow. 
During his brief period as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications under Prime 
Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, he shocked his LDP colleagues and postal bureaucrats by 
calling for postal privatization. His frequent calls for postal reform came despite the 
political influence of the postmasters and the close clientalist relationship between the 
postmasters and the LDP. Koizumi’s defiance gained him some popularity, but not 
enough to overcome the preference for seniority and conformity within the party (Iijima, 
2006; Reed and Shizuma, 2009). Despite his lack of support within the party, he would 
run for party president and prime minister in 1995 and 1998, losing first to Hashimoto 
Ryutaro and then to Obuchi Keizo, two candidates who had firmer support within the 
party.  
During his time in the Hashimoto cabinet as Minister of Health and Welfare, 
Koizumi demonstrated his knack for political theater. At a moment when it seemed that 
reforms of the postal service would not go through—thanks to successful lobbying by the 
postal interests and Hashimoto’s own lack of political courage—Koizumi threatened to 
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resign the cabinet if something was not done. This threat forced Hashimoto to negotiate 
with key LDP leaders and come up with a reform bill, however limited, that appeased 
both Koizumi and the postal lobby. This bill set the way for some of Koizumi’s much 
more extensive reforms during his own tenure as prime minister (Maclachlan 2010, 2011). 
Koizumi’s third try at the party leadership would be different. Due partially to 
changes in rules for how LDP leadership was elected based on the votes of local chapters, 
Koizumi would take the party leadership by highlighting his passion for reforming the 
party. Throughout his campaign, Koizumi promised to change the LDP, or failing that to 
“break it” (Iijima, 2006; Lin, 2009). Compared to other prime ministers, Koizumi’s 
resume was less distinguished. He served in the Ministry of Health and Welfare twice 
and the Ministry of Postal Services once, but had no experience as Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, Minister of Finance, or Minister of Trade and Industry. In addition, many 
would point out that Koizumi spoke much differently than normal politicians. His style of 
speech is best described as “pithy.” Indeed, both his critics and admirers alike have 
referred to his rhetorical style as “one phrase politics.” His statements are short, to the 
point, but in their own way clever.  
If Koizumi’s intentions for postal reforms were transparent, his attitudes 
toward security issues were less easy to gauge. In many ways, Koizumi seemed like a 
politician cast in the mold of Nakasone Yasuhiro and Hashimoto Ryutaro. As a 
conservative with ties to the Bereaved Families Societies, he seemed to share the same 
pragmatic Gaullism instincts that these two politicians shared: a desire for a more 
independent Japan with great military capabilities, coupled with a realization that close 
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cooperation with the US was the most politically feasible option in the short-term (Envall, 
2008). However, in his actions before and during his administration, Koizumi would 
prove to be much more conservative than the LDP mainstream. Like many anti-
mainstream conservatives, Koizumi had walked out of the Diet rather than sponsor the 
official Murayama apology for wartime crimes. However, in many ways, Koizumi’s 
contentious politics went far beyond that of Nakasone Yasuhiro and Hashimoto Ryutaro, 
both of whom had tendencies to moderate their stances in order to position themselves 
more in the mainstream. Whereas both prime ministers had eventually yielded to external 
and domestic pressure and had refrained from Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi seemed to 
thrive off this pressure, refusing to relent in his Yasukuni Shrine visits. While in office, 
Koizumi was an outspoken proponent of constitutional revision, visits to Yasukuni Shrine, 
and officially acknowledging the JSDF as a military. However, the Gaullism of Koizumi 
also had its limits. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, there was a limit to Koizumi’s 
endorsement of anti-mainstream ideas on defense, and like Hashimoto, he would take 
several moderating measures, such as approving the re-articulating the Murayama 
apology and his embrace of various anti-militarist and pacifist tones, throughout his 
tenure. As this chapter will also demonstrate, to a certain degree Koizumi’s own views on 
security were less relevant than his more overarching projects of upholding “reform” as a 
political symbol and his project of postal privatization.  
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The Operational Environment: Popular Support Base, Expanded Administrative 
Resources, Rising External Threat 
 
In 2000, the LDP faced a crisis of legitimacy. The LDP had posted a dismal 
showing in the Lower House election and faced public dissatisfaction after the party had 
chosen Mori Yoshihiro as Prime Minister following Obuchi Keizo’s stroke. The public 
was dissatisfied with the way Mori had been chosen (largely behind closed doors), and 
the gaffe-prone Mori’s popularity figures soon dropped to singer digits. In order to 
restore public trust, the LDP changed its party selection process, raising the number of 
votes that local branches had from one to three. This brought the Prefectural Delegate 
votes from a minority of the total votes to a majority. How these votes would be cast was 
determined in local primaries (Lin, 2009; Glosserman, 2001, April; Mikuriya, 2006). 
Party leaders in the LDP figured (incorrectly as it turned out) that factions and koenkai 
would continue to shape the outcome of these primaries. Thus, most predicted—
incorrectly—that former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro would win the position of 
party president, and thus, become the next prime minister of Japan. Despite having weak 
backing within the party, especially from the most powerful factions, Koizumi was able 
to use his well-known image as a political and economic reformer to appeal the 
prefectural chapters. These chapters were increasingly inclined—like many voters in the 
modern era—to favor charismatic, creative leadership over interest-group loyalty. 
Koizumi was able to win 42 out of 47 prefectural chapters, and with this local support 
behind him, many of Koizumi’s former opponents in the party had little choice but to line 
up behind him in the second phase of the voting (Lin, 2009).  
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Thus, Koizumi has been described as one of the most democratically elected 
prime ministers in postwar Japan (Izumikawa, 2010, p. 152; Lin, 2009; Uchiyama, 2010). 
As Iijima Isao, Koizumi’s personal political secretary, has written about Koizumi: instead 
of appealing to just LDP members, he instead decided to appeal the wider Japanese 
population with the idea that if he did so, they would put pressure on the party members 
to elect him. As his political secretary recalls, Koizumi wanted to be the first prime 
minister elected by the people, not just his party (Tawara, 2007, p. 70). The change in 
voting system for party leadership made this more of a possibility.  
Thus, from the very beginning Koizumi had a very different power base than 
many of the prime ministers who came before or after. Instead of strong factional 
support, Koizumi had a popular base that reached beyond his party and allowed him to 
attack it when necessary to pursue his preferences. Koizumi’s popular persona allowed 
him to ignore factional considerations when making his policies. Thus, Koizumi’s 
popular persona was an important resource, but one that needed to be constantly retained 
though dramatic acts that kept the public engaged and interested.  
The government reforms of 1999 and 2001, including changes to the Cabinet 
Law, had also reduced the formal constraints on prime ministerial power. First, the law 
reduced the size of the cabinet in order to make consensus amongst the cabinet members 
easier. The reforms also took important steps in limiting the influence of the bureaucracy. 
In Diet deliberations, bureaucrats could now only act as witnesses on technical matters. 
Politicians were now responsible for answering questions during Diet sessions (Gaunder, 
2007, p. 125; Shinoda, 2003, p. 24-26). The legal power of the prime minister, the cabinet, 
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and the kantei also changed during Koizumi’s tenure. Administrative reforms that had 
begun during Hashimoto’s tenure became active. The Basic Law, along with the Cabinet 
Law amendments, granted the Cabinet Secretariat enhanced powers of coordination. The 
prime minister was also now able to create new positions within the kantei to deal with 
new issues as well as ad hoc offices for specific policy initiatives. The prime minister 
could also appoint new ministers of state based on issues he deemed important (Shinoda, 
2003, 2007; Iijima, 2006; Maclachlan, 2010). These new legal powers undermined the 
traditional “bottom-up” decision-making structure that privileged the bureaucrats, zoku 
politicians, and interest groups that made up the subgovernment.  
At the domestic level, Koizumi had to deal with financial structural reforms and 
Japan’s stagnant economy. Often, concerns over financial reform—and especially 
Koizumi’s project of postal reform—would trump other issue areas throughout his term. 
At the regional level, the Koizumi administration continued to face regressed security 
dilemma that placed Japan in the same neighborhood as a belligerent and nuclear-armed 
North Korea and a China with rising military capabilities and desires for regional 
leadership. In the erratic behavior of North Korea, anti-mainstream conservatives would 
find not only a palpable external threat in the North’s ballistic missile capabilities and 
nuclear tests, but also in the lingering abduction case a unique crime against Japan that 
could be used to focus popular fears and anxieties. These rising security threats would 
end up being a substantial resource for the continued “salami slicing” (Samuels, 2007a; 
see also Kliman, 2006) of Japan’s anti-militarist norms. Perhaps no other resource was as 
important as the memory of the Gulf War shock of 1991. As Kliman (2006) has written, 
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the memory of Japan’s failure in the first Gulf War created a sense of “internalized” 
gaiatsu was another important resource for the Koizumi administration that helped him 
push through bold initiatives to support the US in the Global War on Terror.  
 
Parsing Koizumi’s Approach: Kantei-Diplomacy, Personalizing the US-Japan 
Alliance, Proving his Maverick Credentials 
 
 
Much has been written about the style of Koizumi’s politics. Books on his style 
of politics often note his skillful use of the mass media, his skill as a political 
“entertainer” and his use of simple expressions (“one phrase politics”) and appeals to 
citizens’ common sense (Mikuriya 2006; Iijima 2006; Otake 2006; Horiuchi 2009). In 
some studies, this kind of leadership has been associated with populism of the worst kind, 
a style of leadership that played to the deep insecurities of Japanese society (see, for 
example, McCormack, 2007; Hosaka, 2005). However, beyond mere style, there is a 
pattern in Koizumi’s policy approaches that points to an important coherence. All of his 
actions point to a politician who was able to use unexpected opportunities to support his 
public image as a reformer, a maverick, and strong leader able to follow through with his 
convictions.  
Scholars have noted the lack of consistency in Koizumi’s foreign and defense 
policy (Uchiyama, 2010, p. 79; McCormack, 2007). Despite his often nationalistic 
rhetoric, Koizumi showed little inhibition about playing a subordinate role in the US’s 
security agenda (McCormack, 2007). At times, Koizumi would embrace the US strongly, 
casting aside doubts about its unilateralist course or domestic worries about Japan’s 
entrapment in US global strategy (military realism). At other times, Koizumi’s actions 
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would suggest a more moderate track, one interested in regional reconciliation and 
reduction of the security dilemma through diplomacy (political realism). This was most 
evidently displayed in his negotiations over the normalization of relations with North 
Korea and the return of Japanese abductees. At other times, Koizumi appeared as a 
nationalist, demonstrating little concern for the sensitivities of neighbors such as China or 
North Korea over wartime atrocities (nationalism/ Gaullism). And still, at other times, 
Koizumi would speak sincerely about Japan’s role as peaceful nation, in no way 
interested in repeating her history as an aggressor (symbolic pacifism)29.  
Thus, on the surface, Koizumi’s approach to defense policy and politics would 
seem like an incomprehensible amalgam. However, a closer inspection that situates his 
defense policy in relation to his other policy objectives as prime minister reveals 
something quite different. Despite the often conflicting ideologies of the different parts, 
each action within these groupings served a singular goal: each action took advantage of 
a short-term opportunity to demonstrate Koizumi’s policy acumen and competence as a 
national leader in accomplishing proximate goals. The importance of this approach 
cannot be stressed enough. As a leader with small factional power, and a flagrant 
challenger to traditional ways of doing business, Koizumi needed to find ways to 
energize a moribund public in order to maintain his popularity30. This popularity, in turn, 
                                                 
29 For a review of the four major lines categories of thought on defense policy in Japan: Gaullism, military 
realism, political realism, and pacifism, see Chapter 1. For a more comprehensive review, see Samuels 
(2007b) or Mochizuki (1983/1984). 
 
30 Though commentators of Japanese politics have noted that Japanese society is generally conservative, 
there is nevertheless an aspect to Japanese politics that is quite sensationalist. Sakai (2011), for example, 
describes the behavior of the Japanese media as often quite close to that of tabloid magazines, more 
interested in gossip and innuendo than even-handed reporting. In an age when a great deal of voters 
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would help him in his prime objective of postal reform. Thus, his approach to defense 
policy and politics can be seen as coherent when see through the larger lens of his overall 
strategy as a prime minister.  
Aspects of Koizumi’s unique approach to Japanese politics have been 
abundantly explored in major books, articles, and dissertations (see for example, the work 
of Gaunder (2007), Shinoda (2007a), Horiuchi (2009), Maclachlan (2010, 2011) and 
Uchiyama (2010)). Prior works have, for example, pointed out the revolutionary aspects 
of Koizumi’s policy-based method for selecting cabinet ministers. Not only did Koizumi 
choose Takenaka Heizo, an economics Professor at Keio University, to head up his 
economic reforms, but he would also appoint an unprecedented number of women to the 
cabinet (five), including the very popular Tanaka Makiko as Foreign Minister. He would 
also minimize cabinet reshuffling throughout his tenure to minimize factional influences. 
By evading factional considerations in his decision on cabinet ministers, not only did he 
optimize the talent available for policy decisions, but he also increased his credibility 
with the public31.  
Political theater, “one-phrase” politics, and personal branding were also 
important aspects of his approach. Throughout his tenure, Koizumi used “theatrical” 
performances that allowed him to stay in the spotlight. These performances often 
                                                                                                                                                 
identify themselves with neither party, a politician that finds a way to be “interesting” has a distinct 
advantage.  
 
31Rejecting the traditional faction-based method of selecting a cabinet had one other major benefit—it was 
wildly popular. Polls taken by the Asahi Shimbun immediately after the selection of his cabinet showed 
that this already high support rate of 78 percent had gone up to 85 percent (Shinoda, 2011, p. 58).  
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underscored his reputation as a “maverick.” As will be discussed in later sections, his 
decision to personalize his relationship with George W. Bush and his decision to meet 
personally with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il were likely calculated to maximize 
opportunities for media exposure and to help make successes in these bilateral 
relationships appear as personal victories.  
As was seen in the previous chapter, “kantei-shudo” or “kantei diplomacy” can 
be a powerful tool for personalizing diplomacy and accomplishing important policies that 
are beyond the reach of bureaucrats. The term “kantei diplomacy” has become 
somewhat synonymous with Koizumi’s administration (see, Shinoda, 2007a; Takami, 
2006). Koizumi’s kantei diplomacy was one part personal preference and one part 
necessity. In the early parts of his administration, the 9/11 attacks and the disarray in 
MoFA following the appointment of Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko made it essential 
for Koizumi to use the expanded resources of the kantei to avoid the stigma of “too little, 
too late” that had been attached to Japan’s first Gulf War response. Koizumi understood 
that he needed to fashion a response that was decisive and that would visibly contribute 
to coalition forces in Afghanistan. Koizumi’s use of the kantei was especially adept. He 
was able to bring in the best talent from the various ministries and use this talent to come 
up with new policies quickly. In addition, he was able to move special legislation through 
the Diet in record time. This kantei-led approach to policy would continue with the Iraq 
legislation and with other initiatives, including his much prized postal and economic 
reforms.  
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In addition, Koizumi would use negotiations with the political actors outside 
his party to maximize policy flexibility. He would frequently use negotiations with the 
Komeito, the coalition partner of the LDP during this period, as well as overtures to the 
DPJ to help put pressure on his own party (to say nothing of the threat of US gaiatsu that 
was often employed in defense policy). As Shinoda (2007) details in his concentric circle 
approach, using the support of outsider actors like the Komeito and the DPJ helped keep 
pressure on government officials within his own party. Koizumi was able to negotiate 
with Komeito first and then present the product of these negotiations to the LDP elite as a 
fait accompli (see Gaunder, 2007, p. 124; Shinoda, 2007). Koizumi also consistently 
sought the support of the DPJ through his term in order avoid excessive reliance on the 
LDP or the Komeito for policy passage (Shinoda, 2007, p. 137; Shimizu, 2005, 
November 14). Though Koizumi's attempts at courting the DPJ were largely 
unsuccessful, this action demonstrated Koizumi's flexibility and his desire to use outside 
resources to battle his own party.  
Another important aspect of Koizumi’s tenure was his use of the electoral 
process to attack his own party. One of Koizumi’s campaign slogans was: “If I cannot 
change the LDP, I will break the LDP!” (Iijima, 2006, 2007; Nakasone, 2005, February 
22; Mikuriya, 2006, p. 34). Koizumi was skillful in using his grass root support and 
popularity to overcome resistance in his party. Unlike Hashimoto, who had eventually 
yielded to party pressure, Koizumi would use every tool in his political repertoire to 
achieve his objectives. When it came to postal reform, Koizumi bet that his popularity 
would help keep anti-reformers in line. When anti-reformers refused cooperate, he 
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dissolved the Lower House, branded those who had opposed his reforms as “rebels,” and 
had them kicked out of the party. He then sent out “assassins” candidates to compete with 
these Diet members in the election. As will be discussed, this approach bears discussion 
because of the potential it holds for more radical approaches to defense policy and 
politics in the future.  
Building on this scholarship, what this section will demonstrate is that the 
various components of Koizumi approach to defense policy and politics, despite their 
distinct ideological trappings, worked within a coherent strategy. As Rumelt has argued, 
good strategy is usually based on a single critical insight that gives coherence to actions. 
Koizumi’s embrace of the US (military realism), his diplomatic overtures to North 
Korea (political realism), and his Yasukuni Shrine visits (Gaullism) were all important 
compenents in maintaining his image as a can-do prime minister, capable of overcoming 
the trappings of the LDP party system. Within these ideological strains, Koizumi was 
able to overcome opposition, realize proximate goals, and thus remain interesting to a 
public that had the tendency to be disillusioned with politics. Though often overlooked in 
studies of Koizumi, symbolic pacifism also played an important supporting role during 
his administration. His embrace of symbolic aspects of Japan’s anti-militarist identity 
both in his embrace of the rhetoric of apology and adherence to the content of anti-
militarism in key policies allowed him to limit his political liabilities and remain an 
attractive leader to the Japanese political center and outside of the East Asian region.   
During his administration, the issue of Futenma Airbase would come up as a 
point of contention. In this area, too, Koizumi demonstrated shrewdness, though of a 
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different kind than witnessed in his other policy measures. Unlike Hashimoto who had 
chosen to involve his office personally in the return of Futenma and to create a personal 
relationship with the Governor of Okinawa, Koizumi would for the most part leave 
relations with Okinawa in the hands of experienced bureaucrats. To an extent, this 
approach was necessary. This hands-off approach, though different from his approach to 
other policy issues, was consistent with his primary goal of postal reform. Coinciding as 
it did with his attempts to push through dramatic postal reform legislation, Koizumi 
judged that his personal involvement in the issue would gain him little.   
 
Logics of Military Realism: Embracing the US 
 
 
Because of the broad consensus among Japanese elites on the benefits of the 
US-Japan alliance, there has usually been little question over whether to embrace the US 
as a partner. The question has been: to what extent and for what purposes? In the case of 
Koizumi, he chose not only to embrace US policies whole-heartedly, but also to 
personalize the relationship between himself and US president George W. Bush in 
unprecedented ways. Through his skillful management of the policy process, he was also 
able to make groundbreaking contributions to the alliance and provide himself a platform 
for pursuing gradual change in military affairs.  
The personal relationship between Koizumi and President George W. Bush 
would come to surpass even the “Ron-Yasu” relationship of Ronald Regan and Nakasone 
Yasuhiro of the mid-1980s. Koizumi would be a frequent visitor at Bush’s Crawford 
Ranch in Texas, the beneficiary of several poolside chats, and would even have the 
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privilege of listening in on one of the President’s Daily Briefs by the CIA (Tawara, 2006, 
p. 135-136; Iijima, 2007). During the celebration of Bush’s 59th birthday, Koizumi would 
serenade Bush with a verse from Elvis’s “I Want You, I Need You, I Love You.” The 
two frequently bonded over their shared love of Elvis and their fondness for Gary 
Cooper’s western classic High Noon. In his final trip to the US, Koizumi was not only 
rewarded with a summit putting a final stamp on the alliance’s transformation, but was 
also treated to a presidential tour of Elvis Presley’s Graceland in Memphis, Tennessee 
(Faiola, 2006, June 27; Iijima, 2007, p. 277-279; Yoshida, 2006, June 29). Despite 
Bush’s unpopularity in Japan, the personalization of the bilateral relationship 
nevertheless proved a great political success for Koizumi. The close relationship gave the 
prime minister another arena in which to demonstrate his charisma and flamboyance, and 
provided him with numerous opportunities to exploit his media savvy. 
The substance of his contributions to the US alliance and his skill in 
manipulating the policy process were no less significant. For example, one of the most 
studied aspects of the Koizumi administration is his acumen with the resources of the 
kantei. Koizumi would use those resources to help overcome bureaucratic and political 
obstructions in formulating policy on contributions to the alliance in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq (Shinoda, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007; Takami, 2006; Kliman, 2006). In the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats 
remembered painfully the “failure” of the first Gulf War, where Japan had been criticized 
for not providing a “human” contribution to the war, only its large financial contribution. 
The shock and embarrassment of this incident reverberated deeply in Japanese elite 
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circles and provided permissive conditions for a bolder approach to alliance management 
should another crisis arrive. Though elite attitudes were pre-disposed to a more active 
contribution, few would predict the boldness and speed of Koizumi’s policy responses in 
the wake of the September 11th attacks. Ground-breaking legislation to send the Japan 
Self Defense Force overseas in support of US operations in Afghanistan was passed in 
just three weeks. Koizumi was able to use early public statements pledging concrete 
support to the US to outpace the bureaucracies, his party, and the Diet. This approach 
contrasted drastically with the traditional practice of intensive consultation (nemawashi) 
before announcing a policy course (see Chapter 2), all of which had inhibited Japan’s 
response during the first Gulf War. As Kliman (2006, p. 83) argues, by setting high 
expectations with the US, Koizumi was using the threat of future American gaiatsu to 
overcome complacency and intransigence within his own party and the bureaucracy. 
Other attributes of Koizumi’s policy process were equally conspicuous in their 
effectiveness: Koizumi assembled the most skilled bureaucrats and experts from the 
relevant ministries under policy teams in the kantei in ways that allowed him to form 
policy options quickly under his own leadership; he used early negotiations with the 
LDP’s coalition partner the Komeito to help pressure his own party to take action; and 
Koizumi also framed his contributions in both Afghanistan and Iraq as contributions to 
international security rather than defining them in collective self-defense terms (Shinoda, 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007; Kliman, 2006; Samuels, 2007a). 
Dispatches of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq would stretch the limits of 
constitutional pacifism without entirely alienating the Japanese public or breaking the 
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coalition with the more pacifist Komeito. The Anti-Terror Legislation of 2001 would 
allow the JSDF to provide logistic and noncombatant support to the U.S.-led 
multinational force, engage in search-and rescue activities for missing military personnel, 
and carry out humanitarian relief operations for refugees. Over time, the MSDF would 
take on an extensive role in refueling US ships in the Indian Ocean. The 2003 Iraq 
Special Measures Legislation, the second piece of legislation to allow the JSDF to assist 
the US overseas, would be enacted in the same top-down style as the 2001 Anti-Terror 
Legislation. The obstacles would be more formidable for the 2003 Iraq Special Measures 
Legislation. Instead of the “rear area” support provided in the 2001 legislation, these 
measures proposed sending JSDF into an active war zone (though for legal purposes, the 
Samawah region or Iraq would have to be labeled a non-combat zone before JSDF 
members could be dispatched). In addition, as the legislation was being debated, two 
Japanese diplomats would be slain in Iraq. However, much like the Anti-Terror 
Legislation of 2001, Koizumi’s early promises of support to President Bush, his own 
strong support ratings, and memories of Japan’s failure to provide a “human 
contribution” to the first Gulf War helped spur legislative action. From February 3, 2004 
to July 18, 2006, 600 Ground Self Defense Force would be stationed in Samawah, Iraq 
and provide humanitarian assistance and help with reconstruction.  
Though both the Anti-Terror Legislation of 2001 and the Iraq Dispatch 
Legislation of 2003 broke with tradition by dispatching the JSDF for de facto collective 
self-defense, they nevertheless adhered to Japan’s anti-militarist identity in ways that 
allowed Japan to maintain the pretense of constitutional pacifism (Oros, 2008). Japanese 
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JSDF personnel were for the large part kept out of danger, and in the details of JSDF 
dispatches pains were taken to limit contributions to tasks that were largely humanitarian 
in nature. Both the Anti-Terror Legislation of 2001 and the Iraq Dispatch Legislation of 
2003 also served the proximate goal of demonstrating to the public Koizumi’s skill at 
using the kantei resources to overcome the centrifugal forces of the government. In doing 
so, he helped avoid the trauma associated with the first Gulf War and strengthened the 
sense of trust with the US. Most importantly, however, these contributions had taken 
place without overt requests from the US. The swiftness of Koizumi’s declarations of 
support, coupled with his close relationship with President Bush, helped create conditions 
for his administration to control the policy content of alliance contributions.  
Japanese contributions to the War on Terror and the Iraq War helped put the 
US-Japanese security relationship on secure footing, thus guaranteeing US extended 
deterrence against North Korean belligerency and the emerging long-term Chinese 
military threat. Though Japan no longer had to fear US abandonment, Japanese officials 
and the public now had to worry about entrapment in US wars. Within the contours of 
this new special relationship, some believed Japan was becoming the “Britain of East 
Asia” (McCormack, 2007). Increasingly, joint-statements released by both governments 
suggested that the alliance was in reality being globalized (White House/ MoFA, 2006, 
June 29; Nabeshima, 2003, June 2). Just as Prime Minister Nakasone had done in the 
mid-1980s, Koizumi was using the contours of the US-Japan alliance framework to 
whittle away at the edges of Japan’s anti-militarist institutions (Envall, 2008; Samuels, 
2007a). Within this new alliance framework, old inhibitions against collective self-
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defense would fall by the wayside. Japan would begin to acquire the set pieces for an 
operational ballistic missile defense shield. Building on a formal decision in 1998 to 
support joint missile defense research, a cabinet decision would be made in December 
2003 to proceed with a two-layer system consisting of Standard- 3 missile interceptors 
deployed on AEGIS-equipped destroyers and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-
3 missiles (Glosserman, 2004, January, p. 4; Uriu, 2004, p. 177). The decision by the 
Tokyo government to deploy a limited missile defense system would require Japan and 
the US to integrate planning, development, and systems design in unprecedented ways. 
The missile defense systems would allow Japan access to US early warning intelligence 
and technology, but also bring up thorny issues of legality. Not only would cooperation 
require modifications of the ban on arms exports, but it would also require maneuvering 
around constitutional issues of collective self-defense. Though Japan would maintain its 
one percent of GDP limit on defense spending, significant improvements would be made 
in capabilities, including the acquisition of mid-air refueling aircraft, an important 
component of any pre-emptive or retaliatory strike on North Korea. 
During the Koizumi administration, alliance managers on both sides would 
continue to reshape the alliance in ways that strengthened Japanese capabilities and 
immersed Japan further in US technology and US global defense priorities. Indeed, 
McCormack (2007) would call the 2006 agreement leading to the fusion of command and 
intelligence functions of US and Japanese forces the most dramatic turn in the alliance 
since the signing of the security treaty. Joint force modernization plans would include 
enhanced intelligence capabilities, a coordinated network of satellites, missile 
 151 
interceptors, and radar, as well as increased joint training, and the establishment of the 
first joint command centers (Samuels, 2007a, p. 178-179; McCormack, 2007). In short, 
Japan would continue to benefit from US extended deterrence and technological 
integration with the US; in exchange, Japan would willingly enmesh itself deeper in US 
defense infrastructure and expand its roles within the alliance.  
In siding closely with US, Koizumi demonstrated both the continuing 
relevance of a mainstream military realist approach to the transformation of military 
affairs and the importance of the prime minister/ US presidential relationship for prime 
ministerial power. He also demonstrated the “paradoxical logic” (see Envall, 2008; 
Mochizuki, 2007) of embracing the US. In short, the more Koizumi earned the trust of 
US leadership, the more flexibility he had in other areas of foreign policy and defense. 
Koizumi would be able to pursue independent diplomacy with North Korea and the US 
would turn a blind eye as Japan pursued an energy development initiative worth billions 
in Iran—despite both of these countries being labeled members of Bush’s “axis of evil.” 
The US would also acquiesce to Japanese demands to include the “rachi mondai” 
(abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s) on the agenda of six-party talks 
with North Korea, and would turn a blind eye as Koizumi’s trips to Yasukuni Shrine 
rankled regional stakeholders like China and South Korea32.   
 
 
 
                                                 
32 One of the lingering questions that remains from Koizumi’s administration is the relevance of this 
approach for other prime ministers. Indeed, because few other prime ministers have been able to connect so 
closely with the US president on a personal level and have attempted to pre-empt US demands for alliance 
contributions, it is difficult to tell whether this is indeed a strategy relevant across prime ministerships or a 
tactic more specific to the Bush-Koizumi relationship.  
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Logics of Political Realism: Koizumi’s Dramatic Trip to Pyongyang 
 
One of the most dramatic events of Koizumi’s administration was his historic 
meeting with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Il on September 17, 2002. Though the 
decision to visit the leader face-to-face and negotiate the return of Japanese citizens and 
pursue normalization of ties was characteristic of Koizumi’s flare for the dramatic, the 
move also risked alienating the Bush administration and threatened Koizumi’s support 
from conservative groups on the political right (like the Bereaved Family Association) 
(Iijima, 2007, p. 105). The Pyongyang Declaration required that he admit Japanese guilt 
for wartime atrocities, apologize for Japanese transgressions, and promise one of Asia’s 
most unstable dictators economic and humanitarian assistance (even if only 
provisionally). Despite these risks, the trip worked within a larger strategic logic: his visit 
to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-Il was dramatic in a way that both allowed him to 
surprise the Japanese public and demonstrate once again his maverick credentials, and it 
also accomplished a several important short-term goal that made Koizumi look effective 
as a national leader. In his first visit, Koizumi was able to bring back five of the 
abductees and help secure access to more information on the other abductees. The visit 
also served another important political purpose. It helped Koizumi’s popularity figures 
rebound after the steep drop following the forced resignation of his popular Foreign 
Affairs Minister Tanaka Makiko. By May of 2002 Koizumi’s popularity ratings had 
fallen into the low 40s. His dramatic trip to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-Il and 
return the abductees boosted his approval rating by nearly 30 points and brought his 
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popularity ratings back to about the level they were when he had started his 
administration (Cha, 2004).   
There was nothing automatic about Koizumi’s trip to meet directly with Kim 
Jong-Il. Throughout Koizumi’s term, North Korean ballistic missiles, coupled with the 
regime’s erratic behavior, represented the most palpable threat to national security, not 
only absorbing the administration’s time and energy, but also capturing the imagination 
of the public. Indeed, many commentators hypothesized that Koizumi’s enthusiastic 
embrace of the US security deterrent was driven by the threat of North Korean aggression 
(Samuels, 2007a; Hughes, 2009). North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile tests, the 
regime’s periodically belligerent rhetoric, the revelations of nuclear weapons 
development, and the details of the abductee cases all contributed to a sense of threat 
throughout Japan that made direct negotiation with the regime a political hazard.  
More importantly, negotiating with the dictator for possible diplomatic 
normalization seemed to cut across the grain of Koizumi’s conservative ideology. Still 
the opportunity to visit Pyongyang to talk directly with North Korea’s leader and to bring 
five of the abductees back was an opportunity that proved too difficult for the prime 
minister to pass up. Indeed, accounts suggest that the decision to visit the reclusive 
country had more to do with the proximate goal of bringing back the abductees than with 
the opportunity for normalizing ties with the North. Koizumi was reported as telling his 
associates that if he could bring back even one abductee he would go (Iijima, 2007; 
Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-Bu, 2006). The opportunity to visit Pyongyang came after long 
negotiations between Japanese officials and their North Korean counterparts. For the 
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most part, the details of the meetings were worked out through secret meetings and 
rendezvous between clandestine contacts and officials on both sides (Yomiuri Shimbun 
Seiji-Bu, 2006; Tanaka, 2005b; Tanaka, 2009, p. 104-116). For a long time the two sides 
had negotiated on the issue of the abductees, the normalization of diplomatic ties, and 
nuclear and security issues. For some time, fear of a leak had kept Japanese officials from 
informing their US counterparts. Japanese officials were worried that if there were a leak, 
the North would back down and the visit would be ruined (Tanaka, 2005, 2009)33. Before 
the visit, Koizumi would notify the US and later contact President Bush directly to 
inform him of his intention to meet with Kim Jong-Il. Though Bush was not enthusiastic 
about the trip, he nevertheless voiced his understanding of Koizumi’s visit (Yomiuri 
Shimbun Seiji-Bu, 2006). As Tanaka Hitoshi, a top diplomat partially responsible for 
arranging the meeting would note in his memoirs, it was the special relationship that 
Koizumi had formed with President Bush that made Koizumi’s gambit possible (Tanaka, 
2009, p. 112, 120). 
On September 17, 2002, Koizumi made his dramatic trip. He would be the first 
Japanese prime minister to visit the reclusive country. Despite predominantly being 
associated with a Gaullist/ nationalist tradition with regards to defense, Koizumi was 
nonetheless willing to apologize for the “tremendous damage inflicted by Japanese 
colonialism” (Cha, 2002; Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-Bu, 2006; Iijima, 2007; Uriu, 2003). In 
                                                 
33 Much as Hashimoto had done with Futenma, Koizumi made secrecy a priority during the initial phases of 
negotiations, keeping only the members of MoFA directly involved in the negotiations, the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, the Vice Cabinet Secretary, and the Foreign Minister notified of progress (Tanaka, 2009, p. 103). 
No doubt domestic considerations were also an important factor behind the decision to keep negotiations 
secret. The abductee issue was one of the most sensitive political issues in Japan, and leaked information of 
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return, Kim Jong-Il apologized for the abduction of thirteen Japanese citizens in the 
1970s and 80s. The two parties then signed the Pyongyang Declaration, which consisted 
of four agreements: (1) the two sides would resolve to normalize ties; (2) there would be 
a “settling of accounts with the past” that would include the provision of economic 
assistance from Japan and in return the North would waive pre-1945 property claims; (3) 
on abductions, the North Koreans agreed to ensure that no similar incidents would occur 
in the future; and (4) the two sides agreed to security-related confidence-building 
measures, and the North Korean side agreed to a moratorium on missile launches in and 
after 2003 (Stockwin, 2008, p. 112; Cha, 2002; MoFA, 2002). 
As a result of Koizumi’s visit to North Korea, five of the original abductees 
were returned. However, the mood of the Pyongyang Declaration was spoiled by the 
specifics reported by the North Korean officials regarding the remaining abductees. Of 
the thirteen that were thought to be abducted, eight were reported by North Korean 
authorities as dead. Since the abductees were young at the time, many in the Japanese 
media speculated that the abductees died by violent means. The issue of the abductees 
and the specifics of the crime would soon become a media sensation that would 
overshadow the diplomatic gains of the Pyongyang Declaration. Later revelations that 
North Korea was enriching uranium and had been continuing with its nuclear program in 
violation of a 1994 agreement would also dampen enthusiasm for further normalization 
talks, as would the Bush administration’s hardline stance toward the regime (Stockwin, 
2008, p. 113; Uriu, 2003; Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-bu, 2006). The North’s withdrawal 
                                                                                                                                                 
any kind would likely have sparked a media circus. Behind Koizumi’s dramatic meeting with Kim Jong Il 
were no less than 20 secret meetings between officials (Tanaka, 2009, p. 103).  
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from the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 would strain diplomacy even further and spur 
Japan to aggressively pursue a joint ballistic missile defense program with the US.  
In May 2004, to break the silence between the two countries, Koizumi visited 
Pyongyang for a second time. Much like the first meeting with the two countries, the 
meeting was spurred by the possibility of accomplishing an important proximate goal. In 
this case it was getting North Korean government to allow the family members of the 
abductees to leave for Japan. During this meeting, North Korean officials acknowledged 
that the return of Japan’s citizens was permanent and agreed that their families could 
leave to join them. Koizumi, in return, agreed to provide humanitarian aid (food aid and 
medicine) and reopen negotiations for normalization of diplomatic ties. Koizumi was also 
able to get Kim Jong-Il’s promise to provide more information on the abductees reported 
dead. By this point, however, a coalition of powerful pressure groups had emerged on the 
abductee issue. The net effect of the pressure from these groups was to strengthen the 
hand of the conservative Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo within the government and draw 
the Japanese position closer to the US. The strange case of Yokota Megumi’s ashes 
would soon push the issue beyond the control of the government. A series of tests done 
by Japanese scientists showed that the ashes handed over by the North Korean 
government were the remains of two unrelated people. This news infuriated the Japanese 
public and tainted the credibility of the North Korean regime in the public’s eyes 
(Hiwatari, 2006, p. 50-51; Cha, 2004).    
The second trip only marginally improved Koizumi’s already high approval 
rating of 60 percent (Cha, 2004). After 2004, Koizumi would quietly abandon the North 
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Korean initiative. Realizing that key members of his government, a majority of the 
public, and Japan’s key strategic ally were not supportive of his initiatives, he accepted 
that there was no longer any benefit in pursuing the issue. Though the primacy Koizumi 
placed on US alliance management would impinge on his efforts to normalize ties with 
North Korea, as would the scale of popular revulsion in Japan at the abductee issue, the 
most important impacts of Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang lied beyond the content of this 
political realist initiative. Koizumi’s trip to North Korea provided another platform for a 
dramatic display of leadership and allowed him to demonstrate once again his ability to 
accomplish important proximate goals (in this case, the return of the abductees and their 
families). His trip to Pyongyang helped to improve his flagging popularity figures, 
strengthened his power base among the public, and helped him continue on his path 
toward postal reform. 
 
Symbolic Nationalism: Yasukuni Shrine Visits as a Matter of the Heart 
 
 
Perhaps Koizumi’s most contentious act in the realm of defense politics was his 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine every year during his prime ministership. These visits put him at 
odds not only with China, South Korea, and other countries that had suffered under 
Japanese colonial rule, but also with left wing politicians, pro-China business elites, and 
even during the last year of his administration the US Congress. Despite the lingering 
questions over the legitimacy of the shrine and its symbolism, Koizumi would frequently 
characterize his visits as a domestic issue and “a matter of the heart.” In his press 
conferences and speeches accompanying his visits, he would frequently justify his trips in 
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terms of his desire to pray for the perished war dead, express his puzzlement at negative 
reactions to his visit, and punctuate his trips with pacifist language that restated his desire 
that Japan never again embark on the path of war. Polling data from several newspapers, 
including the Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi Shimbun during this time shows that by the 
end of his prime ministership Koizumi had turned an otherwise unpopular symbolic act 
of state into a quasi-popular one (Stockwin, 2008; McCormack, 2007; Mong, 2010). The 
reversal in popular opinion may have reflected the growing insecurity of the Japanese 
public against the backdrop of rising Chinese power and the noxious North Korea 
abductee issue, but probably also demonstrated the public enthrallment with Koizumi’s 
ability to overcome political obstacles. In short, his Yasukuni visits became one more 
symbol of a prime minister who could stare down opposition.  
Koizumi’s determination to visit Yasukuni was probably based on his 
assumption (an assumption that had regularly proven correct) that his reputation as a 
reformer was tightly bound with his ability to meet the letter of his campaign pledges, 
and that any retreat from these pledges would be exploited by his political opponents. 
Before becoming prime minister, Koizumi had promised the powerful Japan Bereaved 
Families Association, which boasts close to a million voters, that he would make a formal 
annual visit to the shrine (McCormack, 2007, p. 50; Samuels, 2007a). Additional pressure 
was placed on the prime minister by other smaller organizations such as the Military 
Pension Federation, and the Association of Shinto Shrines, as well as major rightist 
intellectuals. Leftist groups for their part saw the prime minster’s visits as symbols of an 
outmoded militarism and feudalism that denied Japan’s postwar legacy as a state devoted 
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to human rights, democracy, and pacifism. These leftist groups, such as the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP), Social Democratic Party (SDP), labor unions, and various 
NGOs, such as the National Organization of Pacifist Bereaved Families, as well as 
sympathetic intellectuals and newspapers opposed the prime ministerial visits 34 . In 
addition to these groups, Koizumi also faced staunch regional opposition to the visits 
from China and South Korea. In China, the visits usually provoked statements of 
displeasure from officials in Beijing as well as street demonstrations. South Korea also 
saw Yasukuni as a sign of Japan's past oppressive rule. South Koreans have not forgotten, 
for example, that a large number of Koreans were conscripted to fight in WWII and died 
as a result (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 200-205)35. As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, prior 
prime ministers—such as Nakasone Yasuhiro and Hashimoto Ryutaro—had visited 
Yasukuni in their capacity as prime minister, only to abandon the visits once opposition 
from China and South Korea became a major diplomatic issue.  
Several explanations have been presented as to why Koizumi chose to 
consistently visit the shrine. One, that Koizumi was apt to make decisions for emotional 
reasons, and therefore was greatly moved by his memory of the memorial when he was 
                                                 
34 One tactic used by peace groups was to file suit against Koizumi for his visits. Several important lawsuits 
took place against Koizumi for his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Lawsuits against Koizumi occurred in Osaka, 
Fukuoka, and Okinawa. These lawsuits pointed out that Koizumi’s visits violated constitutional provisions 
against the separation of church and state. For more on these lawsuits, see Tanaka (2004a, 2004b) and 
McCormack (2007, p. 16-17). Both the Fukuoka District Court in April 2004 and Osaka High Court in 
September 2005 returned judgments that the visits to Yasukuni were unconstitutional. However, in the 
summer of 2006, the Supreme Court would throw out the judgments of these rulings on a technicality. 
Though none of these lawsuits were successful, they helped keep pressure on the prime minister to refrain 
from visiting the shrine.  
 
35 As might be expected, protests in both China and South Korea were quite intense. Crowds would 
frequently burn Japanese flags. In one case, twenty young Koreans cut off their pinky fingers and sent them 
to the Japanese embassy in protest (McCormack, 2007, p. 16).  
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younger; two, the prime minister was motivated by his political desire to maintain 
support among influential pressure groups on the right; and three, Koizumi’s strong 
feeling that Japan should not simply bend before the criticism of its neighbors (Stockwin, 
2008, p. 108; Mong, 2010). While all of these factors probably influenced his decisions to 
an extent, writers have also pointed out that Koizumi's prime ministership coincided with 
“a period of rapid growth in the Chinese economy, and fears in Japan that the balance of 
economic and political influence was shifting away from Japan in favor of China were 
widespread” (Stockwin, 2008, p. 108). This idea, that Koizumi was adept at playing on 
the insecurities of the public, has been reflected in the arguments of several other authors 
(see McCormack, 2007; Hosaka, 2005; Mikuriya, 2006). While Japanese insecurities 
about rising Chinese power may have played one important role in Koizumi’s political 
calculations, perhaps the most important aspect was the dramatic and contested nature of 
the visits. Resistance from leftist groups, business groups with economic interests in 
China and South Korea, and later even from the US helped to demonstrate Koizumi’s 
resolve to the public. His willingness to visit Yasukuni became a proxy for the larger 
image of “reform” that was linked with other measures, including his maverick persona 
and his postal reform measures. Since he had promised the Bereaved Families 
Association that he would visit the Shrine every year as prime minister, the visits 
themselves were a symbol for his credibility as a reformer who could live up to his public 
promises.  
Koizumi was also able to frame the issue of the Yasukuni visits in ways that 
benefited his maverick persona and downplayed the nationalist character of his visits. 
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Koizumi repeatedly stated that his visits were for purposes of peace and to mourn for the 
spirit of fallen soldiers. In his press conference on January 4, 2006, Koizumi criticized 
China and South Korea for turning “a matter of the heart” into a diplomatic issue 
(Kunimasa, 2006, January 31). These various framings—as a domestic issue, a personal 
matter of the heart, and as a way of honoring Japan’s pledge for peace—were methods of 
tempering resistance from Japan’s political center. The more China and South Korea 
railed against his visits, the more Chinese and South Korean activists seemed like 
extremists instead of Koizumi. By using his visits to espouse the virtues of peace, he 
distanced his own actions from a radical right position. As time passed, public sentiment 
increasingly backed Koizumi.  
In 2006, Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni would come under increased pressure. 
In May, Koizumi learned that he would not be allowed to address a joint sitting of the 
houses of Congress unless he pledged to stop his Yasukuni visits (Nakata, 2006, May 17; 
McCormack, 2007). When asked at November 2005 Summit with George Bush whether 
he would stop the visits to Yasukuni Shrine if the US asked him to, he reportedly stated 
that “I will never stop, even if asked by the United States not to” (McCormack, 2007; 
Wan, 2011, p. 340). Additional pressure was also put on Koizumi by the Association of 
Corporate Executives, and the Asahi and Yomiuri newspapers would oppose the visits in 
a rare joint editorial. Perhaps most devastating was the revelation that the deceased 
Showa Emperor had stopped visiting the shrine because of the enshrinement of the Class 
A war criminals (McCormack, 2007; Stockwin, 2008). Despite mounting opposition, 
Koizumi would nevertheless go forward with his August visit to the shrine. At this point, 
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his prime ministership was in its twilight, and Koizumi no longer needed dramatic acts to 
increase his power base to challenge his party. This visit was truly a matter of the heart. 
On August 15, 2006 Koizumi made his final visit to Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister—
his sixth in total. As opposed to previous visits, this one was different in that it took place 
on the anniversary of the end of World War II. A Yomiuri poll taken right after his last 
visit showed that 43 percent of respondents approved of the visit while 39 percent 
disapproved (Green and Koizumi, 2006). It is a testament to Koizumi’s persistence that a 
“matter of the heart” would in the end also become another (albeit small) political victory 
for his administration36.  
 
Limited Peace Offerings: Low-Cost Pacifism that Adhered to Japan’s Anti-Militarist 
Identity 
 
A frequently overlooked aspect of Koizumi’s defense policy is the extent to 
which he embraced the rhetoric of anti-militarism, pacifism, and reconciliation 37 . 
                                                 
36 Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine have an interesting postscript. After top leaders from both Japan and 
China had refrained from visiting each other’s capitals for over four years, relations unexpectedly 
blossomed under Koizumi’s even more conservative successor, Abe Shinzo. Despite Abe’s reputation as a 
staunch conservative (even more so than Koizumi) and his own ties with the Bereaved Families 
Association, Abe refrained from visiting the shrine as a way of improving ties with China. In a sense, 
Koizumi’s assessments of relations with China—in essence, that economic interdependence and cultural 
exchanges provided a backstop of deterioration in relations—seemed justified by this later development. In 
addition, Japan’s improved ties with the US also seemed to make Chinese leaders eager to stem the decline 
in relations. Wan has argued that the upswing in relations with China from 2006-2009 is difficult to justify 
by structural factors alone. Given Abe’s conservative leanings, the blossoming of better relations has been 
even harder to explain (Wan, 2011, p. 341-343). Prime Ministers after Koizumi would largely refrain from 
visiting both Beijing and Seoul to improve relations, drawing international praise (Emmott, 2006; 
McCormack, 2007). In addition, Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao would agree to create a joint 
commission on the history that would take place over three years. The two governments would also agree 
in principle to an agreement to jointly develop the petroleum and natural gas fields in the disputed areas in 
the East China Sea (Przystup, 2012, Personal Interview; Watanabe Akio, 2012, Personal Interview; Wan, 
2011).  
37 In a sense, this approach drew from the example past conservatives such as Hashimoto Ryutaro, who in 
his 1997 trip to China had also offered his own “heart felt apology” (see Chapters 3). Yet, for a politician 
 163 
Throughout his tenure, the prime minister was very adamant about framing his 
international activities in the language of Japan’s peace identity. Following the example 
of Hashimoto during his administration, Koizumi would frequently visit memorials and 
sites associated with the victims of Japan’s colonial past and the victims of World War II 
(Iijima, 2007). During these trips, he would repeatedly pledge that Japan would never 
again embark on the path of war. Typically, Koizumi’s verbal contributions to 
reconciliation, peace, and anti-militarism have been overlooked because the content of 
his policies were largely center-right and nationalist in character. His trips to Yasukuni 
Shrine, for example, were seen as naked attempts to appease supporters on the far right, 
especially the Bereaved Family Association. For these reasons, scholars have tended to 
dismiss Koizumi’s apologies as formulaic and insincere (McCormack, 2007). Regardless 
of Koizumi’s sincerity or the formulaic nature of his apologies, Koizumi’s pacifist and 
anti-militarist rhetoric were important aspects of his political strategy. Overall, his 
repeated pledges that Japan would never again engage in war, his endorsement of the 
Murayama apology for wartime atrocities, and his visitation of sites that related to 
Japan’s wartime past helped dampen criticisms of his regime domestically, assuaging 
many in Japan’s political center, and allowed him to avoid stricter criticisms from 
countries outside of Asia, including the US.  
Following his first visit to Yasukuni Shrine in his first year as prime minister, 
Koizumi was quick to remark that: “We should not engage in such a war ever again. I 
paid the visit to renew my pledge for peace” (CNN 2001, August 13). Koizumi’s pledge 
                                                                                                                                                 
like Koizumi, who was known to be more confrontational than the diplomatic Hashimoto, this is 
nevertheless an important element, worthy of analysis.  
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for peace and his promise that Japan would never again engage in war were to be 
repeated not only at future visits to Yasukuni Shrine, but at other functions as well. In the 
weeks following September 11, the prime minister traveled to Beijing and Seoul and met 
with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts to convince them that Japanese 
contributions to the US campaigns in Afghanistan were not moves toward 
remilitarization. During these visits, Koizumi also visited two symbols of Japan’s 
imperialist past—the Marco Polo Bridge and Sodaemun Independence Park. At each of 
these sites, Koizumi would visit the memorials to Japan’s wartime atrocities, despite the 
often anti-Japanese nature of these sites. The diplomatic payoff was that both Beijing and 
Seoul shelved their criticisms of Japan’s contribution to the US war in Afghanistan 
(Kliman, 2006, p. 84; Iijima, 2007, p. 35). During these visits, Koizumi would repeat his 
pledge that Japan would never again engage in war and offer his “heartfelt” apology for 
Japan’s wartime atrocities (Iijima, 2007, p. 36-37; Tanaka, 2009, p. 150). Koizumi would 
repeat his apology for the suffering caused by Japan in other settings as well, for example 
in his dramatic meeting with Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang, as well as in his visits to Manila 
Bay in the Philippines and Arlington Cemetery in the US (Iijima, 2007).  
Just as Koizumi’s “heartfelt” apologies for Japan’s wartime atrocities helped to 
blunt the edge of his Yasukuni visits and made his policies more palatable to Japan’s 
political center and international audiences, he would also use the language of 
international community and international contribution to soften the sharp edge of 
contributions to the US-Japan alliance. Throughout his tenure, Koizumi would enact a 
number of important measures that would lead to greater de facto collective self-defense 
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with the US; however, Koizumi adamantly characterized these contributions in terms of 
international contributions and highlighted the humanitarian nature of these operations. 
The most conspicuous aspect of this framing can be seen in the dispatch of the JSDF to 
Iraq. In the early stages of the war against Iraq, Koizumi was quick to announce his 
support of the US war despite a majority of Japanese citizens being against the invasion. 
Just as in the Indian Ocean dispatch, Koizumi chose roles for the Ground Self Defense 
Force in Samawah, Iraq that conformed closely to Japan’s anti-militarist identity. Thus, 
activities were limited to humanitarian assistance and rebuilding efforts and great efforts 
were taken to keep Japanese forces out of danger (Oros, 2008, p. 186). Once the UN 
resolution authorizing the rebuilding of Iraq was passed, Koizumi made the most of its 
significance, emphasizing the multilateral character of the operation, the anti-militarist 
aspects of the dispatch, and the core values of international solidarity and international 
contribution symbolized by the UN resolution.  
Generally speaking, Koizumi could afford to endorse pacifism and anti-
militarism rhetorically. There was little political risk in doing so. His visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine had already mollified his supporters on the political right, and his rhetoric did little 
to concern alliance managers in Washington. As critics would acknowledge, Koizumi 
would stop short of pledges to peace that directly addressed Chinese and South Korean 
fears or anger over the history issue—for example a joint commission with China and 
South Korea to explore the history issue—and thus, entailed political risks (Iijima, 2007, 
p. 39-41). Koizumi’s example demonstrates to future political leaders that rhetorical 
pacifism and anti-militarism can be an effective mechanism for winning tacit consent 
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from Japanese audiences in the political center and internationally outside of Asia, even 
as the content of policies endorse moves on the political right such as greater alliance 
contribution, rearmament, and symbolic nationalism. 
 
Okinawa: Koizumi’s Reluctant Bottom-Up Approach 
 
 
Another important defense issue during the Koizumi administration would be 
the lingering case of Futenma Airbase, the wider issue of Okinawa’s base burden, and the 
realignment of bases in Japan. The Okinawan base issue lingered on past the Hashimoto 
administration through the Obuchi and Mori administrations into the Koizumi 
administration. Little progress had been made in shifting the functions of Futenma from 
Ginowan city to the less populated Henoko area of Nago City, despite the efforts of 
defense bureaucrats to win over local support. Local resistance by environmental and 
political groups constituted an important reason for the failure to implement the 
agreement (McCormack, 2007; Brooks, 2010). Other factors were also now at play. The 
agreement on the details of the relocation had been opened up to the inputs of local 
politicians. In November of 1998, Ota had been replaced by Governor Inamine Keiichi, a 
candidate supported by the LDP and the business community. Though an ostensible 
proponent of the decision to move Futenma’s functions to Henoko, Inamine would set 
conditions that would ultimately complicate the implementation of the agreement. Instead 
of the 1,500 meter runway eventually settled on, Inamine advocated a 2,500 meter 
runway that was to be used as part of a joint civilian-military airstation with a time limit 
of fifteen years to be set for the military use of the runway. The Obuchi administration 
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eventually adopted a resolution approving the concept of joint civilian-military airport 
and agreed to discuss the concept of a 15-year limit on the use of the facility with the US 
(Brook, 2010; Morimoto, 2010). In addition to wrangling over the feasibility of a 
civilian-commercial airport in the sparsely populated Henoko region, local parties would 
continue to debate the merits of various means of runway construction, including 
replacing the original concept for an offshore facility with a land reclamation project.  
On August 13, 2004 a major helicopter crash occurred on the campus of 
Okinawa International University in the vicinity of Futenma Airbase. The crash caused 
major damage on the university, but luckily no one, including the crew members, was 
seriously injured. This incident served as one catalyst for including the Futenma 
relocation issue into the negotiations that were taking place between US and Japanese 
counterparts for the realignment of bases in Japan and the East Asia region. For the most 
part, Koizumi’s role in the negotiations over the 2005/ 2006 realignment agreement 
would be a small one. One scholar judges that in comparison to Hashimoto, who had 
devoted extensive energy to balancing the interests of the alliance and Okinawa, 
Koizumi’s attention to the matter was sporadic (Brooks, 2010).  
There were good reasons for his sporadic attention. The negotiations over the 
base realignment were occurring at a time when Koizumi’s primary goal of postal reform 
was finally at its climax. During key parts of the negotiations, Koizumi was pre-occupied 
with engineering his electoral gambit (including his use of political “assassin” candidates 
to run against those resisting postal reform). For this reason, the figures of then JDA 
Director General Nukuga Fukushiro and Administrative Vice Minister Moriya Takemasa 
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are more prominent in the negotiations. Still, Koizumi’s leadership would play a small 
but important role in the tedious negotiations over the realignment of bases. In a sense, it 
was his personal credibility with the US that was the glue that held negotiations together. 
In contrast to Japan’s contributions to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
negotiations for the base realignment would be much more contentious. This was not 
surprising given the controversial nature of the base issue in Japan. At key moments, he 
was also responsible for spurring working-level bureaucrats to work harder toward an 
agreement. Much like Hashimoto, Koizumi stressed to working level officers his desire 
for an agreement that would maintain US deterrence in the region, while still seeking out 
methods of lower citizens’ burden within the alliance (Moriya, 2010, p. 185)38.  
The new agreement would once again settle on the location of the Henoko area 
of Nago for a relocation site, but would also add the extra benefit of shifting 8,000 
marines and their dependents to Guam. As part of the agreement, Japan would bare 
nearly 60 percent of the costs, estimated at approximately 6 billion. Given the enormity 
of the figure, it would be a subject of intense negotiations throughout this time period 
(Brooks, 2010; Moriya, 2010). The implementation of the agreement, however, would 
continue to meet with staunch resistance from local activist groups prompting, the 
Okinawa base issue to once again come to the forefront in 2009 after the election of the 
DPJ (as we will see in Chapter 5).  
                                                 
38 I translate this directly from Moriya’s account. Moriya writes that Koizumi ordered, “Try your best to 
lower citizen’s burden without damaging US deterrent capabilities” [“Nichibei anzen hosyo taisei no 
yokushiryoku wo sokonau koto naku, kokumin no fundan no keigen wo jitsugenseyo”] (Moriya, 2010, p. 
185).  
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The case of base realignment is an oddity within the Koizumi case study, but 
also one that as consistent with his approach as a prime minister. Having devoted his 
attention to the issue of postal reform, Koizumi lacked the resources Hashimoto had built 
up during the earlier phases of his prime ministership, namely a personal relationship 
with the governor of Okinawa and working-level knowledge on the base agreement, to 
intervene directly in the issue. For this reason, Koizumi had little choice (and every 
incentive) to leave negotiations in the hands of experienced bureaucrats.  
 
Postal Reform: An Example for Defense Entrepreneurs? 
 
 
Koizumi’s greatest feat of political entrepreneurship took place not in the field 
of security policy and politics, but rather, in the area of postal reform. However, this 
reform holds important lessons for defense policy and politics because it demonstrates 
how significant will-power and daring strategies can upset entrenched sectionalism by 
leveraging the power of popular opinion. Prior to coming to office, Koizumi had 
campaigned on a reformist agenda. He had promised the electorate that if he could not 
change the LDP, he would smash the LDP. A priority for Koizumi was reforming Japan’s 
government-run postal system. In order to reform the system, he appointed Takenaka 
Heizo, an economics Professor at Keio University, to his cabinet. While it was Takenaka 
and others of the so-called “supply-side” economists in Japanese academia who were 
responsible for the details of postal reform, it was Koizumi who was responsible for the 
broad strokes of the reform movement. Others from the Council of Economy and Finance 
were chosen mostly from the private sector, and thus, were chosen outside of the faction 
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system. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Council of Economy and Finance did not 
negotiate directly with the party, but rather, presented decisions as a fait accompli 
(Yomiuri Shimbun Seiji-Bu, 2006). When Koizumi's postal reform bill passed the Lower 
House with only a slim margin, and faced even stiffer competition in the Upper House, 
Koizumi threatened to call Lower House elections if the bill did not pass the Upper 
House (Gaunder, 2007, p. 129-130).  
In the past, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989-1991) had made a similar 
threat in order to pass electoral reforms, but had later backed down. Koizumi, however, 
would not shy away from calling new elections. In September 2005, Koizumi made good 
on his campaign pledge to dissolve the Lower House of the Diet and called for snap 
elections based around the issue of postal reform. This made the election a direct 
referendum on his postal reform project. In addition, he refused to grant party 
endorsement to Lower House LDP members who had voted against the bill. For those 
who resisted his reform efforts, he had them kicked out of his party and sent “assassins” 
(hand-picked contenders) to compete with these Diet members in their district. The 
election gave Koizumi an unprecedented 296 out of 480 seats—a resounding victory for 
his reform agenda (Gaunder 2007; Maclachlan, 2010, 2011). With a two-thirds majority 
in the Lower House, he now had the ability override resistance in the Upper House if 
necessary. The framing employed by Koizumi was an essential part of his success. 
Koizumi, using his reformist credentials, argued that a vote for these “rebels” was a vote 
for the status quo (Maclachlan, 2010; Gaunder, 2007). Clearly it was the style of 
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Table 4: Koizumi Junichiro: Approaches to Defense Policy and Politics 
Approach Characteristics Results 
   
Personalize the 
Relationship with 
the US 
*Personal diplomacy  An expanded platform for demonstrating 
charisma 
*A political liability in the unpopular George 
W. Bush 
*A political ally against rivals within his party 
Over-deliver on 
Alliance 
Contributions 
 
*Top-Down Decision-
making 
*Special Kantei teams  
*Negotiations with 
coalition members before 
appealing to party base 
*Concrete alliance contributions (avoiding 
“too little, too late” label) 
*Refueling support in Afghanistan  
*JSDF dispatch to Iraq for humanitarian 
assistance 
Dramatic Visit to 
North Korea 
*Top-Down Diplomacy 
*Softened up by officials 
in MoFA and secret 
contacts  
*Return of five abductees 
*Boost in popularity rating by thirty percent 
Visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine 
*Security and historical 
symbolism 
*Increased visibility 
*A liability during most of his administration, 
would nevertheless serve as a symbol of his 
resolve 
Okinawa/ Base 
Realignment 
*Bureaucratic-bottom-up 
approach 
*a modified version of the 1996 agreement 
(8,000 marines to be moved to Guam); Japan 
to pay approximately 60 percent of costs 
*avoided public gaffes and alliance friction 
*Postal Reform 
(non-security 
example) 
*Direct Challenge to 
dissenting party members 
*Confrontational politics 
*Historic privatization of Japan’s postal 
services 
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Koizumi’s politics as much as the actual content that excited the public, especially non-
affiliated voters, and gave Koizumi his expanded mandate.   
Koizumi’s use of his power as party president and prime minister to attack 
dissenting members of his own party is an important example of entrepreneurship. It 
stands as an important example for the area of defense policy and politics because of its 
potential use in areas where entrenched interests currently prevent progress on key issues. 
This is most apparent in the areas of constitutional revision, revisions to the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, and/or bolder moves on the Futenma Base issue. In each of these areas, 
short of dramatic tactics to fight policy dissenters in the coalition, ruling party, and 
minority party and that appeal to popular opinion, little is likely to change.  
 
Conclusion: The Value of Coherent Strategy 
 
 
Koizumi’s policy accomplishments in the realm of defense were second to 
none. By the time Koizumi had left office, he had put Japanese soldiers on the ground in 
Iraq, contributed billions to the US in support of the War on Terror, cooperated closely 
with the US on ballistic missile defense, brought back five of the abductees from North 
Korea, and created a permissive environment for greater military and JDA (now MoD) 
contributions to policymaking. Shortly after his administration ended, the JDA would be 
upgraded to a full ministry. Most importantly, he had conducted his defense policy in a 
way that strengthened his support domestically, and thus, contributed to his victory in his 
primary political goal of postal reform. As he went into his final month in office, he 
enjoyed a support rate of 47 percent—an astounding number considering that many 
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Japanese prime ministers leave office with support rates in the low twenties or high teens 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2006, August 28).  
It is fitting that former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro would say of 
Koizumi: “Prime Minister Koizumi has an ability to recognize the needs of the times” 
(2005, February 22). Nakasone’s comments were directed specifically towards Koizumi’s 
recognition that pressure groups were losing their hold on voters, and thus, that prime 
ministers could get around zoku policy groups and party factions to enact change. His 
comments, however, could also be applied to Koizumi’s recognition that the public 
wanted someone who could “smash” the LDP. Though Koizumi demonstrated the 
greatest amount of risk, boldness, and political shrewdness in the area of postal reform, 
he nevertheless also demonstrated great skill, leadership, and innovation in the area of 
security policy and politics.  
As Takami (2006) writes, there were several factors that made Koizumi’s “top-
down” leadership possible. First was the large number of non-aligned voters that had 
grown since the 1990s. This allowed the prime minister to stand apart from the party and 
build an independent support base. The second important feature that had made “Koizumi 
magic” possible was the importance of television in politics. This made Koizumi’s “one 
phrase politics” easy for viewers to understand. Finally, the administrative reforms 
enacted during the Hashimoto administration strengthened the prime minister’s office, 
allowing Koizumi the administrative support he needed to lead from the kantei. All of 
these important enabling factors of Koizumi-style top-leadership remain.  
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Some scholars have noted the lack of consistency in Koizumi’s foreign and 
defense policy (Uchiyama, 2010, p. 79; McCormack, 2007). Though Koizumi embraced 
policies ranging from political realism, to military realism, to Gaullism, his policies were 
nonetheless logical in one important regard: his actions helped bolster his image as a 
prime minister who could accomplish goals against great resistance. Whether it was his 
decision to support the US as an ally, his decision to visit North Korea and meet Kim 
Jong-Il face to face, or his decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine, each of these policies kept 
Koizumi in the public eye and demonstrated his skill at achieving proximate objectives 
and facing down resistance. The dispatch of the Marine Self Defense Force to the Indian 
Ocean was a concrete show of alliance support for the US; Koizumi’s face to face 
meeting with Kim Jong-Il in North Korea resulted in the return of five abductees; the 
dispatch of the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq was a “human” contribution that was 
revolutionary in Japan’s postwar era; and his trips to Yasukuni demonstrated his 
commitment to following through with campaign promises despite stringent opposition. 
The controversial nature of each of these actions, in turn, helped sustain his image as a 
“maverick,” and thus, helped Koizumi maintain his support base outside of the party39.  
                                                 
39 Perhaps the most stinging criticism of Koizumi came from none other than Hashimoto Ryutaro, who 
went on record as saying that Koizumi’s approach to diplomacy was too focused on the US. Hashimoto 
would say in an interview: “Currently, Japan's ties with other nations other than the U.S. are like dotted 
lines. We should at least try to make those dotted lines into solid ones as well.” As well as that, “Japan 
needs to have more politicians who can establish close relations with other nations - those who can truly 
engage in diplomacy and not just seek out their own concessions” (Daimon, 2004, January 1). While 
applauding Koizumi’s moves to improve US relations through the dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq, cooperation 
on missile defense, and for the administration’s support of the US in the war on terror, he nevertheless felt 
that Japan was becoming too narrowly focused on the US. In a sense, what Hashimoto was criticizing 
Koizumi for was not pivoting on better US-Japan relations to reach outward to other countries as he had 
during his administration. This criticism would ring sharpest in the areas of South Korea and Chinese 
diplomacy. 
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Throughout his tenure, Koizumi also demonstrated the “paradoxical logic” of 
seeking greater diplomatic autonomy through closer relations with Washington. Indeed, 
Washington stepped aside as Tokyo pursued a normalization track with North Korea and 
was awarded a contract for developing energy resources in Iran--two members of Bush’s 
“axis of evil.” Evidence suggests that the reason Washington did not take a stronger 
stance on these issues is because of Koizumi’s unflinching support of the alliance, 
Japan’s contributions to coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the special 
relationship that Koizumi had built with President Bush.  
Through strength of personality and cunning political theater, Koizumi was 
also able to turn his most unpopular policy moves, his Yasukuni Shrine visits and his 
dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq, into quasi-popular ones by making them symbols of his own 
maverick image. While some of his initiatives—for example, the transformation of 
Japan’s defense establishment to allow greater inputs from military officers and force 
realignments for greater interoperability with the US—have stuck, others have proven 
less enduring. His most controversial action, prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, 
has been by and large neglected by successive prime ministers. This demonstrates the 
persistence of Japan’s anti-militarist culture and the degree to which future leaders have 
sought to minimize the risks of antagonizing China. This demonstrates the limitations of 
charisma and showmanship in creating long-lasting change in the realm of defense 
politics.  
The Koizumi case teaches us that coherence of design in political strategy is 
important, but that this coherence need not be faithful devotion to any one line of 
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Japanese strategic thinking (Gaullism, military realism, political realism, or pacifism). In 
the case of Koizumi, the most important coherence was in terms of the desired end state: 
higher popularity figures to support his reform agenda. Each of the defense policies 
pursued above sought to foster Koizumi’s image as a politician who could accomplish 
clear-cut goals against great political odds. This image helped to maintain his popular 
support base outside of his political party, and thus, to pursue reform efforts against 
entrenched interests.  
As Rumelt (2011) writes, good strategy is surprising at the time, yet simple in 
retrospect. Koizumi’s key insight was just that. He understood that the Japanese public 
was eager for a prime minister who could accomplish something (anything!), face down 
opposition, and represent a more self-confident Japan. For this reason, Koizumi’s defense 
policies embraced opportunities for assertive action, wherever those opportunities may 
have been.  
Chronology of Key Events: Koizumi Junichiro Administration 
 
Apr. 23, 2001: Koizumi Junichiro wins upset victory to become Liberal Democratic Party 
president over Hashimoto Ryutaro.  
Apr. 26, 2001: New Cabinet sworn in. In a break with tradition, PM Koizumi picks the 
members himself, without bargaining with faction bosses.  
May 23, 2001: Koizumi Cabinet records 85 percent public approval rating.  
Sept. 13, 2001: PM Koizumi supports U.S. retaliation for Sept. 11 terrorist strikes. “It’s 
only natural for President Bush to take strong action.” When asked if he support U.S. 
retaliation, he says “of course.”   
Sept. 17, 2001: PM Koizumi prepares to support possible U.S. retaliation by providing 
logistic support and intelligence, “strong support for U.S. fight against terrorism.”  
Sept. 19, 2001: Coalition government agrees to write legislation that allows SDF to 
protect U.S. bases in Japan, Diet, PM residence, and nuclear power plants.   
Oct. 5, 2001: Japanese Cabinet approves a bill to support U.S. counterterrorist operation. 
The legislation allows the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to provide logistic and other 
noncombatant support to the expected U.S.-led multinational force, engage in search-and 
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rescue activities for missing military personnel, and carry out humanitarian relief 
operations for refugees.          
Oct. 18, 2001: Special Measures to Fight Terrorism Bill passes Lower House.   
Nov. 27, 2001: Lower House approves SDF dispatch to Indian Ocean.   
Jan. 29, 2002: FM Tanaka Makiko is fired from her position after multiple gaffes and 
disputes with MoFA officials.   
Feb. 1, 2002: Kawaguchi Yoriko is sworn in as foreign minister.  
March 29, 2002:  Kyodo News Agency poll shows that Koizumi Cabinet approval rate 
hits record low of 44.8 percent, dropping below 50 percent for the first time (as a result of 
the Tanaka firing).  
May 2, 2002: Kyodo News Agency poll shows Koizumi Cabinet’s approval rate drops to 
43.4 percent and disapproval rate is 45.1 percent; 80.2 percent of respondents speculate 
Koizumi Cabinet will not last more than one year.  
June 23, 2002: PM Koizumi promises that he will speed negotiations on relocation of the  
U.S. Futenma heliport in Okinawa.  
Sept. 17, 2002: PM Koizumi meets Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang.   
Jan. 14, 2003: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine.  
Jan. 28, 2003:  PM Koizumi vows to make annual pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine as 
long as he is in office.                            
Feb. 17, 2003: Defense Agency spokesman says Japan and the U.S. have agreed to begin 
ballistic missile defense (MD) tests off Hawaii in the spring of 2004.   
Feb. 26, 2003: Tokyo notifies Washington that it will not support the military expenses of 
Iraqi war, but it will shoulder the burden of Iraqi reconstruction after Saddam Hussein is 
ousted.  
Feb. 27, 2003:  U.S. announces plans to review the defense of Japan, including 
strengthening of interoperability with the SDF along with the assumption of Japan’s 
deployment of MD.   
March 17, 2003: PM Koizumi gives total support to a U.S. announcement to take military 
action against Iraq unless Saddam Hussein surrenders within 48 hours.                                                       
April 4, 2003:  Japan Defense Agency signs contract to buy first air refueling tanker, 
scheduled to be delivered in FY 2007.  
April 21, 2003:  U.S. tanker and F-15s of ASDF begin first aerial refueling exercise over 
Kyushu and Shikoku.    
May 15, 2003: Three military emergency bills designed to prepare Japan for foreign 
military attacks pass Lower House with an overwhelming majority.  
May 22-23, 2003:  Bush-Koizumi summit held at Bush’s private ranch in Crawford, Tex.    
June 6, 2003: Three military emergency bills pass House of Councilors with an 
overwhelming majority.  
June 13, 2003:  Cabinet approves bill that allows SDF to help Iraqi reconstruction, for the 
first time without the consent of the host country.   
June 29, 2003: Asahi poll finds that 46 percent of Japanese voters support sending SDF to 
Iraq, 43 percent oppose it, while about 70 percent feel that Japan needs to contribute to 
Iraqi reconstruction.   The poll finds public approval of Koizumi’s Cabinet at 47 percent, 
 178 
down slightly from May, while 52 percent support Koizumi’s reelection in the LDP’s 
leadership election in September.  
July 11, 2003: Japan sends two Air Self-Defense Force C-130 transport aircraft carrying. 
Self-Defense Force members to Jordan as part of a UN humanitarian effort to help Iraq.   
July 11, 2003: JDA introduces a “layered missile defense system,” combining the 
ground-based PAC-3 and a sea-based SM3 into four  Aegis destroyers and one  Air 
Defense Missile Group with a budget of ¥200 billion over the next two years.  
July 16, 2003: Yomiuri Shimbun poll indicates that 31 percent are in favor of the dispatch  
of SDF to Iraq, while 43 are opposed and 24 percent undecided.  
July 25, 2003: Bill allowing dispatch of SDF to Iraq passes with 136 votes in favor, 102 
votes against despite a no-confidence motion against PM Koizumi in the Lower House.  
Sept. 19, 2003: President Bush and PM Koizumi affirm that both nations will cooperate 
to reconstruct Iraq; Japan prepares $1 billion in financial aid for 2004 in response to U.S. 
request.  
Sept. 20, 2003: PM Koizumi wins re-election as LDP president with 399 votes (60 
percent) of the 657 votes cast, he says that he will continue with economic reform.  
Nov. 2, 2003: PM says Japan's SDF in Iraq will need to be protected by US and British 
coalition forces; he also indicates the need to review the constitution to "legitimize" the 
SDF as a National Military".  
November 29, 2003: Two Japanese diplomats killed in an ambush in Tikrit, Iraq.  
November 30, 2003: FM Kawaguchi tells Secretary Powell via telephone that Japan will 
continue to help Iraq reconstruction efforts despite death of two diplomats.  
Dec. 17, 2003: Tokyo will spend nearly $1 billion on missile defense in 2004. The system 
will utilize Patriot missiles and intercept missiles deployed aboard Aegis-equipped 
destroyers.  
Dec. 19, 2003: Japan announces plans to buy an American-made missile defense system 
and continued participation with the U.S. in the joint-development of a missile defense 
system. Partial introduction of the system will begin in early 2007 and be fully 
operational by 2011.  
Jan. 9, 2004: JDA Chief Ishiba Shigeru orders advance reconnaissance team from the 
GSDF to leave for Iraq – the first of about 600 soldiers that Japan plans to send to 
southern Iraq for reconstruction efforts.  
Feb. 18, 2004: Japan wins right to develop Iran’s Azadegan oilfield for an estimated $2.8 
billion. U.S. calls the deal “deeply disconcerting.”  
Feb. 18, 2004: Under Secretary of State John Bolton meets counterpart Amano Yukiya to 
discuss WMD nonproliferation and arms control policy. He reassures Japan its agreement 
to develop Azadegan oilfield will not damage U.S.-Japan relations.   
March 16, 2004: Asahi poll reveals support for Koizumi Cabinet up to 49 percent from 
last month’s 44 percent; those who did not support the government fell from 37 percent 
to 32 percent. Support for SDF deployment to Iraq is split with 42 percent for and 41 
percent against, a sharp drop from the 48 percent against in February.  
April 10, 2004: Poll shows 45.2 percent disagree with Tokyo’s rejection of the 
kidnapper’s demands to withdraw troops vs. 43.5 who supported the decision.  Support 
 179 
for the Koizumi Cabinet fell 3 percentage points from March to 48.4 percent; the 
disapproval rate is up 2.6 points to 39.3 percent.    
May 11, 2004: Asahi Shimbun opinion poll indicates 73 percent of respondents favor 
maintaining the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty.  
July 4, 2004: Fuyushiba Tetsuzo, secretary general of New Komeito, opposes PM 
Koizumi Junichiro’s remarks that the pacifist Constitution should be revised so it can 
exercise the right to collective defense and carry out joint actions with U.S. forces.   
Aug. 13, 2004: A U.S. military transport helicopter crashes at a university campus in 
Ginowan, Okinawa, but there was no report of casualty from students.   
Oct. 4, 2004:  Prime Minister’s Defense Advisory panel (Araki Commission) presents 
“The Vision for Future National Security and Defense Capabilities.” It recommends 
bolstering U.S. ties, easing arms exports, and enacting a permanent law on Self Defense 
Force (SDF) deployments overseas.   
April 22, 2005: Japan extends Self Defense Forces (SDF) deployment by six months 
(until Nov. 1, 2005) in support of “Operation Enduring Freedom.”  
June 28, 2005: Senior Japanese and U.S. officials begin two-day meeting in Washington 
to discuss the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and the sharing of defense roles.  
June 29, 2005: Kyodo News reports PM Koizumi expresses willingness to consider 
keeping Japanese troops in Iraq beyond the mission’s current deadline of December.  
Aug. 8, 2005: PM Koizumi dissolves House of Representatives and calls general election 
for Sept. 11 after House of Councilors voted down government-sponsored postal 
privatization bills.  
Aug. 10, 2005: Okinawa International University launches balloon to protest U.S. Marine  
Corps helicopter crash in August 2004, which damaged the walls of its main building.  
Sept. 11, 2005: PM Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party wins majority of seats (296 of  
480) in the Lower House and coalition partner New Komeito wins 31 seats.  
Sept. 26, 2005: U.S. and Japanese defense officials begin senior working-level talks on 
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. They break up after two days without agreement.  
Oct. 13, 2005: Senior Japanese and U.S. government officials fail to agree on Futenma 
Air Station relocation.  
Oct. 14, 2005: Diet approves postal privatization bills.  
Oct. 17, 2005: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine for the fifth time.  
Oct. 26, 2005: U.S. accepts Japan’s proposal on a replacement facility for the relocation 
of the Futemma Air Station in Okinawa.  
Oct. 29, 2005: Tokyo and Washington reach agreements to finalize reshaping their 
bilateral alliance, including major troop redeployments, new construction, and increased 
jointness among U.S. and Japanese personnel.  
Oct. 31, 2005: Okinawa Gov. Inamine Keiichi rejects plan to relocate the Futemma Air 
Station within Okinawa Prefecture. New Defense Agency Director General Nukaga 
Fukushiro says he hopes to win over local communities on this matter.  
Nov. 15-16, 2005: President Bush visits Japan. He meets PM Koizumi at a summit in 
Kyoto and stresses the importance of the alliance for promoting freedom in Asia and 
pursuing global economic and security matters.   
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Dec. 8, 2005: PM Koizumi announces decision of the Cabinet to extend for one year SDF 
activities in Iraq.  
Feb. 13, 2006: PM Koizumi says he will shelve plans to give Japan its first full-fledged 
Defense Ministry since World War II after a military bid-rigging scandal.   
Apr. 23, 2006: Japan and the U.S. strike a deal on sharing the cost of relocating 8,000 
U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, with Tokyo paying 59 percent, or $6.09 billion, of 
the estimated $10.27 billion total cost through grants, investment and loans. JDA Director 
Gen. Nukaga and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announce the agreement, paving the way 
for implementation of the package to realign the U.S. military presence in Japan.  
May 1, 2006: The U.S. and Japan release a joint statement confirming a bilateral deal to 
realign U.S. Forces in Japan by 2014. Major features include the integration of USFJ 
command structures with the headquarters of several branches on the U.S. mainland. 
Under the deal, Japan will pay for infrastructure costs and the U.S. for operational moves.  
June 20, 2006: Prime Minister Koizumi announces Japan will withdraw ground troops 
from Iraq. The ASDF will remain to transport goods and personnel for the coalition.   
June 28-30, 2006: Prime Minister Koizumi makes final visit to the U.S. as prime 
minister. A White House Dinner, Oval Office summit, and Graceland visit are planned.      
July 17, 2006: The 10th Ground Self Defense Force contingent ends humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance and completed its withdrawal from Iraq.  
July 19, 2006: The government of Japan decides to expand the Air Self-Defense Force’s 
airlift mission between Kuwait and Iraq.  
Aug. 15, 2006: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine. This visit is his sixth and first on the 
anniversary of the end of World War II.    
Aug. 16, 2006: Yomiuri Shimbun conducts a poll on Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit: 53 
percent of respondents (including those generally favorable) support the visit, and 39 
percent did not.  
Sept. 26, 2006: President of the LDP Abe Shinzo is elected prime minister by both 
houses of Parliament.   
 
Timeline adapted from materials in Comparative Connections Chronologies (2001-
2006)
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CHAPTER 5: 
Yuai Politics and the Collapse of Power: The Prime Ministership of Hatoyama Yukio 
(2009-2010) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Hatoyama Yukio’s prime ministership (September, 16 2009-June 2, 2010) is an 
important case  in Japanese defense politics because it is the first time in recent history 
that a prime minister has challenged—however subtle that challenge may have been—the 
primacy of the US-Japan strategic alliance. In contrast to both Hashimoto Ryutaro and 
Koizumi Junichiro, who had believed in the importance of the alliance and helped deepen 
it through their charisma and personal involvement, Hatoyama had throughout his 
political career stood against deeper entrenchment of the US-Japan alliance. In addition, 
whereas both Hashimoto and Koizumi had used the expertise of bureaucrats to help 
manage the alliance, Hatoyama’s politics was ideologically set against the continuation of 
bureaucratic control of policy in all areas. Hatoyama had campaigned throughout his 
political career on the slogan of “from bureaucrats to politicians” (kanryo kara seiji 
made) and “policy by politicians” (seiji-shudo). Given that the US-Japan alliance had 
benefited from the close ties and the accumulated personal networks of key bureaucrats 
and officials, Hatoyama’s challenge to bureaucratic power was significant. Yet, despite 
coming to power with overwhelming public support and new ideas about the direction of 
defense policy, Hatoyama would nevertheless have to resign within a short period of time 
after mismanagement of the relocation of Futenma Airbase. This was first time in the 
post cold war period that a Japanese prime minister’s resignation was directly due to the 
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mishandling of defense issues. By the end of his approximately eight months in office, 
Hatoyama’s popularity figures had declined from his post-election high of 71 percent to a 
mere 17 percent (Economist, 2010, June 2). By the end of his administration, Hatoyama’s 
policies had effectively alienated both the US and Okinawa, had forced the Social 
Democratic Party to leave the coalition, and had damaged his party’s prospects for 
winning the Upper House election scheduled for July.  
Critics of Hatoyama have described him as “hapless” and “aloof”—by one 
critic as having a “diplomacy without a strategy” (Yamauchi and Inoue, 2010, p. 99) and 
by another as having a “blind-folded diplomacy” (Nakanishi, 2010, p. 113). Certainly, 
there were elements of Hatoyama and the DPJ’s approach that signaled what Rumelt 
(2011) has described as “bad strategy.” The DPJ’s 2009 Manifesto set out numerous 
goals on a range of topics that opposition politicians criticized as wishful thinking. 
Though the Manifesto itself seemed to be an important element of a good electoral 
strategy—one that helped produce an overwhelming victory over the LDP—as a list of 
preferred outcomes, the lack of hierarchy these goals produced seemed to have migrated 
into the first DPJ administration itself. Second, and most importantly, Hatoyama would 
demonstrate through his tenure an inability to face the problems at hand and to choose 
between a number of unsavory alternatives. Hatoyama was the consummate “peace 
lover” (see Hayao, 1993; Shinoda, 2000) throughout his administration, hoping to 
appease all parties with nuanced and delicate compromises40. As Rumelt has written, the 
inability to choose is usually the foundation of bad strategy.   
                                                 
40 Hashimoto had also demonstrated “peace loving” tendencies during his administration. However, though 
Hashimoto’s attempts to assuage China and Okinawa had sometimes stretched the coherence of previous 
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A closer examination of Hatoyama’s policy actions and statements during this 
period reveals that there was a basic logic to Hatoyama’s approach to defense and foreign 
affairs. Indeed, by examining these important logics, the crucial limitations of 
Hatoyama’s approaches become clearer. Through his actions and his rhetoric, Hatoyama 
demonstrated a desire to chart a course that rejected Japan’s shift toward greater 
integration into the US’s global military strategy. This course had been building 
momentum since at least the mid-1990s and had been mapped in various ways through 
successive government documents such as the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration on 
Security, successive National Defense Program Outlines, the US-Japan Guidelines for 
Defense Cooperation, the Armitage-Nye Report (on the US side), and through the many 
statements of LDP prime ministers from Koizumi onward stressing the values of 
democracy and free markets shared with the US (Bisley, 2008; Hughes, 2009; Samuels, 
2007a; Sebata, 2010). As an alternative to this defense trajectory, Hatoyama (and to an 
extent followers within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)) sought to lower Japan’s 
liabilities within the alliance, demonstrate leadership internationally through “civilian” 
issues like nuclear nonproliferation and climate change, and bring many aspects of 
defense into the realm of citizen politics. In the long term, Hatoyama and the DPJ also 
hoped to make progress on regional integration and the history issue in ways that would 
lead to the gradual de-militarization of the region. 
                                                                                                                                                 
gains made in US-Japan alliance management through the Joint Declaration, SACO, and negotiations over 
the Joint Guidelines, he would never abandon his support for maintaining US deterrence in Okinawa. In 
short, Hashimoto chose to support US deterrence early in his administration, and used that position as a 
pivot on which to reach out to other actors.  
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In some ways, Hatoyama’s operational approach also seemed to be based on a 
reasonable assessment of the situation. Given the depth and breadth of the US alliance 
and his own party’s fragmented views on defense and security, it would be difficult to 
mount a direct political challenge to the US-Japan alliance. Instead of the more 
confrontational political style of Koizumi, Hatoyama attempted to achieve his desired 
course by balancing the interests of the many actors involved. Hatoyama sought to 
balance coalition partners (especially the Social Democratic Party) and US-Japan alliance 
managers; the needs of the US military with the needs of Okinawan citizens; and to use 
overtures to China as a counterbalance to US gaiatsu. He did so while adopting a “first 
among equals” approach to managing his cabinet and a trial-and-error approach to 
seeking workable solutions.  
However, if Hatoyama’s approach demonstrates that he understood at least the 
basic aspects of his challenge--the fragmentation of views of security in his cabinet, a 
Japan that had become more deeply integrated into US global strategy and technology, 
and a regional context not yet ripe for peace—there is also some evidence that he 
misunderstood many fundamental aspects of his situation as well. The most essential 
mistake Hatoyama made was in overestimating how much he could realign the US-Japan 
relationship around his and Obama’s shared interest in climate change and nuclear 
security. He also grossly overestimated the US’s willingness to renegotiate the terms of 
the Futenma Airbase relocation and his own administration’s ability to navigate defense 
issues without the help of the bureaucracy. In his operational approach, Hatoyama mixed 
the worst of bottom-up and top-down approaches: while avoiding the expertise of 
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bureaucrats and mid-level officials at the bottom, he allowed himself to become bogged 
down in the morass of the fractured opinions of his cabinet. Over the time, his cabinet’s 
fractured view on Futenma would become apparent in ways that opened up the 
administration to media scrutiny. Moreover, the timing of his challenge of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty could not have been worse. Hatoyama’s indirect challenge came at a time 
when the US-Japan Security Treaty marked its 50th anniversary, at a time when President 
Obama enjoyed high popularity ratings in Japan, and when dramatic examples of the 
lingering security dilemma in Asia would reappear. Though Hatoyama’s failures as a 
leader can be attributed to his misreading of his environment (and thus are somewhat 
context-driven), they also demonstrate a somewhat generalizable aspect of political 
strategy: muddle-through and consensus-based approaches are inferior when one seeks to 
challenge entrenched positions within a subgovernment.  
This chapter will evaluate Hatoyama’s prime ministership in terms of his 
political strategy and his policy entrepreneurship. The chapter begins with a background 
sketch of Hatoyama, his political background, highlighting his experience and his 
opinions on defense issues. It then moves on to a description of his operating context and 
the challenges he faced. The chapter then parses Hatoyama’s approach to defense before 
concluding the chapter with an assessment of his approach and his relevance to the 
Japan’s defense trajectory in the post cold war world. In addition to demonstrating the 
miscalculations Hatoyama made during his administration, this chapter will also builds 
on aspects drawn from the Hashimoto and Koizumi case studies to conduct 
counterfactual analysis of where Hatoyama could have improved his approach. 
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Hatoyama Yukio’s Political Background and Security Orientation 
 
Like many prominent politicians in Japan, Hatoyama Yukio came from a long 
political pedigree. Hatoyama was a fourth generation politician from a family that is often 
referred to as the “Kennedy family” of Japan (Mori 2009; Itagaki 2009; Hasegawa 2010). 
His great grandfather began his parliamentary career in 1892; his grandfather, Hatoyama 
Ichiro, was prime minister from 1954-1956; and his father Iichiro was Foreign Minister 
in 1976-7. If political fame came from the paternal side of the family, wealth would come 
from the maternal side. Hatoyama’s mother is heir to the Bridgestone tire fortune and has 
been called the “Godmother” of politics for her ability to fund the political careers of 
both her sons Yukio and Kunio (Mori 2009; Itagaki 2009; Hasegawa 2010). In many 
ways the legacy and attitudes of Hatoyama Ichiro, the grandfather who became prime 
minister during the tumultuous period of the fifties, would foreshadow many of the 
attitudes of his grandson. As a conservative politician aligned against future mainstream 
politicians like Yoshida Shigeru, the elder Hatoyama saw the restoration of Japanese 
sovereignty, the expulsion of US forces from Japan, the revision of the constitution, and 
independent armed forces as his goals (Edstrom 1999; Mori 2009).  
Hatoyama Yukio graduated with a PhD degree in Industrial Engineering from 
Stanford University and worked as a professor of engineering before entering politics in 
1986. Hatoyama won his first House of Representative seat in 1986 under the LDP and 
the Takeshita faction. In his early days, under a group called the “Utopia Society,” he and 
other like-minded parliamentarians studied political reform. In 1993 he left the LDP and 
co-founded the New Party Sakigake. He and Kan Naoto then left this party to found the 
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Democratic Party of Japan in 1996. A key theme from the party’s early political ideology 
was to create a party that could take responsibility and wrest authority away from the 
bureaucracies. As much of their policy statements and party literature would state, this 
new party would attempt to shift Japanese politics away from “collusion” between 
politicians and bureaucrats and towards partnerships between citizens and politicians 
(Iwami, 1996; Koellner, 2011, p. 25). Hatoyama led the DPJ from 1999-2002. When 
Ozawa Ichiro stepped down from the party leadership in May 11, 2009, Hatoyama 
became the new face of the party and the main candidate for prime minister. In an 
election by fellow party representatives, Hatoyama won the leadership race over Okada 
Katsuya (Itagaki, 2009).   
Mirroring many of the sentiments of his grandfather in the early postwar 
period, Hatoyama would say at a Foreign Correspondents Club meeting in 1996: “We 
have never questioned the deployment of U.S. troops in Japan for the last five decades 
after the war, particularly during the Cold War years. But now, we do not want to regard 
it as a matter of course to have a foreign military force stationed in Japan, which is an 
independent nation…We would like to create an environment for Japan to consider a 
Japan-U.S. security regime that does not require the full-time deployment of U.S. forces” 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 1996, October 4; Akita, 2009, December 21). Hatoyama’s desire for 
an alliance without permanent bases was also reflected in an article written for the Bungei 
Shunju. This article—which Sneider (2011) argues should be seen as representing the 
core group of the DPJ at the time and not just Hatoyama (though the article is attributed 
to Hatoyama)—proposed a gradual decrease in the number of bases in Japan with the 
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goal of eventually creating an “alliance without permanent bases.” This decrease in bases, 
the article argued, would be made possible by expanding regional forums for cooperation 
on security issues (Hatoyama, 2011, p. 125-127; see Sneider, 2011, p. 123, for a 
background narrative on the creation of this article).  
Despite the periodic lip service he paid to the US alliance during his 
administration, there is evidence to suggest that Hatoyama's preferences for a more 
autonomous Japan were genuine. His odd editorial printed in Voice, which was partially 
translated in English for the August 27, 2009 online edition of the New York Times, railed 
against American capitalism and spoke of the decline of US power. Hatoyama depicted 
American capitalism and American-led globalization as threats to local tradition and local 
economic models (Hatoyama, 2009, p. 136). Though part of this critique was leveled at 
Koizumi-era free market reforms, by implication these criticisms could also be applied to 
the American economic model from which Koizumi’s economic reformers took much of 
their ideas. Even as the editorial acknowledged the important military role of the US in 
the East Asia region for years to come, the same editorial spoke of the insecurity of the 
dollar economy, Japan’s Asian identity, and noted that Japan would have to steer an 
independent course between China and the US (Hatoyama, 2009). The article was thus 
conspicuous in the way it implicitly depicted the US as an economic threat, a declining 
power, and in the somewhat reluctant tone41 in which Hatoyama signaled the need to 
                                                 
41 The issue of “sincerity” when it comes to Hatoyama’s acknowledgement of the importance of the US-
Japan Security Treaty is a complex and important one that will be explored throughout this chapter. 
Nevertheless, there was a consistent pattern to Hatoyama’s approach, both rhetorical and otherwise, to the 
US Security Treaty: Hatoyama outline his desire for alternatives and amendments to the alliance while later 
stating (somewhat contradictorily) his support for the alliance.  
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embrace the US for military reasons42. Furthermore, in his resignation speech as Prime 
Minister, even as he re-affirmed the necessity of the US-Japan Security Treaty, he looked 
hopefully to a future down the line where Japan would no longer need the US bases 
(Hatoyama, 2010, June 2). 
Beyond his preference for a Japanese defense posture without bases, Hatoyama 
also inherited from his grandfather a love of the ideas of European integrationist Count 
Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi. During the historical 2009 campaign, 
Hatoyama stressed his pet idea “yuai”—the two kanji for friendship and love—
sometimes translated as “fellowship.” The idea of “yuai” embraced not only ideas that 
were grounded on the founding of the European Union, but also, on the French ideas of 
fraternity, equality, philanthropy, and freedom (Hatoyama, 2009; Itagaki, 2009; Mori, 
2009). His ideas for “yuai” diplomacy would include diplomacies of “trust” with other 
countries and an East Asian Community as a war-free zone that would help lower 
security “dependence” on the US (Itagaki, 2009; Hatoyama, 2009). His preference for an 
East Asian Community that would serve as a “war free” zone gives Hatoyama’s Gaullism 
a left-leaning aspect that is absent from the more nationalistic Gaullism of Nakasone 
                                                 
42 Hatoyama’s thinking was heavily influenced by scholars such as Terashima Jitsuro, president of the 
Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, who served as a personal advisor to Hatoyama. Much like other 
scholars who regularly publish in Sekai and Japan Focus, Terashima is an outspoken critic of US bases. 
His writings for Sekai have frequently chided mainstream Japanese intellectual for abetting the ossification 
of the US-Japan alliance and has urged to Japan stop its “excessive dependence on the US” and to return to 
the “common sense” assumption that Japan’s security should be secured by Japanese (for relevant 
examples see: Terashima (2009, October; 2010, February)). For Terashima’s own analysis of Hatoyama’s 
leadership and the deeper meanings of his failure to move the Futenma Base outside of the prefecture, see 
Terashima’s (2010, August 9) article in Japan Focus. Taking a different track than Hatoyama’s critics, 
Terashima argues that his failure was not in mismanaging the details of Futenma, but rather, in letting his 
larger goal of comprehensively re-evaluating the alliance from the ground up to become a quagmire over 
how to deal with just one piece of the puzzle. In Terashima’s opinion, Hatoyama sealed his fate the 
moment he accepted the prior negotiating framework of finding a location that would maintain the US’s 
current military capabilities in the region. 
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Yasuhiro, Koizumi Junichiro, and Abe Shinzo. In addition, whereas conservatives such 
as Koizumi had rankled relations with China and South Korea through visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine, Hatoyama pledged not to visit the shrine. In addition, he gave signals that he 
planned to approach the lingering history issue through such measures as a fresh 
government statement on Japan’s wartime guilt (to supplement the official apology made 
by the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in 1995) and a proposal to build a 
non-sectarian war memorial to challenge the ideology of Yasukuni Shrine (Itagaki, 2009; 
Easley, Kotani, and Mori, 2010). In addition to these measures, both his political career 
and his policy actions while in office made it clear that Hatoyama was deeply passionate 
about both advancing the cause of climate change diplomacy and working toward a non-
nuclear world.  
 
The Operational Environment: Fractured Party/ Cabinet view on Defense, 
Entrenched US-Japan Security Relationship, and the Regional Security Dilemma 
 
 
Hatoyama came to power at a time when the institution of the prime minister 
was institutionally at its strongest and when public sentiment was decidedly against the 
continuation of strong bureaucratic power. At the beginning of his administration he had 
strong approval ratings (77 percent) that reflected the spirit of his party’s triumph over 
the incumbent LDP. This starting approval rating would rank second only to Koizumi in 
the post cold war era. The landslide victory of the DPJ in the Lower House elections of 
August of 2009 ended more than half a decade of nearly uninterrupted rule by the LDP. 
This was a revolutionary moment in Japan: the first time the dominant LDP party had 
been thrown out of power by the power of the vote. As a result, the DPJ easily held a 
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two-thirds majority in the Lower House of the Diet. Much like the other prime ministers 
studied in this dissertation, Hatoyama also came to power on the heels of domestic 
turmoil, a public appetite for reforms, and economic issues that seemed at the time to 
dwarf issues of defense and foreign policy. The “Lehman Shock,” as the global recession 
of the time was often referred to in the press and by politicians, had gravely weakened 
Japan’s export-dependent economy. The result of this shock was deepening public 
suspicion of US-style capitalism and Koizumi-era economic reforms.  
If these aspects of Hatoyama’s context suggest that the situation was ripe for 
dramatic political change, other trends suggest that the path toward new policies, 
especially in the realm of defense, would be very difficult. To begin with, the DPJ party 
and its leadership reflected a much more heterogeneous mix of preferences on defense 
than the LDP. Since its inception in the late-1990s, the DPJ had developed in such a way 
as to attract a diverse group of politicians who were united primarily in their opposition 
to LDP hegemony. The result was a heterogeneous mix of LDP-defectors, former 
bureaucrats, NGO activists, and former executives. While the party had managed to form 
a consensus on the need for better social policy and a gradual unwinding of some of the 
LDP’s most unpopular neoliberal economic programs, divisions on defense issues were 
more drastic than anything the LDP had experienced during its time in power. The party 
ranks included the more conservative views of Hatoyama and Ozawa Ichiro, pro-US 
alliance conservatives like Maehara Seiji, as well as moderates such as Kan Naoto. In 
addition, important party members, such as former Socialist Yokomichi Takahiro, held 
extremely pacifist views (Easley et al, 2010, p. 5; Konishi, 2009, p. 2-3; Sohma, 2010; 
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Sneider, 2009, p. 7-8; Koellner, 2011). This lack of consensus on defense issues, the US-
Japan alliance, and how to approach difficult issues such as constitutional revision and 
regional reconciliation led to clever but largely ambiguous phrases in the 2009 Manifesto, 
such as “close but equal relationship with the US” and an “East Asian Community,” 
which hinted at significant changes without outlining specifics (DPJ, 2009).  
Aggravating the fractured nature of the party was the design of the party 
leadership. Hatoyama had come to power in May of 2009 after then-party head Ozawa 
Ichiro had been caught up in a scandal involving illegal donations to his political fund. 
Hatoyama won the party leadership over Okada Katsuya in no small part because of his 
support from Ozawa (Koellner, 2011, p. 29-30). Though Hatoyama was the leader of the 
party, Ozawa would continue to play a strong role within the party. De facto power 
would be split between Hatoyama and Ozawa following the September 2009 election. 
Whereas powerful leaders in the LDP had been both leaders of their party and prime 
ministers, the DPJ would split the functions with Hatoyama serving as prime minister and 
Ozawa serving as Secretary General of the party. This post, along with his strong 
following within the party, and his manifold connections made Ozawa an extremely 
powerful figure. As was seen in the previous chapter, Koizumi Junichiro had skillfully 
used his power as leader of his party to expel from the party individual politicians who 
had opposed his main policy of postal privatization. By allowing Ozawa to rule the party 
while he was prime minister, Hatoyama had given up a key source of power for 
bargaining with members of his own party and helped to fuel some of the centrifugal 
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processes already prevalent in Japanese politics (see Shinoda, 2000; Hayao, 1993; see 
Chapter 2).  
Another important limitation—one largely of Hatoyama’s own making—was 
his promise to the Okinawan people to rework the 2006 base realignment agreement with 
the US, coupled with past rhetoric that positioned Hatoyama as against the US base 
presence. In the heat of electoral battle, Hatoyama had promised to rework the relocation 
plan for the controversial Futenma Airbase that had taken the US and Japan nearly a 
decade to negotiate. In the current plan, the airbase (which is located in a crowded section 
of Ginowan city) would be returned to Japan by 2014 after building a replacement facility 
in the Henoko area of Nago in northern Okinawa. At the same time, 8,000 US troops and 
9,000 family members would be transferred to Guam, with Japan paying $6.1 billion, or 
60% of the total relocation and infrastructure building costs (MoFA, 2006, May 1; see 
Chapter 4). The issue of the relocation of Futenma Airbase had been festering for well 
over a decade. Despite the central government’s attempts to undermine local resistance 
through a range of economic assistance packages, resistance to the creation of a 
replacement base in the Henoko area of Nago city had grown into a significant political 
force (see Endo, 2010). During his campaign, Hatoyama had promised to move Futenma 
“outside of the country or at least outside of the prefecture” (kaigai, sukunakutemo 
kengai), reflecting the spirit of the party’s “Okinawa Vision” published a year earlier 
(DPJ, 2008, p. 4-5; Endo, 2010; Yomiuri Seiji-bu, 2010)43. This promise would pit 
                                                 
43 During the DPJ’s historic campaign, two conspicuous instances where Hatoyama announced his intention 
to seek a solution that allowed the bases to be moved out of Okinawa Prefecture were speeches on July 19 
and August 17, 2009 (Fukushima, 2011, p. 33).  
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Hatoyama against US officials, who would pressure Japan to stick to the original 2006 
agreement, as well as bureaucrats within MoFA and the MoD who had worked so hard to 
negotiation the 2006 agreement. Making matters worse for Hatoyama was the public 
record of his preference for a US-Japan alliance without bases and other rhetoric—such 
as his stated preference for a defense framework less dependent on the US—that 
undermined US confidence and diminished US willingness to accommodate his desire for 
new negotiations.  
Other factors were also working against Hatoyama. In order to achieve passage 
of legislation in the Upper House, the DPJ had formed a coalition with the left-leaning 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) (the rump party of the once major opposition Japan 
Socialist Party) and the anti-reform People’s New Party (PNP), both of which had argued 
strongly for renegotiating base realignment plans with the US. Moreover, the DPJ had 
signed an agreement with both coalition partners promising to move toward the 
realignment of US forces on Okinawa with the aim of decreasing the prefecture’s burden 
(Fukushima, 2011, p. 35-38; Yomiuri Seiji-bu, 2010). While prior LDP administrations 
had also found it necessary to form coalition governments with a minority party with 
pacifist leanings, the SDP and its leader Fukushima Mizuho would prove much more 
stubborn in their resistance to accommodating alliance issues than anything the Komeito 
had demonstrated during its coalition with the LDP (see Chapter 4). The SDP would 
prove to be ideologically wedded to the Okinawan base issue and to a lesser extent its 
preferences for a security policy without a permanent US military presence (see 
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Fukushima, 2011)44. The DPJ’s coalition with these two parties thus made Hatoyama’s 
attempts to build a “relationship of trust” with President Obama more difficult.  
Perhaps most importantly, in terms of his preference for a defense posture less 
dependent on the US, Hatoyama was fighting the current of a deepening and broadening 
alliance structure that had been gaining momentum since the mid-1990s. This trend 
reflected more than just rhetoric, but also technological integration, and integrated force 
planning, command, and intelligence sharing. These trends had started during the 
Hashimoto administration (see Chapter 3) and were given a substantial boost during the 
Koizumi administration (see Chapter 4) and had maintained their momentum during the 
following LDP years. During his term, power politics would also reassert itself in ways 
that would threaten Hatoyama’s ability to find suitable political space outside the shadow 
of the alliance. Instead of a region ripe for friendship, he would instead find periodic 
reminders of the security dilemma in East Asia and reminders of why the US military 
presence was still needed in the region.  
 
Parsing Hatoyama’s Approach to Defense Policy and Politics: Indirect Challenge to 
the Alliance; Yuai Diplomacy; and De-bureaucratization 
 
 
Much has been written about Hatoyama’s pension for abstraction, his 
aloofness, and his failure to deal with the specifics of policy. Indeed, much of what 
occurred during the short term of Hatoyama’s administration might rightfully be 
                                                 
44 The DPJ’s alliance with the SDP and PNP did not have to be a political liability, however. As I discuss 
later, the alliance with these two parties could have been a political asset in the event that Hatoyama chose 
to directly confront the US over the details of the base treaty.  
 
 196 
described in terms of what Rumelt (2011) calls “bad strategy.” As Rumelt argues, a great 
deal of bad strategy is conditioned by an inability to choose. As the crisis over Futenma 
Airbase came to the political fore, Hatoyama inability to choose became apparent. 
During the campaign, he left Okinawans with the impression that he would move the 
base “out of the country, or at least out of the prefecture.” However, during a November 
summit meeting with President Obama—the famous “trust me” summit—the president 
left their meeting believing that Hatoyama had promised to implement the original 2006 
Henoko agreement. During this time, both his Defense and Foreign Minister were under 
the impression that he had conceded that endorsing the original 2006 Henoko agreement 
was the only feasible option (Kitazawa, 2011). After the summit, however, when it 
became apparent that the issue of Futenma might cause a rupture in the coalition 
government, Hatoyama would state that he would need to put off making a decision until 
he had considered all other options. In addition, and in comparison with the two other 
prime minister examined in this dissertation (Hashimoto Ryutaro and Koizumi 
Junichiro), Hatoyama had difficulty turning his abstract concepts—“a close but equal 
alliance” and “East Asian Community”--into concrete policies, with proximate goals, that 
would demonstrate his policy competency to the public.  
All of these criticisms of Hatoyama are well founded, and this chapter 
addresses these failings. However, to Hatoyama’s credit there were also important 
elements of coherence in his various approaches to defense, to an extent grounded in the 
realities of the moment, that warrant examination. Hatoyama’s thinking on Japanese 
security politics ran against trends in defense policy that have been evolving since the 
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mid-1990s. These trends include further integration into US strategy, the loosening of 
constraints on collective self-defense, as well as the gradual weakening of Japan’s anti-
militarist norms and the strengthening of Japanese military capabilities within the alliance 
framework. Hatoyama’s own preferences were for a Japan devoid of US bases, or at the 
very least, less reliant on US military power for defense45. Instead, he hoped to guide 
Japan toward policies that adhered more closely to Japan’s anti-militarist security identity 
(see Oros, 2008; discussed in Chapter 1), where Japan sought international prestige 
through “civilian” security issues such as nuclear diplomacy, climate change diplomacy, 
and development assistance. However, recognizing both the influence of US officials in 
key ministries like MoFA and MoD, as well as his own party’s fractured vision on 
defense issues, his key insight was that the US could not be confronted directly.  
Instead of hugging the US closely as LDP politicians had done since Koizumi, 
Hatoyama’s approach—at least in the early stages—would attempt to lean on civilian 
internationalist policies, friendly overtures towards China, and greater citizen 
involvement on security issues. With civilian internationalism, the Hatoyama 
administration would attempt to use its contributions to issues like climate change politics 
and nuclear nonproliferation as a means of projecting leadership in the world (Toyoshita, 
2009; Easley et al, 2010; Mulgan, 2009, November 12). At the same time, his 
administration would attempt to use historical reconciliation and regional order-building 
as a way of alleviating the security dilemma in the region. Hatoyama hinted that issues 
                                                 
45 Hatoyama would state in an interview with the Ryukyu Shimbun several months after the end of his 
administration that although he had never used the term “an alliance without bases” during his 
administration, he was hoping that his administration could move the alliance in that direction (Ryukyu 
Shimbun, 2011, February 13; Norimatsu, 2011, February 28). 
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such as the base problem in Okinawa, Host Nation Support and the Status of Force 
Agreements, and the secret nuclear agreements of the early 1950s and 1960s, would be 
made the subject of popular democratic politics. Thus, the Hatoyama and the DPJ would 
“domesticize” defense politics by emphasizing greater transparency and debate in the 
Diet (Easley et al, 2010). All of these measures were generally consistent with the DPJ 
mantra of transferring power from bureaucracies to politicians and from politicians to 
citizens. As will be demonstrated, the broad strokes of Hatoyama and the DPJ’s strategy 
were poorly suited for a context that included an active regional security dilemma, a 
Chinese government that was unwilling to embrace “Yuai” approaches to security, and a 
US partner that was unwilling to compromise on prior agreements on base relocation 
issues.  
Equally important to Hatoyama’s approach were nuances in execution. The 
two most important nuances were his consensus-based, first among equals approach to 
handling his cabinet, and his de-bureaucratization of the policy process. Though his 
approach to cabinet management was abundantly criticized in the press, the reality was 
that Hatoyama had allowed himself to be drawn into this difficult position from the 
beginning of his administration. As a faction leader within the DPJ, Hatoyama’s position 
was second strongest, and thus very powerful, but was a far second to Ozawa’s faction46. 
Hatoyama had come to power on the terms that his leadership would be de-facto split 
with Ozawa. His cabinet had been chosen with the help of Ozawa to reflect both factional 
power within the DPJ and to give coalition partners such as the SDP and the PNP an 
                                                 
46 Koellner (2011) measures the factional strength of Hatoyama as having 45 members of the DPJ as 
compared to Ozawa’s 120 members. This calculation, however, should be considered a rough calculation.  
 199 
important stake in the new government. These cabinet members were for the most part 
fellow faction leaders within the DPJ, and, as in the case of SDP and PNP representation, 
leaders of minority parties. These figures had little hesitation on speaking out 
independently on policy to the media, sometimes with policies that contradicted other 
ministers.  
To make matters worse, his cabinet, constructed out of consideration for 
factional power and coalition party representation, contained drastically different views 
on defense. Social Democratic Party President Fukushima Mizuho, well known for her 
pacifist sentiments and her pro-Okinawan stance, was placed in the same cabinet with 
moderates such as Minister of Defense Kitazawa Toshimi (who would endorse the 2006 
agreement to move Futenma to the Henoko area of Okinawa). Having established a 
cabinet with a fractured vision of defense, Hatoyama then opted for a strategy that 
maximized flexibility by exploring different alternatives and trying to form a consensus 
around an issue. This consensus-based approach, however, would not be extended to 
bureaucrats. Having come to power on a stringently anti-LDP and anti-bureaucracy 
platform, the DPJ had set about centralizing power in the cabinet and the prime minister’s 
office. Thus, at a key point in negotiations with the US over the relocation of Futenma 
Airbase, Hatoyama would decide to cut out bureaucrats with prior experience negotiating 
with US officials over the base issue. Though the intent of this move was to create an 
environment where new approaches could be considered by cutting out participants with 
vested interests in the old 2006 agreement, the result of this approach was to deprive the 
administration of the expertise and personal contacts of the experienced bureaucrats. The 
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move also served to strengthen the suspicion of US officials that supporting the 
Hatoyama administration was not in their long-term interest.  
 
Civilian Internationalism, the Demilitarization of the Alliance, and Ignoring the Security 
Dilemma 
 
An important pillar of Hatoyama’s approach would be his use of civilian 
internationalist approaches such as nuclear nonproliferation, international development, 
and climate change diplomacy as platforms for international leadership and as common 
ground for a close relationship with the US. In a sense, this approach substituted softer 
“international” agendas for regional ones that addressed the growing security dilemma 
(Toyoshita, 2009; Easley et al, 2010). Hatoyama’s speech at the UN on September 22, 
2009 would emphasize his government’s pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and his desire for Japan to act as a bridge between 
the developed and developing world. He would also frequently state his desire to work 
with the Obama administration toward a world free of nuclear weapons and to address 
global poverty (Hatoyama, 2009, September 22; Green and Szechenyi 2009, October 3).  
In his two early meetings (September 23, 2009 and November 13, 2009) with 
President Obama, Hatoyama would also demonstrate his desire to reformulate the US-
Japan bilateral relationship around these common civilian goals of nuclear 
nonproliferation and climate change. One of the unstated purposes of this greater 
emphasis on nonproliferation and climate was to capture two of the most popular themes 
of Obama’s historic campaign (which had been widely followed in Japan) and to use 
them as a way of putting distance between Japan and the military aspects of US global 
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security strategy. Prior to the November Summit meeting with the US, Hatoyama’s 
government would announce that his government would not extend refueling assistance 
to allied forces in the Indian Ocean after January. As the opposition party, the DPJ had 
regularly pointed out the problematic nature of fuel assistance for the constitutional ban 
on collective self-defense. As they had argued frequently in their battles with the LDP, 
there was no way of knowing whether the fuel would be used for combat or non-combat 
missions. Since at least some of the fuel would be used plausibly in support of combat 
missions, fuel assistance could be seen as a violation of the constitutional ban on 
collective self-defense. Rather than directly repudiating the current support, the 
administration would let the current legislation expire. In replacement of this fuel 
assistance, his government would support job training and agricultural assistance in 
Afghanistan with five billion dollars worth of additional aid (Yomiuri Seiji-bu, 2010; 
Green and Szechenyi, 2010, January).  
Though these early policy moves were largely successful, it soon became clear 
that the DPJ would face stiff resistance from the US when it came to renegotiating 
military base issues. From public statements and high level bilateral contacts, down to 
working level meetings, the Obama administration would send clear messages early in 
the new DPJ administration that it would not renegotiate the 2006 agreement that would 
transfer the functions of Futenma Airbase within Okinawa prefecture. During their 
summit meeting on November 13, 2009, Hatoyama uttered the words “trust me” to 
Obama on the issue of Futenma, leading the president to believe that his administration 
would implement the 2006 Henoko agreement. Instead, Hatoyama and his administration 
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would undertake a lengthy re-evaluation process that would drag on for several months. 
Hatoyama’s failure to support the 2006 plan from the outset, ironically, would eventually 
erode his ability to remain relevant in one of the civilian internationalist issues he cared 
about most. After months of mixed statements and contradictory proposals from the 
Hatoyama cabinet on the base issue, the Obama administration would deny Hatoyama a 
full meeting at the Washington Nuclear Summit in April 2010 (Ogawa, 2010, April 8; 
Nikkei Shimbun, 2010, April 14; Funabashi, 2010, June 8). Hatoyama would instead 
have to settle for a ten-minute sidebar. The brevity of this meeting would contrast sharply 
with the 90-minute meeting secured by Chinese counterparts. This inability to secure a 
meeting with the US would turn out to be a significant political failure and signal a steep 
decline in the prime minister’s support rate.  
To make matters worse, visible signs of the security dilemma would appear in 
ways that would provide the media fuel to point out Hatoyama’s neglect of the alliance. If 
Hatoyama had hoped to emphasize “Yuai” diplomacy—creating relationships of trust and 
friendship—with countries in the region, North Korean belligerency would provide a 
poor backdrop for his approach. On March 26, a North Korean torpedo sank the South 
Korean naval ship Cheonan, heightening tensions in the region. As Hatoyama would later 
state in an interview, the sinking of the Cheonan was on his mind during the negotiations 
for Futenma and would help shift momentum back to the original 2006 plan (Ryukyu 
Shimbun, 2011, February 13; Norimatsu 2011, February 28). Small incidents with China 
in the East China Sea would also crop up late in Hatoyama’s administration, upsetting 
hopes of closer ties with China as a way of decreasing Japan’s “dependence” on the US  
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for security. In April, a Chinese surveillance helicopter would come within 90 meters of a 
Japanese Marine Self Defense Force destroyer during a People’s Liberation Army naval 
exercise near Japanese territorial waters. Also, in early May a Japanese research ship 
operating within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) would be pursued by a 
Chinese ship and ordered to cease its activities (Przystup, 2010, July; Nikkei, 2010, April 
23). These incidents would be a harbinger of the much more serious incident in 
September during the Kan Naoto administration when a diplomatic row would ensue 
after a Chinese trawler would clash with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.  
Each of these incidents served as a reminder of the sensitive security 
environment in the region and the importance of the US military presence as a stabilizing 
force. These incidents also helped create stark penalties for Hatoyama for downgrading 
the military aspects of the US-Japanese relationship.  
 
Other Means of Displacing the Alliance: Engaging China, “Yuai” Diplomacy, and 
Seeking an East Asian Community  
 
 
Another important aspect of Hatoyama’s approach would be his lean toward 
Asia. This approach would include overtures of friendship toward China and preliminary 
movements toward an East Asian Community. Hatoyama would also show some signs 
that his “Yuai” philosophy might eventually manifest in grand gestures on historical 
issues. It seemed as if the Hatoyama administration hoped that improved ties with China 
would lead to greater leverage in its relationship with the US, and that over time this 
leverage would allow it to displace military aspects of the alliance. However, as bilateral 
relations with the US deteriorated, Hatoyama would have to modify his rhetorical stance, 
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admitting that improved regional relations and region-building would be based on the 
foundation of a strong US-Japan alliance framework (Przystup, 2010, March; Green and 
Szechenyi, 2010, March). 
Despite expectations to the contrary, Hatoyama’s attempt to engage China 
were very modest, building cautiously on the positive gains of prime ministers before 
him. Efforts to improve relations with China included attempts to move forward on the 
2008 agreement on joint development of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea and 
preliminary gestures on the history issue. These initiatives came in addition to 
Hatoyama’s pledge to refrain from visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, as well as 
suggestions that the DPJ would explore a secular replacement for the controversial shrine 
(Yang and Lim, 2010; Yomiuri Seiji-bu, 2010). In his early meetings with President Hu 
Jintao, Hatoyama emphasized his convictions that an East Asia Community could be 
built on the foundation of a strong China-Japan relationship and stated that he would like 
to turn the East China Sea into a “Sea of Fraternity” (Przystup, 2009, October, p. 5; Yang 
and Lim, 2010, p. 64). In addition, Hatoyama would engage both South Korea and China 
regarding his idea of an East Asian Community during major leadership meetings and 
summits. However, the lack of specifics involved in Hatoyama’s East Asian Community 
idea suggests that the concept was more an aspiration than a policy idea and that he was 
not yet ready to take political risks to make the idea a reality. A more benign explanation 
would be that Hatoyama hoped small cooperative initiatives such as a joint project on gas 
and oil development in the disputed territories might eventually develop into more robust 
political ties between the countries.  
 205 
The most ambitious action, however, came not from Hatoyama but from 
Ozawa Ichrio. In December, Ozawa would lead a large delegation that included 143 Diet 
members to China as a way of creating stronger political relations with the country. As a 
result of the visit, the DPJ and the Chinese Communist Party agreed to increase the 
exchange of Diet members on a regular basis. Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, a 
possible successor to President Hu Jintao, also visited Japan. Hatoyama arranged for him 
to meet the Emperor on December 15. This meeting was arranged with less than the 30 
days advance notice required by protocol (Przystup, 2010, January; Harris, 2010, January 
1).  
In a sense, these overtures by Hatoyama and the DPJ provided a counterweight 
to the shift toward the US that had been occurring under the LDP since Koizumi had 
come to power. However, significant barriers remained to using better ties with China to 
offset aspects of the US alliance. One such barrier was popular opinion. In Japanese 
government polls taken in 2009, for example, 66.6 percent of respondents said that they 
did not feel close to China, and 71.9 percent rejected the idea of an alliance with Beijing. 
In the same poll, 73 percent said they felt close to the United States, and 76.4 percent said 
that the U.S.-Japan alliance was useful for Japan (Green, 2011, p. 21; for similar results 
see also, Przystup, 2009, October, p. 6). In addition, to the usual lingering bilateral 
issues--China’s human rights record, differences over the history issue, and territorial 
disputes in the East China Sea--a significant barrier to better relations would also be 
China’s own domestic politics, where Chinese politicians frequently benefit from using 
Japan as an outlet for domestic unrest.  
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In short, during Hatoyama’s administration measures to improve Chinese 
relations would remain largely symbolic, despite a desire to displace Japan’s security 
dependence on the US. The promise of an East Asia Community would also remain a 
long-term aspiration rather than a concrete policy proposal. If some authors have 
suggested that Hatoyama’s realism was learned over the tenure of his administration 
(Green 2010, July), there is evidence in Hatoyama’s relations with China that some of 
this realism was understood from the outset.  
 
Elements of Execution I: Consensus, Ambiguity, and Muddle Through 
 
If shifts toward civilian internationalism and better relations with regional 
powers were seen as the proximate goals of the administration, Hatoyama’s actions made 
it clear that he believed these goals could not be approached directly through either an 
appeal to the public for a new defense course or through a Diet resolution calling for 
drastic changes, such as the unconditional return of Futenma Airbase. Instead, rhetorical 
ambiguity, muddle through, and gradual consensus-building would be employed. As one 
scholar has noted, these strategies are little more than the traditional styles of Japanese 
politics that seek to “moderate, compromise, and seek a sense of balance” (Sohma, 2010, 
p. 7). In the Hatoyama case, however, these approaches seemed even more necessary 
given that de facto leadership was split with Ozawa. On the security issue that would 
become one of the proximate causes of his administration’s fall—the issue of Futenma 
Airbase—he would stubbornly stick to an approach of consensus and balancing, even 
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when there was no consensus to be had. He would refuse to choose between the US and 
pro-alliance forces in his government on the one hand, and Okinawa and his coalition 
partner the SDP on the other. 
Both in the campaign literature and in speeches, the DPJ and Hatoyama called 
for a “close but equal relationship” with the US as well as an “East Asian Community.” 
However, Hatoyama and the DPJ did so without defining what precisely was meant by 
these terms. In a sense, much of the ambiguity of these phrases served an important 
function—they appealed to popular sentiments in Japanese society while papering over 
division on defense issues within the party. Thus, an “equal relationship” was a free-
floating signifier that could mean different things at different moments. The term “equal” 
was largely seen as code for a Japan that would be less submissive to the US. However, 
specific aspects of equality—for example, Japan’s willingness to revise its constitution to 
allow for collective defense—were quietly ignored. The phrase could also be understood 
to mean a Japan that would lower its contributions within the alliance, and thus, would 
resist further Japanese integration into US global security strategy. In its maximalist 
formulation, the phrase could also be interpreted to mean a policy of gradually undoing 
the fundamentals of the alliance: starting with a drawdown of bases and then moving 
toward revision of Host Nation Support and the Status of Force Agreement (Easley et al, 
2010) 47 . However, these meanings were largely assumed, and the ambiguity that 
                                                 
47 As Sunohara (2010) has written, there is nothing new about the use of the word “equality” when it comes 
to dealing with the US. Indeed, Bush administration officials had promoted their own version of an “equal” 
partnership. Using the Nye-Armitage report findings, Bush officials were reported to have frequently 
chided their counterparts to reinterpret the constitution to allow for collective self-defense. As these 
officials argued, a truly equal Japan should be able to come to the US’s defense in time of need (see also, 
Samuels, 2007a). 
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shrouded these statements did little to satisfy the US or clarify the DPJ’s long-term 
intentions for the larger Japanese public. Still, few who have followed Hatoyama’s career 
doubted that his instincts were to oppose the presence of US bases on Okinawa. Indeed, 
early in his administration, it still seemed entirely possible that Hatoyama would take a 
hardline stance against the US. In an October 29, question and answer session in the 
Lower House, Hatoyama would said that his party would conduct a comprehensive 
review of the US-Japan alliance including Host Nation Support, the bilateral Status of 
Forces Agreement, and the realignment plan for US forces in Japan. On November 16, 
Hatoyama would tell reporters that there was no point in holding a bilateral working 
group discussion over Futenma Airbase if changes to the agreement are not possible 
(Kitazawa, 2012, p. 135). The statement, however, was puzzling, coming as it did only 
three days after a summit with President Obama where the US president was left with the 
impression that Hatoyama would implement the 2006 agreement. In his June 2 
announcement that he would be stepping down from the prime minister post, Hatoyama 
express his thoughts about the security relationship in this way: “I don’t think a U.S.-
dependent security should last fifty or one hundred years…Japan’s peace should be 
created by the Japanese themselves” (Tanaka, 2010, June 14; Hatoyama, 2010, June 2). 
As prime minister, however, Hatoyama will largely be remembered for his unwillingness 
to challenge the US openly and his mixed statements on the US alliance. 
In terms of the “East Asian Community,” it too would signify varying and 
sometimes contradictory content. In most formulations it would mean a war-free security 
community based on the shared economic interests of the region. At some points, it 
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would mean a regional community without the US, but at other times, Hatoyama would 
state that he could not image an East Asian Community without a US military presence 
(see Itagaki, 2009). In his article for Voice, Hatoyama would also discuss the idea of an 
East Asian monetary fund that would help to protect Asia from the instability of the 
dollar (Hatoyama, 2009, p. 139). As discussed before, Hatoyama’s ideas on East Asian 
regionalism were partially based on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas of a pan-European zone. 
Since Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own ideas were aspirational at the time, perhaps we should 
judge Hatoyama’s ideas in the same way. After all, in his resignation speech Hatoyama 
would say that his ideas were not necessarily meant to refer to the present, but rather, to a 
Japan five, ten, or twenty years from now (Hatoyama, 2010, June 2).  
As will be discussed in more detail in the next sections, Hatoyama frequently 
avoided confrontational approaches when dealing with his own cabinet, especially 
members of the cabinet who were from coalition parties. It also seemed that in terms of 
“evaluating” the US-Japan alliance from the ground up, Hatoyama eventually hoped to 
open up the alliance to the realm of citizen politics. The issue with this approach was, of 
course, the stiff resistance that Hatoyama would face from the US and the lack of support 
he would receive from his own cabinet. In short, consensus-based approaches work 
poorly in situations where actors are firmly entrenched in their positions. If the US was 
willing to allow minor changes of direction in efforts in Afghanistan and symbolic 
measures such as the DPJ’s decision to review secret nuclear treaties from the early 
postwar period, they would draw the line at tampering with the 2006 agreement on base 
realignment. The SDP was also unwilling to change their position on moving Futenma 
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out of Okinawa. Thus in the end, critics of Hatoyama found it easy to make his 
consensus-based approach synonymous with a lack of leadership.  
 
Elements of Execution II: Callous Statements towards the Alliance, Lax Cabinet 
Management, Poor Sequencing, and De-bureaucratization 
 
As has been demonstrated thus far, Hatoyama’s broad strategic approach to 
defense corresponded poorly to his operational environment. Not only did he misjudge 
the degree to which he could substitute civilian internationalist policies for maintenance 
of the military aspects of the alliance with the US, but he also misjudged the degree to 
which overtures towards China would be rewarded with an alleviation of the security 
dilemma. Compounding the weaknesses of Hatoyama’s strategy, however, was poor 
execution and policy management. Failures at this level would include a callous approach 
to speaking about the US-Japan alliance, lax management of his cabinet, poor sequencing 
of policy measures, and shutting out valuable expertise in the Japanese bureaucracy.  
From the early days of his administration, Hatoyama would have to fight off 
speculation that he was anti-American in his outlook. Nearing the end of the DPJ’s 
historic electoral campaign, parts of an essay written by Hatoyama for Voice were 
translated and published in the New York Times. The passages included parts that 
denounced “American-style economics” and suggested that Japan needed a strategy to 
seek independence from US and Chinese power struggles (Hatoyama, 2009, August 26; 
see also, Hatoyama, 2009). In a sense, this article was nothing more than a distillation of 
Hatoyama’s campaign rhetoric. This article, however, caused a small firestorm in the 
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press (both in the US and Japan), and Hatoyama found himself in the early phases of his 
administration explaining how his article was not meant to be anti-American (Nikkei 
Shimbun, September 3). Despite his efforts to praise the benefits of the US-Japan 
alliance, especially during the backdrop of its 50 year anniversary, characteristics of 
Hatoyama’s anti-alliance tendencies would crop up in ways that worried both US alliance 
managers and members of the press. For example, at an October 10, 2009 trilateral 
leadership meeting with South Korea and China participants would report to US officials 
that Hatoyama was proposing his East Asian Community idea as a way to decrease 
“dependence” on the US (Green and Szechenyi, 2010, January; Kitazawa, 2012, p. 
141)48.  
In addition to his occasional callous statements, his decision to move forward 
with largely symbolic measures, like a panel to examine the secret nuclear agreements of 
the 1950s and 1960s, put populist politics over alliance management in ways that fueled 
the worst suspicions of US alliance managers and political commentators49. Hatoyama 
would also reiterate his intention to review the US alliance from the ground up, including 
Host Nation Support and the Status of Force Agreements (Funabashi, 2010, June 8; 
                                                 
48 As then Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi reports the incident in his memoirs, Hatoyama reportedly 
said, “Up until this time, Japan has relied too much on the United States. As a member of Asia, we want to 
emphasize a strategy that focuses on Asia” (Kitazawa, 2012, p. 141).  
 
49  The “Secret Pacts Committee,” headed by Kitaoka Shinichi of University of Tokyo was generally 
conducted in a low profile manner. This committee examined 1) the secret pact between the government in 
January 1960 regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan in times of emergencies 2) the pact 
regarding military operations in the event of an escalation of conflict in the Korean Peninsula, and 3) the 
pact made during the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons in case 
of an emergency. One of the key reflections of Kitaoka (2010) was that the secret pacts demonstrated how 
limited democratic participation had been in the area of security in the postwar era (2010, p. 27). However, 
as Brooks has argued the low profile manner of the “Secret Pacts” Committee was symptomatic of a larger 
pattern during the Hatoyama administration—piecemeal approaches that were not linked to any strategy or 
major political goal (2011, p. 22). 
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Green and Szechenyi, 2010, January; Nikkei Shimbun, 2009, October 30). These 
measures sent strong signals that in the long-term the Hatoyama administration and the 
DPJ had interests inimical to the alliance50.  
To make matters worse, Hatoyama showed poor control over his cabinet. As 
discussed earlier, the challenge of managing his cabinet lay partially in the manner of its 
construction. Social Democratic Party President Fukushima Mizuho, well known for her 
pacifist sentiments and her pro-Okinawan stance, was placed in the same cabinet with 
moderates such as Minister of Defense Kitazawa Toshimi51. The gulf between Fukushima 
and Kitazawa was much greater than had been experienced in previous cabinets. Even the 
Socialist-led government of the early nineties had been formed only after an 
understanding had been reached with then party president Murayama Tomiichi that he 
would recognize the constitutionality of the US-Japan Security Treaty and the Self 
Defense Forces. As Fukushima would write about Hatoyama’s leadership, despite his 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
50 Hatoyama’s pension for making headlines through controversial statement would not be limited to the 
time of his administration. On February 13, 2011, Hatoyama would make headlines again. In an interview 
with the Ryukyu Shimbun (a newspaper in Okinawa), he would state that at the time his administration had 
decided to settle on the 2006 Henoko agreement, they needed an explanation for the decision and so had 
settled on “deterrence” as an “expedient” (hoben). The Ryukyu Shimbun newspaper would feature the 
headline “yokushiryoku wa hoben” (Deterrence an Expedient). Though Hatoyama’s statement that 
deterrence was an “expedient” would make the headline, the full statement made it clear that Hatoyama 
understood that Futenma’s bases functions were an essential part of the US base structure in Okinawa, and 
that in a larger sense Futenma did contribute to deterrence (see Kitazawa, 2012, p. 147; Norimatsu, 2011, 
February 28; Fukushima, 2011, p. 77). Nevertheless, his interview with the Ryukyu Shimbun demonstrates 
his ability to baffle both US-Japan alliance supporters and anti-base activists alike.  
 
51 In his memoirs on his time as Defense Minister, Kitazawa Toshimi would recount how he was convinced 
of the merits of the Henoko plan early during his tenure as Minister of Defense. Though he originally had 
sympathy for Hatoyama’s policy of “out of the country, or at least out of the prefecture,” briefings with 
defense bureaucrats and his own trips to Okinawa would convince him that what was most important was 
to implement the 2006 agreement as soon as possible (Kitazawa, 2012, p. 127-128). One might note that 
Kitazawa’s change of heart proves that Governmental Politics adage that “where one stands depends on 
where one sits.” 
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slogan of “policy by politicians” (seiji-shudo), at no point did he take firm control of his 
cabinet (2011, p. 80). As a maverick cabinet minister, Fukushima would eventually play 
an important spoiler role. At the end of Hatoyama’s administration, Fukushima would 
refuse to sign the cabinet order authorizing the acceptance of the Henoko option for the 
relocation of Futenma Airbase. However, beyond this measure, she would also refuse to 
resign from her cabinet post, forcing Hatoyama to fire her (see Fukushima, 2011, p. 28-
30)52.  
When asked in an interview several months after his resignation why he did not 
choose a cabinet that would allow him to realize his vision of a security treaty “without 
permanent bases,” and specifically why he appointed the moderate Kitazawa as his 
Minister of Defense, he replied: “Kitazawa was Chair of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defense, and was supposed to have a stable vision for defense-related 
matters. Rather than appointing ministers on specific themes, we had lists of candidates, 
and placed the most suitable person in each position” (Norimatsu, 2011, February 28; 
Ryukyu Shimbun, 2011, February 13). In short, Hatoyama had followed a traditional 
method of selecting cabinet minister, reminiscent of old LDP practices that ignored 
policy preferences in favor of seniority and factional balancing.   
As the Futenma Airbase issue evolved, cabinet ministers would make their 
different preferences for policy on the issue known through public statements. This gave 
the public a sense that there was no one policy on Futenma and that each of the cabinet 
                                                 
52 As Fukushima (2011) explains in her memoirs, her decision not to quit, but instead, to make Hatoyama 
fire her was a calculated political move meant to demonstrate her and her party’s strong stance against his 
decision to backtrack on his electoral promise to move Futenma out of Okinawa. 
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ministers was acting independently. In the early days of the administration, Defense 
Minister Kitazawa would make public statements that suggested that the original 2006 
agreement would be the inevitable course of action; meanwhile Foreign Minister Okada 
Katsuya would publicly state that the current plan was unrealistic and that the functions 
of Futenma should be consolidated into Kadena Airbase on a 15 year limited basis. Soon 
after these statements, Fukushima Mizuho would publicly state that her party might leave 
the cabinet if Futenma Airbase was not moved out of the prefecture (Kitazawa, 2012; 
Fukushima, 2011; Green and Szechenyi, 2010, January). As the self-imposed May 
deadline for an agreement approached, and it became clear that neither Guam nor the 
Kadena consolidation option would be available, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano 
Hirofumi would propose Tokunoshima city in Kagoshima Prefecture as a possible 
location for some of Futenma’s functions (on the recommendation of DPJ lawmaker 
Makino Seishu) (Kitazawa, 2012, p. 137). However, the problem with the Tokunoshima 
option was the same had been faced by the other options. Not only were the local 
townships opposed to the relocation, but the US too was opposed to the option.  
Hatoyama would also poorly sequence his policy measures. In the early days of 
his administration many analysts predicted that Hatoyama would attempt to delay any 
significant challenges to the US-Japan alliance until after the DPJ had consolidated power 
in the Upper House elections in July 2010 (Konishi, 2009; Sohma, 2010). However, 
following the summit with the US in November of 2009, Hatoyama would set a self-
imposed deadline for resolving the Futenma Airbase issue by the end of May, just before 
the Upper House elections. Given his administration’s lack of preparations on the 
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Futenma issue and the lack of consensus in the cabinet, this self-imposed deadline seems 
in retrospect like a major blunder53. In an interview conducted after his resignation, when 
asked why he chose to impose a deadline on his own administration for the end of May, 
Hatoyama would justify his approach by saying he thought he would need to postpone a 
decision until after March when the budget would be voted on, but that he could not 
delay the decision for much longer than that without angering the US. In addition, he 
hoped to resolve the issue in a way that kept it off the agenda for the July Upper House 
elections (Norimatsu, 2011, February 28; Ryukyu Shimbun, 2011, February 13). Despite 
his rationalization of the move, there seemed little reason for Hatoyama to limit his own 
range of action on the issue.  
 Perhaps several of these mistakes could have been avoided if there had been 
stronger inputs from experts in the bureaucracy. Indeed, a conspicuous aspect of the 
Hatoyama government was the degree to which he tried to divest bureaucrats of power 
and centralize control in the prime minister’s office. One of the ways he attempted to 
accomplish this was by setting up a National Strategy Unit (in reality little more than an 
office at this point in his administration). This bureau not only centralized budget-making 
and other important functions, taking them out of the hands of bureaucrats, but also 
divested special interests of power within the party structure (Sohma, 2010; Tanaka, 
2010, June). In one sense, the National Strategy Unit was meant to build on some of the 
successes of Koizumi’s kantei special teams (Shinoda, 2007a). However, from the 
                                                 
53 Unlike Hashimoto, who had  worked hard  during the early stages of his administration to establish a 
working relationship with the Governor  of Okinawa and the US ambassador, Hatoyama lacked significant 
resources to approach the Futenma issue by the time he set his deadline.  
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beginning, Hatoyama’s administration cut itself off from an important resource by 
refusing to use top talent from the bureaucracies. In addition to shutting out the advice of 
bureaucrats from political deliberations at the top, in the later part of negotiations with 
the US over the relocation of Futenma (at the behest of SDP head and Consumer Affairs 
Minister Fukushima Mizuho) top bureaucrats with direct experience in prior negotiations 
would be relieved of duty (Tanaka, 2010, June; Brooks, 2011, p. 91). This move would 
further unsettle US officials involved in the negotiations and intensify concerns that 
Hatoyama would have a negative impact on the alliance the longer he stayed in power 
(Brooks, 2011).  
 
Counterfactuals I: Decisions, Deadlines, and Cabinet Management 
 
Despite the difficult operational environment of Hatoyama’s administration, 
the scope of his failure as a prime minister was largely avoidable. Small differences in 
sequencing, a different cabinet construction, a different approach to cabinet management, 
and differences in rhetorical strategy could each have made significant improvements to 
his performance.  
The first and most dramatic change Hatoyama could have made to improve his 
political situation was to have made a decision on the Futenma Airbase issue early in his 
administration or to keep the issue off the agenda until after the July 2010 Upper House 
elections. There was a sense throughout Hatoyama’s administration that he hoped a 
solution to the Futenma issue would materialize through diligent negotiations or that the 
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public, Okinawa, and the US administration would appreciate his efforts to accommodate 
their very different positions. A more effective approach would have been to make an 
early decision among several unsavory possibilities: to concede defeat by endorsing the 
2006 agreement; shelve the issue until after the summer Upper House elections; or risk 
the DPJ’s electoral popularity in a direct confrontation with the US (for more on this 
option, see below). Given that the DPJ and its leadership was more eager to take on 
economic and social welfare issues, the primary concern of Japanese politics at the 
moment, an early concession on Futenma would have been the most prudent course of 
action. Indeed, As Defense Minister Kitazawa would write about the early days of the 
administration, he felt that as soon as soon as the DPJ had opened up the possibility of 
amending the earlier agreement they were in essence opening “Pandora’s box.” 
Suggesting that Futenma could be moved outside of Okinawa would heighten Okinawan 
expectations (in reality expectations had already been heightened during the campaign), 
sow the seeds of distrust with the US (who had invested 15 years into negotiating the 
details of the original agreement), and more importantly make the original agreement 
harder to implement (Kitazawa, 2012, p. 128). Kitazawa’s assessment would prove 
correct. Now that Hatoyama had suggested that a better agreement was possible, it was 
hard to reign in expectations. The ultimate product of Hatoyama’s approach would be to 
simultaneously alienate the US and Okinawa, while making the original agreement harder 
to implement.  
Indeed, early in the administration the US had made its position on the issue 
clear in a way that allowed the administration ample time to reformulate its policy on the 
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issue and move on. As early as October, both Defense Minister Kitazawa and Foreign 
Minister Okada tried to convince Hatoyama that other options (including the Kadena 
option that Okada had earlier advocated) had very little possibility for implementation 
(Kitazawa, 2012, p. 133-134). At this point, Okamoto Yukio, who had served as former 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro’s special envoy to Okinawa, consulted with 
Hatoyama and tried to convince him of the merits of the 2006 Henoko plan and that the 
prime minister should focus his efforts on lobbying for an environmentally friendly base 
(even if the financial cost would be higher) (Kitazawa, 2012, p. 134). Though 
backtracking on the policy would have been harmful to Hatoyama’s popularity figures 
and his administration’s survival, changing course early might have allowed his 
administration to move on to other tasks while minimizing the political fallout. Indeed, 
there is some evidence to suggest that Hatoyama considered doing just that during his 
November summit with the President Obama, where Hatoyama uttered the words “trust 
me” to the president.  
Despite the difficult situation Hatoyama found himself in between alliance 
managers, members of his own cabinet, and the intransigent position of the SDP, there is 
reason to believe that more Koizumi-esque approaches might have improved his 
situation. In terms of his negotiating tactics, Hatoyama might have taken a cue from 
Koizumi, who chose to fire the popular but intransigent Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko 
from his cabinet. As the Futenma issue dragged on, SDP leader Fukushima Mizuho was 
allowed to play a stronger role in debates, frequently challenging Hatoyama on the issue. 
Koizumi had faced a similar challenge during his administration in the figure of Tanaka 
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Makiko, the popular maverick politician whom he had appointed as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. Tanaka had become embroiled in a nasty fight with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and had shown herself on more than one occasion to be negligent in her duties as 
Foreign Minister. Koizumi dismissed his popular foreign minister and suffered a drastic 
loss in popularity (approximately a 30 percent drop). The key difference with Koizumi’s 
approach to his handling of Tanaka and Hatoyama’s approach to Fukushima, was that 
Koizumi dismissed Tanaka early in his administration and quickly found an issue (his trip 
to North Korea to meet Kim Jong Il) where he could accomplish a dramatic success and 
regain his popularity. A close examination of the timeline of Hatoyama’s administration 
demonstrates that he had missed his window of opportunity around December when the 
SDP had publicly threatened to quit the coalition if the DPJ backtracked on Futenma. At 
this point and time his own popularity rating were still relatively high and could have 
survived the firing of a cabinet minister. His chances of political survival would have 
been even greater if he could have found another project that offered a proximate success.  
An alternative approach to the issue would have been to delay making a 
decision on Futenma until after the June 2010 Upper House elections. Indeed, the 
decision to set a deadline for the end of May is puzzling given that there was little 
external pressure to do so. Though his popularity rating would undoubtedly have slipped, 
this slippage would probably not have endangered his administration to the extent that his 
other approach did. In addition, a successful Upper House election would have given him 
additional clout to either abandon his campaign pledge on Futenma or to seek a new 
arrangement with the US.  
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Regardless of which course Hatoyama chose on the issue of Futenma and the 
alliance, his administration would probably have fared much better if Hatoyama had been 
able to keep discipline in his own cabinet. Given the dual power structure within the 
government, this would have required the cooperation of Ozawa. Early decisions on 
Futenma and how to address questions of the alliance and the bases could have been 
settled behind closed doors early in a way that demonstrated the government’s common 
voice on the issue. When cabinet members began to test their own proposals on the issue 
publicly, they allowed the media to paint Hatoyama as a weak leader with little control 
over the situation.  
In addition, Hatoyama should have given up largely symbolic measures with 
regards to the US alliance that did little more than undermine trust with the US. 
Hatoyama could have given up, for example, the special committee set up under the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to examine the secret nuclear agreements with the US. 
Hatoyama could also have refrained from stating that he would seek a comprehensive 
review of the alliance that would include a review of Host Nation Support and the Status 
of Force Agreements. More importantly, Hatoyama could have abandoned rhetoric—the 
suggestion that Japan relied excessively on the US for defense, for example—that 
sounded warning bells in Washington. Each of these statements gave the US incentives to 
withhold support for the Hatoyama administration early before the administration was 
able to accumulate a record of success and secure political power. While it was clear that 
Hatoyama understood he would have to moderate his stance on the US alliance to make 
headway on his domestic agenda, the record shows that he did not moderate soon enough.  
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Counterfactuals II: Questioning the Basic Assumption of Hatoyama’s Strategy 
 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, what critics and media personalities 
would often describe as the bizarre behavior of Hatoyama, what US officials described at 
one point as his “loopiness,” and his inability to live up to electoral promises appear to be 
conditioned by a key insight: the US-Japan security relationship could not be challenged 
directly. Caught between hardliners like the SDP’s Fukushima Mizuho and the PNP’s 
Kamei Shizuka and more moderate forces within his own cabinet such as Kitazawa 
Toshimi and Okada Katsuya, Hatoyama found himself hedging between irreconcilable 
paths: at once seeking a relationship “less dependent” on the US, and seeking a 
relationship of “unwavering trust” with President Obama; promising to live up to his 
campaign pledge to move Futenma out of Okinawa prefecture, but also, not ruling out the 
2006 agreement; promising to review SOFA and HNS, but also, speaking of the US-
Japan security agreement as the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. Thus, caught 
between his desire to change the relationship with the US and a lack of imagination for 
how to bring it out, Hatoyama flip-flopped and muddled through.  
Hatoyama’s one time policy advisor, Terashima Jisturo (2010), in his own 
analysis of the causes of the Hatoyama administration’s failure over Futenma, argues that 
Hatoyama lost the negotiations over Futenma the moment he accepted the status quo of 
US-Japan Security Treaty. As discussed in Chapter 1, Article 5 and 6 of the Security 
Treaty set the basic bargain of the treaty: Japan is to provide the US with territory for 
bases and the US in return provides defense from external threats. As seen during the 
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Hashimoto and Koizumi administration, negotiations on the  return of Futenma had been 
based on the condition (which reflected the basic bargain of Article 5 and 6 of the 
Security Treaty) that the current capability and functionality of US forces be maintained. 
As Terashima (2010) argues, the only way to have reversed the 2006 agreement on 
Futenma would have been through a comprehensive reworking of the alliance from the 
ground up. Indeed, in an early statement on October 29, Hatoyama had pledged that his 
party would conduct a comprehensive review of the US-Japan alliance including Host 
Nation Support (HNS), the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the 
realignment plan for US troops in Japan. As the Futenma issue heated up, however, this 
pledge was largely forgotten.  
In a sense, Terashima was suggesting a revolutionary approach to defense 
politics similar to the way Koizumi had approached the Postal Reforms. The comparison 
is an essential one. As discussed in Chapter 1, the US role in the defense subgovernment 
is a strong one, somewhat similar to the strong influence of the Postmasters in the LDP. 
The postmasters themselves have a positive image in Japan, well-liked for their social 
role in rural communities (MacLachlan, 2011). Yet, despite this positive image, Koizumi 
was able to privatize the postal service largely by linking postal reform for larger reforms 
of the Japanese political system. A direct challenge to the US would most likely have had 
to have made use of this same logic, linking reform of the US-Japan Security Treaty to an 
“ending of the postwar period.”54Hatoyama had at least two of the resourses needed early 
                                                 
54 The desire to “end the postwar period” is a goal shared by many liberals and conservative in Japanese 
politics, often found equally in the pages of Sekai (a liberal magazine) and Seiron (a conservative 
magazine).  
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in his administration, strong public support ratings and coalition partners in the SDP and 
PNP who were ideologically predisposed to challenging the precepts of the alliance. 
Clearly, the most important resource Hatoyama was missing to accomplish this goal was 
a firmer hold on power within his party (instead of the de facto split with Ozawa), and a 
cabinet (including Minister of Defense) that shared his goal. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Koizumi had used Professor Takenaka Heizo, a Keio University Economics 
Professor with no background in politics to spearhead his reforms from the cabinet. For 
Hatoyama to mount a direct challenge to the US opinion, he would have needed a policy 
entrepreneur with deep knowledge of security issues to make his attempt successful. 
However, beyond this, Hatoyama would have needed one other resource—one that 
Fukushima Mizuho (2011) herself faults Hatoyama for not having—and that was a 
commitment to challenge the foundations of the US security treaty55. Even given these  
resources, given the popularity of the US-Japan alliance and the depth of positive feelings 
toward the US in Japan, there is no guarantee that a broad reform agenda would have 
succeeded.  
                                                 
55 An intriguing aspect of Fukushima’s own thoughts on Hatoyama’s failing is her invocation of Koizumi 
as a counter-example. As a member of the SDP, Fukushima had fought ideologically against everything 
that Koizumi stood for—his pro-market economic reforms, his embrace of the US alliance, and his visits of 
Yasukuni Shrine. And yet, she is still able to admire Koizumi for his political courage in boldly pursuing 
his political objectives. Fukushima suggests that Hatoyama should have shown the same courage in 
pursuing his desired policies (Fukushima, 2011).  
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Table 5: Hatoyama Yukio: Approaches to Defense Policy and Politics 
Approach Characteristics Results 
   
Find Common Ground with 
President Obama on  
Nuclear Nonproliferation and 
Climate Change  
Diplomacy 
Early efforts to focus on 
these issues and downplay 
various sources of friction 
such as Futenma 
Avoids overt friction with 
the US early in his 
administration 
Gradually Substitute Civilian 
Internationalist Measures For 
Military Aspects of the US-Japan 
Alliance 
Allows legislation 
providing fuel assistance 
to the US to expire; 
substitutes with 
development assistance 
for Afghanistan 
The US expresses regret 
for losing fuel assistance 
but is pleased with 
development aid; fear over 
standoff on Futenma grows 
Attempt a “Muddle Through” 
Approach to Move Futenma 
“Outside the country, or at least 
outside the prefecture” 
Put off decision on 
Futenma until May; 
attempt to find alternative 
to 2006 agreement 
through consultations 
with various townships 
Fails to resolve the basic 
conflict between the US’s 
insistence on 2006 
agreement and the SDP 
pledge not to support that 
agreement. Lax cabinet 
management fuels 
accusations that Hatoyama 
lacks control of policy 
Soft Sell of “Review of the 
Alliance” 
Early statements in Diet 
to review the alliance 
from the ground up, 
including HSN and SOFA 
Commission to review 
“Secret Pacts” with US 
Helps to fuel the suspicion 
within the Obama 
administration that the 
Hatoyama administration 
will impact the alliance 
negatively in the long term 
Yuai Diplomacy/ Lean toward 
China 
Proposes notion of East 
Asia Community; insists 
that China and Japan 
implement agreement to 
jointly exploit resources 
in disputed territories 
In the backdrop of the 
Cheonan shelling and 
frictions in the disputed 
waters, Hatoyama’s Yuai 
diplomacy has trouble 
evolving 
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Conclusion: The Failure of Strategy and the Collapse of Power 
 
If the enabling causes of Hatoyama’s failure can be found in his operational 
context—the fractured nature of his party, the particulars of the coalition government, the 
persistent security dilemma, and heightened expectations created by his party’s 
manifesto--the extent of his failure as a prime minister was due primarily to the broad 
strokes of his policy strategy and failures in execution. Displacing military aspects of the 
US-Japan alliance with “softer” aspirational objectives like a nuclear diplomacy, active 
climate change diplomacy, and a tentative diplomatic courtship of China was a rough 
path given the depth and breadth of the US-Japan military and political relationship and 
the lingering security dilemma in East Asia. This path was made even more treacherous 
by rhetorical gaffes, poor sequencing, a lenient approach to cabinet management, and his 
decision to shut out knowledgeable experts in the bureaucracy. As this chapter has sought 
to demonstrate, a number of changes in Hatoyama’s policy mixture or his execution 
could have done much to prolong the life of his administration, even if the long-term 
displacement of military aspects of the US alliance seemed out of reach. A true challenge 
to US primacy in Japanese defense affairs could have only occurred through a deliberate 
approach that emphasized every available resource of prime ministerial power. Such an 
approach would no doubt have borrowed much from Koizumi’s approach to postal 
reform.  
The impact of Hatoyama’s failed approach was significant. Having opened 
(what then-Defense Secretary Kitazawa called) “Pandora’s box” with regard to the 
Futenma Airbase issue, the DPJ effectively alienated the US alliance managers, Okinawa 
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Prefecture, and the Japanese public. At a local level, Hatoyama’s failure will be felt for a 
long time to come in Okinawa. Having heightened Okinawan expectations over the base 
issue, politicians will now find it more difficult to implement the original agreement for 
the return of Futenma. In the broader sense of security, Hatoyama’s failure has pushed 
the DPJ’s policy on defense in many ways closer to that of the LDP. Not only has the 
DPJ found it necessary to acknowledge the 2006 Henoko agreement and the necessity of 
maintaining US deterrence in the region, but they have also had to rely more extensively 
on defense and foreign policy bureaucrats. However, in a more general sense, the 
declining fortunes of the DPJ and the sting of Hatoyama’s failure have created another 
“drift” similar to the one experienced in the early 1990s prior to Hashimoto’s prime 
ministership. Lacking political energy from the top of the governing pyramid, alliance 
managers have been left to manage a stagnant status quo. In the most general sense, 
Hatoyama’s failure has also played an important role as a catalyst in another bout of 
political stagnation and party realignment (though his direct role in this later development 
is hard to specify).  
At the heart of Hatoyama’s failure were deficits of insight. Having recognized 
the deeply entrenched nature of the US role in defense policy, Hatoyama had 
overestimated the degree to which aspects of the alliance could be displaced gradually 
over time through piecemeal approaches. One commentator would describe Hatoyama’s 
approach as similar to “donuts.” While the many promises of the DPJ had made the 
policies sweet on the outside, there was very little in the middle for which the political 
leadership was willing to stand for (Hasegawa, 2010, p. 137-138). Indeed, for all of the 
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new ideas that Hatoyama had helped to introduce—an East Asian Community, a “close 
and equal relationship” with the US, and the East China Seas as a “sea of fraternity”—it 
was hard to find one concrete policy proposal in which Hatoyama was willing to take 
significant political risks. As Hatoyama made clear in an interview several months later, 
though he had never said “an alliance without bases” he nevertheless wanted to move in 
that direction (Ryukyu Shimbun, 2011, February 13; Norimatsu 2011, February 28). 
Lacking a vision of how to get there, and realizing the strong influence of the US in 
defense affairs, he opted for a piecemeal, trial-and-error approach. What Hatoyama had 
not anticipated was the political risks these half-measures would entail.  
As Rumelt (2011) has written of “good strategy,” it often makes use of 
proximate objectives that are not only possible, but that can be accomplished 
overwhelmingly. As Hayao (1993) and Shinoda’s (2000, 2011) research on the institution 
of the prime minister demonstrates, because of the precarious position of the prime 
minister, the prime minister has an extra incentive to find proximate successes to 
maintain his popular support. Directly following the DPJ’s historic victory, Hatoyama 
was able to accomplish some important proximate objectives. His administration was 
able to allow the Special Measures Law authorizing fuel support for coalition forces in 
the Indian Ocean to expire, replacing this contribution with development assistance in 
Afghanistan. Hatoyama had accomplished something significant in his first few months 
in office: he had created an alternative to one Koizumi-era mechanism for alliance 
support. The Hatoyama administration was also able to promise greater cuts in Green 
House Gas emissions as a way of demonstrating leadership on climate change diplomacy. 
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However, following these early successes, Hatoyama allowed himself to be caught up in 
a policy area (the Futenma issue) where a clear proximate success was nowhere in site. 
Moreover, as his administration progressed, this issue would consume a great deal of his 
time and effort, preventing him from pursuing other policy issues56. 
If Hatoyama had truly hoped to move Futenma out of the prefecture or out of 
the country, there is no doubt that he had failed in the most fundamental aspect of 
strategy: creating a bridge between a challenge and a desired end state. As Rumelt (2011) 
writes, good strategy is surprising at the time, yet simple in retrospect. Bad strategy can 
seem equally obvious. Caught between the demands of his coalition partners and his own 
desire for change in defense affairs and the needs of the US-Japan security treaty, 
Hatoyama substituted muddle-through approach for choice. As a result, his party would 
lose its coalition partners, damage their prospects for electoral success in the July Upper 
House elections, alienate the US and Okinawa, and set the stage for longer delays in the 
relocation of Futenma Airbase. Fourteen years after Hashimoto had made the first steps 
toward revitalizing the alliance, the US-Japan security relationship was once again set 
adrift.  
  
 
                                                 
56 It bears noting that there are authors who attribute Hatoyama’s “failure” to a wider failure of Japan’s 
political system, in particular its sensationalist media. As Sakai (2011) argues, Hatoyama’s failure had 
much to do with the constant prodding of newspapers such as Nikkei, Yomiuri, Asahi, and Sankei. The 
constant criticisms of Hatoyama during the Futenma crisis—which the author describes as sensationalist—
fed into the larger public relations strategy of the LDP and US alliance managers. He argues that instead of 
fulfilling their democratic duty to report the news, these newspapers served as part of a larger “US lobby.” 
Sakai points out that articles frequently used words such as “crisis” (kiki), “rift” (kiretsu), and “cooling” 
(reikyakuka) in reference to the alliance relations (2011, p. 23). For Sakai (2011), the major newspapers 
were responsible for dealing the Hatoyama administration a death by a thousand cuts (see also, Terashima, 
2010, February; Fukushima, 2011, p. 67-69). 
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Chronology of Key Events: Hatoyama Yukio Administration 
 
July 29, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio states that the MSDF refueling mission in 
the Indian Ocean will not be extended if the DPJ wins the Aug. 30 election.  
Aug. 6, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama states that a DPJ government would work closely 
with the Obama administration on the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world.    
Aug. 9, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama suggests that a DPJ government would codify 
Japan’s three non-nuclear principles into law.    
Aug. 17, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama says if elected he will establish an investigative 
team in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dispatch members to the U.S. in an attempt to 
declassify documents regarding U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the 1950s and 1960s.             
Aug. 27, 2009: A translated summary of a journal article by DPJ President Hatoyama 
appears in the online edition of the New York Times.  
Aug. 30, 2009: The DPJ records a landslide victory in the Lower House election, 
securing 308 of 480 seats.    
Aug. 31, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama states that an article outlining his political 
philosophy is not anti-American.  
Sept. 2, 2009: State Department spokesman Ian Kelly states that the U.S. has no intention 
of renegotiating the Futenma replacement facility plan or Guam relocation plan with the 
new Japanese government.  
Sept. 7, 2009: DPJ President Hatoyama delivers an address on climate change and 
announces a midterm emissions reduction target of 25 percent below 1990 levels by 
2020.    
Sept. 9, 2009: The DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s New Party 
(PNP) sign an agreement to form a coalition government which states that it would move 
towards reexamining the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to reduce the burden on the 
residents of Okinawa.    
Sept. 15, 2009: The DPJ elects former party president Ozawa as secretary general.  
Sept. 16, 2009: Hatoyama Yukio is elected prime minister in a special session of the Diet 
and later introduces his Cabinet.    
Sept. 16, 2009: Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi says at his first press conference the 
Hatoyama government would not extend the MSDF Indian Ocean refueling mission and 
would discuss the realignment of U.S. forces on Okinawa “based on a realistic view of 
the situation.”    
Sept. 17, 2009: Mainichi Shimbun reports a 77 percent approval rating for the Hatoyama 
administration.  
Sept. 17, 2009: Foreign Minister Okada orders an investigation of the classified 
agreements in the 1950s and 1960s between the U.S. and Japan regarding U.S. nuclear 
policy.    
Sept. 22, 2009: Prime Minister Hatoyama addresses a UN conference on climate change 
and announces the “Hatoyama Initiative” for Japan to assume a leadership role in 
bridging the divide between the developed and the developing world.    
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Sept. 23, 2009: President Obama and Prime Minister Hatoyama meet in New York and 
discuss the U.S.-Japan relationship, North Korea, Afghanistan, and nuclear 
nonproliferation.    
Sept. 24, 2009: Prime Minister Hatoyama addresses the UN General Assembly and cites 
global economic recovery, climate change, nonproliferation, development, and his vision 
for an East Asian Community as foreign policy priorities.   
Oct. 7, 2009: FM Okada tells the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan that the 
Hatoyama administration is considering alternatives to the 2006 realignment for US 
troops on Okinawa.  
Oct. 8, 2009: Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio announces his commitment to follow the 
1995 Murayama Statement on history.  
Oct. 16, 2009: Hatoyama government postpones decision to fund feasibility study on 
construction of non-sectarian war memorial.  
Oct. 16, 2009: PM Hatoyama suggests he may postpone a decision on whether to accept 
the existing bilateral agreement on the relocation of US forces on Okinawa until mid-
2010.  
Oct. 20-21, 2009: US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits Japan and meets PM 
Hatoyama, DM Kitazawa, and FM Okada to discuss the realignment plan for US forces 
in Japan, specifically the relocation of Futenma, and other security issues.    
Oct. 22, 2009: PM Hatoyama announces that a decision on the relocation plan for US 
Marines on Okinawa would not be reached before President Obama’s visit to Japan in 
November.  
Oct. 23, 2009: FM Okada states that moving Futenma off of Okinawa is unrealistic and 
suggests moving its operations to Kadena, another base on the island.  
Oct. 27, 2009: DM Kitazawa says the existing agreement to relocate Futenma on 
Okinawa would not violate the DPJ election pledge to move the facility out of Okinawa 
or overseas.  Both PM Hatoyama and FM Okada later dispute Kitazawa’s claim.  
Oct. 29, 2009: PM Hatoyama notes during a question and answer session in the Lower 
House of the Diet that his government will conduct a comprehensive review of the US-
Japan alliance including host nation support, the bilateral status of forces agreement, and 
the realignment plan for US troops in Japan.    
Nov. 1, 2009: Kyodo News poll posts a 61 percent approval rating for PM Hatoyama.    
Nov. 5, 2009: Assistant Secretary Campbell meets FM Okada in Tokyo to discuss the 
relocation plan for US Marines on Okinawa.    
Nov. 10, 2009: Japan announces a new aid package for Afghanistan of $5 billion over 
five years.  
Nov. 10, 2009:  The US and Japan agree to establish a bilateral working group to discuss 
the relocation plan for US Marines on Okinawa.  
Nov. 13, 2009: President Obama and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo to discuss bilateral 
security relations, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, nonproliferation, and energy and 
climate.  
Nov. 16, 2009: PM Hatoyama tells reporters there is no point in holding bilateral working 
group discussions on Okinawa if changes to the agreement are not possible.    
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Nov. 17, 2009: The bilateral working group on Okinawa convenes its first meeting in 
Tokyo.  
Nov. 19, 2009: In his e-mail magazine Yuai Prime Minister Hatoyama stresses his desire 
for an unwavering relationship of trust with the US and reveals that he asked President 
Obama to trust him during their meeting on Nov. 13 in Tokyo.  
Nov. 23, 2009: Mainichi Shimbun publishes a survey indicating a 64 percent approval 
rating for PM Hatoyama.  
Dec. 3, 2009:  Fukushima Mizuho, head of the SDP, says her party might leave the ruling 
coalition unless PM Hatoyama decides to move Futenma outside Okinawa.    
Dec. 7, 2009:  A  Yomiuri Shimbun poll finds PM Hatoyama’s approval rating at 59 
percent.   
Dec. 8, 2009: FM Okada says the bilateral working group on Okinawa has been 
suspended.  
Dec. 12, 2009: Cabinet Office releases data from a poll conducted in October showing 
that 78 percent of Japanese harbor positive feelings toward the United States.   
Dec. 15, 2009: FM Okada announces the government will put off a decision on the 
relocation of Futenma. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano cites the need to consult further 
with the SDP and PNP. PM Hatoyama denies the decision to delay is irresponsible, 
stressing the need to consider the feelings of the Okinawan people and says a decision 
could be reached in a few months.    
Dec. 18, 2009: PM Hatoyama’s approval rating falls below 50 percent for the first time to 
46 percent according to a poll released by Jiji Press.    
Dec. 18, 2009:  FM Okada expresses doubt about a proposal by the SDP to relocate all 
US Marines from Okinawa to Guam, citing the potential impact on deterrence.    
Dec. 22, 2009:  Defense Minister Kitazawa tells reporters that the government would like 
to resolve the Okinawa base issue by May 2010.    
Dec. 26, 2009: PM Hatoyama rules out relocating Futenma to Guam.  
Dec. 26, 2009:  Kyodo News poll reports PM Hatoyama’s approval rating fell 16 
percentage points to 47 percent compared to a previous survey in November.    
Dec. 29, 2009:  FM Okada says that if a better alternative to the relocation plan for 
Futenma cannot be found the government will proceed with the existing agreement.    
Jan. 4, 2010: Prime Minister (PM) Hatoyama Yukio holds a New Year’s press conference 
and stresses the importance of reaching a decision on the relocation of Marine Air Station 
Futenma.  
Jan. 9-10, 2010: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi visits Okinawa to consider 
relocation options for Futenma.    
Jan. 11, 2010:  Yomiuri Shimbun poll reveals a 56 percent approval rating for the 
Hatoyama Cabinet.     
Jan. 14, 2010: In an interview with Reuters, FM Okada dismisses the idea that the 
Hatoyama government is promoting relations with China at the expense of the alliance 
with the US.  
Jan. 15, 2010: The Special Measures Law authorizing Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (MSDF) refueling operations in the Indian Ocean expires.    
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Jan. 18, 2010: The Hatoyama Cabinet posts a 41 percent approval rating in a Kyodo 
News poll.  A Yomiuri poll released the same day lists a 45 percent approval rating with 
70 percent saying Ozawa should resign as DPJ secretary general because of an alleged 
funding scandal.    
Jan. 19, 2010: PM Hatoyama and President Obama each issue statements to 
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The 
bilateral Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) also reaffirms the importance of the 
US-Japan alliance.  
Jan. 24, 2010: Susumu Inamine, an opponent of the relocation plan for Futenma, wins 
Okinawa’s Nago City mayoral election.  
Feb. 16, 2010:  PM Hatoyama appoints an advisory board to offer recommendations for 
the National Defense Program Guidelines to be finalized by the end of 2010.    
Feb. 20, 2010: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano visits Okinawa a second time to consider 
options for the relocation of Marine Air Station Futenma.   
Feb. 28, 2010:  The Hatoyama Cabinet’s approval rating stands at 43 percent according to 
a Nikkei Shimbun poll.    
March 9, 2010: A panel of experts submits a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regarding confidential agreements reached between Japan and the US in the 1960s on the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.  
March 17, 2010: PM Hatoyama calls for greater efforts to resolve East China Sea issues 
in order to make the region a “Sea of Fraternity.”  
March 19, 2010: PM Hatoyama instructs his Cabinet to develop specifics on the East 
Asian Community concept by the end of May.   
March 26, 2010: North Korean torpedo sinks the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, 
heightening tensions in the region. As Hatoyama would later state in an interview, the 
sinking of the Cheonan influenced his thinking on the Okinawan base issue.  
March 29, 2010: A Nikkei Shimbun poll reports a 36 percent approval rating for the 
Hatoyama Cabinet.    
March 30, 2010: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano states during a press conference that the 
government is working on relocation plans for Futenma within Okinawa Prefecture.  
April 2, 2010: Okinawa Gov. Nakaima Hirokazu meets Defense Minister Kitazawa 
Toshimi in Tokyo and expresses opposition to the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) Futenma within Okinawa prefecture.    
April 5, 2010: A survey released by Yomiuri Shimbun posts a 33 percent approval rating 
for the Hatoyama government and suggests 50 percent of voters do not support any 
political party. The July 2010 approval rating for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
stood at 24 percent compared to 16 percent for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).       
April 12, 2010: President Obama confers with Prime Minister Hatoyama during a 
working dinner at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. Hatoyama pledges to 
settle the issue of MCAS Futenma relocation by the end of May.      
April 14, 2010: In his Washington Post column In the Loop, reporter Al Kamen dubs 
Prime Minister Hatoyama “the biggest loser” at the Nuclear Security Summit and notes 
some Obama administration officials consider Hatoyama “hapless” and “increasingly 
loopy.”  
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April 24, 2010: The Washington Post reports the Hatoyama government indicated it 
would broadly accept an agreement reached in 2006 to relocate MCAS Futenma within 
Okinawa prefecture, citing an April 23 meeting in Tokyo in which Foreign Minister 
Okada presented a plan to US Ambassador to Japan John Roos.     
April 25, 2010: Over 90,000 Okinawans rally to oppose the relocation of MCAS Futenma 
within the prefecture.  
April 28-29, 2010: Japanese media outlets report the Hatoyama government will propose 
modifications to the 2006 agreement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma including 
alternate construction methods for a key runway and the transfer of some training 
functions to Tokunoshima Island.  
May 4, 2010: Prime Minister Hatoyama states during a trip to Okinawa that it would be 
difficult to relocate all Futenma functions off the island, contradicting a previous pledge 
to do so.        
May 13, 2010: Prime Minister Hatoyama suggests his government might not be able to 
resolve the impasse over Futenma by the end of May as he promised.  
May 14, 2010:  Jiji News poll shows a 19 percent approval rating for the Hatoyama 
government with 42 percent of respondents citing a lack of leadership as the proximate 
cause and 49 percent suggesting he should step down if unable to resolve the Futenma 
issue by the end of May.  
May 23, 2010: Prime Minister Hatoyama visits Okinawa for the second time to apologize 
to the governor of Okinawa for breaking a pledge to remove MCAS Futenma off 
Okinawa and explain his decision to largely accept the existing plan adopted in 2006.  
May 24, 2010:  Prime Minister Hatoyama tells reporters the sinking of a South Korean 
vessel west of the Korean Peninsula in March factored into his decision to largely accept 
the existing agreement on the Futenma relocation.  
May 25, 2010:  Fukushima Mizuho, minister for Consumer Affairs and head of the Social  
Democratic Party (SDP), visits Okinawa to reiterate her support for removing bases from 
the prefecture and tells the press she will not approve Prime Minister Hatoyama’s 
relocation plan if presented at a Cabinet meeting.  
May 28, 2010: The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) issues a joint 
statement reiterating a commitment to relocate MCAS Futenma.  
May 28, 2010: Prime Minister Hatoyama dismisses Consumer Affairs Minister 
Fukushima from the Cabinet for refusing to support his decision on Futenma relocation.       
May 30, 2010: The Social Democratic Party bolts the ruling coalition with the DPJ.    
May 30-June 1, 2010: Several Japanese media outlets release public opinion polls with 
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s approval rating falling between 17 and 20 percent and his 
disapproval rating between 67 and 75 percent. 
June 1, 2010: Hatoyama government releases policy statement on his concept of an East 
Asia Community, saying that US involvement as vital.  
June 2, 2010: Prime Minister Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro resign.    
June 4, 2010: Kan Naoto is elected prime minister. 
 
Adapted from Comparative Connections Chronologies (2009-2010) and Yomiuri Seiji-
bu (2010) Chronology  
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CHAPTER 6: 
Conclusion: Leadership, Strategy, and Policy Entrepreneurship Reconsidered 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
How have the different political strategies and policy entrepreneurship of 
prime ministers mattered in post cold war Japanese defense policy and politics? As this 
chapter concludes, the quality of strategy and entrepreneurial insights at different times 
looms large over Japanese defense politics. Effective strategy—both its mundane and 
dramatic variants—has been important not only for the transformation of defense policy 
and politics, but also, as a component of overall prime ministerial power. These strategies 
used solid insights, formulated practical proximate goals, and had important coherences 
in their design. At key moments in the post cold war era, the approaches of both Prime 
Ministers Hashimoto Ryutaro and Koizumi Junichiro have helped to revitalize the US-
Japan strategic relationship and to loosen anti-militarist constraints on military 
institutions, and have increased Japan’s military capabilities within the one percent of 
GDP framework. Moreover, these administrations used successful measures in defense 
(and foreign policy more generally) to help their domestic reform policies. Strategy is 
equally consequential in its failures. Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s approach—
underpinned by poor insights, weak coherence, and an inability to locate practical 
proximate objectives—was unsuccessful in reversing much of the post-Koizumi status 
quo in defense.  In addition, his failures have set the stage for another period (similar to 
the early 1990s) of policy drift in defense affairs. 
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This chapter will place the insights from the case study chapters in a 
comparative context, demonstrating how the approaches of prime ministers differed in 
the post cold war world, and how this difference has mattered in the trajectory of Japan’s 
defense policy and politics. As this chapter argues, while some important generalizations 
can be made about what constitutes effective strategy in the context of Japanese politics, 
it is also important to avoid a myopic approach to strategy. As I will attempt to 
demonstrate, the universe of effective approaches reaches far beyond what is currently 
captured by current approaches to defense policy and politics. The chapter will conclude 
by outlining possible future avenues for the study of competitive strategy and 
entrepreneurship in Japanese defense policy and politics and beyond.  
 
Political Strategy and Entrepreneurial Insight Matter 
 
As this dissertation has demonstrated, different prime ministers have had 
different degrees of impact on Japanese defense policy and politics through the quality of 
their political strategies and entrepreneurial insights.  In many cases, the impact of prime 
ministers has been hard to evaluate because their contributions were largely symbolic and 
were part of larger dynamic interactions with bureaucrats responsible for defense policy. 
Nevertheless, prime ministerial approaches have made up an important aspect of 
Japanese defense politics. In addition, contributions to defense politics are an important 
aspect of overall prime ministerial power, making contributions in this area important not 
only for scholars of Japanese defense and foreign relations, but also for scholars of 
Japanese domestic politics.  
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Prior studies of leadership have focused on the issue of whether leadership 
matters. Samuel’s (2003) comparative study of Italian and Japanese leadership, for 
example, examined how leaders in similar contexts influenced their environments 
through their choices. Other studies have sought to move past whether leadership matters 
and have looked at components of leadership such as charisma, risk-taking, and 
dedication to a cause (Maclachlan, 2010; Gaunder, 2007). Certainly, these characteristics 
of leadership were operative throughout the case studies. An unwillingness to take 
political risks, for example, was an important reason Hatoyama Yukio was ineffective in 
the area of defense policy and politics. Charisma was also an important component of 
Koizumi and Hashimoto’s prime ministerial power.  
Yet, at the heart of the success or failure of different prime ministers was also 
the quality of their political strategy, along with the insights that underpinned these 
strategies. Without close attention to obstacles and resources power collapses. Thus, 
beyond charisma, dedication, and risk-taking, leaders are also important for their insights 
and for how they use these insights to formulate action.  
One prime minister, Hashimoto Ryutaro, had an important influence on 
defense policy and politics through his use of conventional resources. He was able to 
make a difference by utilizing bureaucratic initiatives, inching policies forward, and 
balancing key stakeholders through nuanced personal diplomacy. In essence, his greatest 
impact was to legitimize the ongoing work of bureaucrats and to use personal diplomacy 
and financial incentives to make Japan’s revitalized alliance with the US more palatable 
diplomatically. His key insight was that he could pivot on his successes in revitalizing the 
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US-Japan strategic relationship to help assuage tensions with China and Okinawa 
Prefecture.  
Another prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro, made a difference through policies 
that were bolder and more personalized. He was able to utilize political theatrics, top-
down initiatives, and personal diplomacy to an extent that few if any prime ministers in 
Japan’s history have ever been able to. His key insight was that in order to stay in power 
and pursue his cherished goal of postal reform, he would need to pursue bold policies and 
demonstrate dramatic policy successes. His personal relationship with President Bush and 
his administration’s strong popularity ratings provided a broad umbrella under which to 
integrate Japan’s defense establishment further into US technology and strategy, as well 
as to set the groundwork for upgrading the Japan Defense Agency to a full ministry.  
As both the Hashimoto and Koizumi cases demonstrate, while there is no 
single model for effective leadership, the underlying elements of good strategy are 
nevertheless the same: quality insights into constraints and resources, a guiding principle 
on how to overcome obstacles, and coherent actions based on this guiding principle. In 
the cases of both Hashimoto and Koizumi, executive leadership was an important 
element in Japan’s greater entrenchment in US strategy and defense technology, its 
expansion of military capabilities, and the gradual normalization of its use of the military. 
In addition, defense and foreign policy proved to be an important element of domestic 
reform. In both cases, skillful alliance management was a precursor to a major domestic 
reform initiative: for Hashimoto, financial and administrative reform; for Koizumi, postal 
and economic reform.  
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Leaders, however, are also important through failures of strategy. As the 
Hatoyama administration case demonstrates, Hatoyama’s desire to dramatically change 
Japan’s defense policy and politics was inhibited by failures of insight and strategy. 
Beyond criticism of Hatoyama as aloof and disconnected from policy details, Hatoyama’s 
insights—that the US could or should not be challenged directly, that his cabinet should 
be managed through consensus, and that civilian security initiatives could be used to 
gradually displace military aspects of the US alliance—proved disastrous for his party’s 
political power and his own efforts to move Futenma Airbase out of Japan. Poor 
sequencing, his decision to cut experienced bureaucrats out of the policy process, and 
gaffes throughout his administration exacerbated his failures. Other alternatives were 
available: the possibility of directly confronting the need for US bases in Japan; an 
approach that relegated the Futenma issue to a later date (when the DPJ might have 
consolidated power); or an approach that sacrificed the Futenma issue early on in order to 
focus on issues that were the core of the DPJ’s electoral politics (for instance, issues of 
livelihood and economic revitalization). Hatoyama’s early failures have led to a period of 
extensive drift in alliance management where once again bureaucrats and politicians have 
reacted passively to issues as they develop. In the context of Hatoyama’s failure, 
successive DPJ leaders have found themselves reluctantly embracing policies strikingly 
similar to the LDP, including improving Japan’s military capabilities within the one 
percent of GDP limit and endorsing the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Thus, Hatoyama’s 
administration has presaged an era of muddle and drift remarkably similar to the period in 
US-Japan alliance affairs from 1991 to 1996.  
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Table 6: Evaluating Prime Ministerial Strategy 
Prime 
Minister 
(Independent) 
Strategy 
(Intervening) 
Context 
(Dependent) 
Policy 
Accomplishments 
Days in 
Office 
Hashimoto, 
Ryutaro 
*Build on existing 
resources: SACO, 
Joint Declaration, 
Guidelines 
*Pivot from 
revitalized alliance 
to improve relations 
with Okinawa and 
China 
*Key Insight: 
A revitalized US-
Japan relationship 
can be used as an 
important resource 
*Financial 
Crisis (Jusen 
Issue) 
*Public desire 
for stronger 
crisis 
management 
*Alleviate 
tension in US-
Japan 
relationship 
*Manage 
tension over 
Okinawa 
issue 
*Stewardship of 
US-Japan 
relationship 
*US-Japan 
Declaration 
*Revised US-Japan 
Guidelines 
*Base Realignment 
Agreement 
*Able to enact 
Financial and 
Administrative 
Reforms 
*Stabilized 
relations with 
Okinawa and 
China 
931 
Koizumi  
Junichiro 
 
 
 
*Emphatically 
support the US by 
preempting demands 
*Use proximate 
successes to build 
personal brand 
*Key Insight: Brand 
as a maverick needs 
to be maintained 
through dramatic 
accomplishments 
 
*9/11 attacks 
*US war in 
Iraq 
*North 
Korean 
nuclear 
belligerency 
*Public 
demand for 
reform  
 
*De facto 
collective defense 
contributions to the 
US 
*Dispatch of JSDF 
to Iraq 
*Modernization of 
Japanese forces 
*BMD cooperation 
*Declining 
relations with 
China 
1979 
Hatoyama  
Yukio 
*Try to displace 
military aspects of 
the alliance with 
softer civilian 
internationalist 
approaches:  
*Soft courtship of 
China; East Asian 
Community 
Key Insight: The 
US-Japan Security 
Treaty cannot be 
challenged directly; 
thus, trial and error 
approach to policies 
*A cabinet 
and party 
divided on 
defense issues 
*A stalled 
policy on 
Futenma 
*Global 
Financial 
Crisis 
*The 
inexperience 
of his party 
*Friction with the 
US 
*Anger of 
Okinawa 
*Rebellion within 
his own cabinet 
*Officially voiced 
the alternative of 
an East Asian 
Community 
265 
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Rumelt’s (1993, 2011) research on strategy points to the importance of 
entrepreneurial insight. Successful strategy is usually based on an insight that competitors 
miss. For Koizumi, that insight was recognition of the public appetite for a prime minister 
who could demonstrate competency and boldness in overcoming obstacles. For this 
reason he sought to demonstrate policy acumen in almost any area where a proximate 
goal seemed within reach. Through the steady accumulation of successes, he was able to 
maintain his popularity and personal brand, and build resources toward postal reform.  
For Hashimoto, his guiding principle was that he could use available 
bureaucratic resources to revitalize the US-Japan alliance. Through small innovations 
(the return of Futenma and direct involvement in the Okinawa base issue) he could 
improve ongoing initiatives, make them more balanced, and then use the revitalized US-
Japan strategic relationship as a resource to boost his own prime ministerial power and 
pivot to improve relations with Okinawa and China. An important insight for Hashimoto 
was also an understanding of the limits of his resources. He realized that while financial 
incentives, personal diplomacy, and softened rhetoric could help bring these two 
important actors closer to Japan, he could not make statements that would undermine 
progress in the revitalization of the US-Japan alliance.  
For Hatoyama, his main insight—that the military aspects of the US-Japan 
alliance would need to be slowly displaced by civilian internationalist programs and that 
better relations with regional countries could lessen dependence on the US for security—
proved a liability throughout his administration. This insight conditioned mixed messages 
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to the US and party coalition partners and helped fuel speculation in the media that 
Hatoyama was weak and indecisive.  
Another important element for these prime ministers was the ability to set and 
accomplish proximate goals. In theory, a good entrepreneurial insight should help 
identify proximate goals. As Rumelt has written, good proximate goals should not be 
targets that are overly ambitious, but rather, ones that organizations can reasonably be 
expected to hit, even overwhelm (2011, p. 106). Moreover, these proximate goals should 
ultimately contribute to a “strategic” or overall goal. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 
setting of Japanese politics, where the position of the prime minister is highly vulnerable 
to weak popularity ratings, factional infighting, and the tendency of subgovernments to 
protect their turf, finding good proximate goals to reach, even overwhelm, is the 
imperative of every prime minister. As each of the cases also demonstrates, secrecy can 
be an important method of minimizing risk when a prime ministerial initiative is less than 
certain of success.  
In the case of Hashimoto, the proximate goals were conditioned by the 
exigencies of the moment. The combined traumas of the North Korean nuclear crisis and 
the rape case in Okinawa had created a sense of crisis in the defense subgovernment. 
Having inherited the SACO, the Joint Declaration, and the Nye Initiative from alliance 
bureaucrats, his clear proximate goal was to guide these resources and use them to 
execute a successful summit with President Clinton. As officials had warned Hashimoto 
at the time, adding the additional goal of securing the return of Futenma Airbase was a 
political risk. For this reason, Hashimoto chose to keep negotiations secret until he knew 
 242 
that he had secured an agreement. Secrecy was important not only because it minimized 
the fallout in case of failure, but also because it neutralized the centrifugal influences of 
debate with coalition political parties and members of his own party, and because it 
guarded against sensationalist coverage in the press.  
A close examination of the Koizumi case shows a prime minister with similar 
skill in pursuing proximate goals. In some instances, Koizumi proved just as cautious as 
Hashimoto in keeping issues a secret so as not to raise the hopes of the public. For 
example, Koizumi kept his plans to visit Pyongyang to meet directly with Kim Jong Il 
secret until the very day of his trip. The secrecy of negotiations was important, not only 
for maintaining the trust of the North Korean regime, but also for minimizing gossip in 
the press and debate within the Diet. By the time of the actual trip, the proximate goal of 
bringing back the five abductees had turned from a remote possibility into a very 
accomplishable objective (though fears that the North Korean regime might renege on its 
agreement were palpable). The secrecy of the trip, too, made the trip dramatic in ways 
that benefited Koizumi’s image. For many, the return of the abductees seemed like 
“Koizumi magic.” In reality, the meeting between Koizumi and Kim Jong Il had been 
carefully orchestrated by secret contacts among top level officials for over a year.  
However, Koizumi was purposely less secretive in his approach to both the 
2001 Anti-Terror Legislation and his 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation. As Kliman 
(2006) and Shinoda (2007) demonstrate in their studies, open public promises of support 
for the US were used to force members of his own government to endorse ambitious 
plans to support the US. The legislation was also designed in ways that ensured that 
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Koizumi could deliver alliance contributions in ways that avoided the label of “too little, 
too late” that had accompanied the response to the first Gulf War and that avoided the 
stigma of merely sending money. However, in both of these measures pains were taken to 
make sure that the measures did not completely alienate the pacifist Komeito party. Prior 
consultations with the Komeito were used to ensure that the policies were not overly 
ambitious in their promises of human contributions through the dispatch of the JSDF.  
In the Hatoyama case, too, we find some examples of important proximate 
successes. In the opening days of his administration, Hatoyama announced his country’s 
intention to cut the Green House Gas emissions reduction target to 25 percent below 1990 
levels by 2020. Hatoyama would also announce that Japan would assume a leadership 
role in bridging the divide between the developed and developing world in combating 
climate change. In announcing these two goals on the international stage at the UN, 
Hatoyama was beginning to draw the contours of his “yuai” diplomacy. Hatoyama was 
also successful in his first initiative to displace military contributions to the US-Japan 
alliance with softer civilian initiatives. In order to soften the blow of his administration’s 
decision to allow the legislation that enabled the JSDF to assist coalition forces in the 
Indian Ocean to expire, his administration offered five billion dollars in new development 
assistance to Afghanistan over five years. On the heels of the DPJ’s historic electoral 
victory, this early action was met with little protest by US officials. However, from this 
point on, Hatoyama would struggle to come up with proximate objectives that would 
demonstrate his ability to lead. His management of the Futenma Airbase issue 
demonstrates important contrasts with the approaches of the Hashimoto and Koizumi 
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administrations: one, instead of keeping negotiations with the US over Futenma secret, he 
allowed the debate over various options on Futenma to become a public debate (with 
different cabinet members voicing different options); and two, he made the mistake of 
setting a deadline for resolving the imbroglio (the end of May) without first establishing 
the means of satisfactorily solving the issue in a way that would demonstrate his 
competency and leadership. Equally important, Hatoyama also failed to identify other 
proximate objectives that might demonstrate his success in visible ways. As the Futenma 
issue dragged on, Hatoyama would have to devote his energies to finding some form of 
solution (anything) that might allow his administration to save face on the issue. The 
failure to identify achievable proximate objectives (as Hashimoto and Koizumi had done) 
was an important reason for Hatoyama’s early exit from office.  
As Rumelt also writes, an effective strategy should ideally make use of 
coherent design (2011, p. 124). This insight has proven especially powerful for 
explaining outcomes in Japanese politics. In situations where there are no ambitious 
objectives, then loose designs are sufficient. Indeed, most prime ministers have little or 
no coherent strategy because they are content to oversee the semi-autonomous work of 
subgovernments. However, the more ambitious the objective, the more coherent the 
design of the strategy needs to be. 
In hindsight coherences may seem more obvious than they were at the time. In 
the case of Hashimoto, the design of the comprehensive package that would revitalize the 
alliance was one accomplished mainly through bilateral dialogue between key 
stakeholders at the bureaucratic level. As Vice Prime Minister and MITI Minister during 
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the Murayama administration, he would have had a good understanding of these 
initiatives and their value. These measures were careful to balance support for the US 
(military realism) with the need to maintain a low posture so as not to threaten China 
(political realism). His chief innovation was adding the return of Futenma (thus adding a 
domestic human security component) to the existing elements of that package and adding 
his own stamp of approval as prime minister. In his pivot to improve relations with 
Okinawan and China (as well as to elevate relations with Russia and ASEAN), 
Hashimoto would tread carefully, making sure initiatives to expand Japan’s diplomatic 
portfolio and assuage other partners did not threaten the progress that had been made in 
revitalizing the alliance. Though Hashimoto would use yen loans to China and economic 
development money for Okinawa as means of repairing ties, he would continue to speak 
out on behalf of the US military presence in Japan. To do otherwise would have 
threatened the work on the Joint Declaration and the revised Joint Guidelines.  
If Koizumi’s strategy demonstrates the most coherence of any approach in this 
study, one can attribute this partially to the ambitiousness of his primary political goals: 
postal reform and his challenge to the influence of the postmasters within his party. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, Koizumi’s choice in proximate goals was designed to maximize 
his image as a confident, can-do prime minister. His appeal to conservatives through the 
endorsement of an independent Japan with a normal military along with his visits to 
Yasukuni was tempered by rhetorical endorsements of Japanese anti-militarism, seen in 
his endorsement (in his own words) of the Murayama apology and his stance that Japan 
would never again embark on the path to war. His embrace of conservative aspects of 
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Japanese defense politics coupled with his anti-militarist rhetoric served to maintain his 
support among conservatives while limiting his alienation of the mainstream Japanese 
and foreign audience (including the US). His personal and emphatic support of the US, 
too, created flexibility that allowed him to pursue wider avenues of prime ministerial 
power. His personal relationship with President Bush, for example, was an important 
resource that allowed him to pursue diplomacy with North Korea and allowed the 
abduction issue to be included in the Six Party talks with North Korea.  
As for Hatoyama, however, there would seem to be little, if anything that was 
coherent about his approach. Without outright rejecting the conventional wisdom that 
Hatoyama had no clear strategy, this dissertation has insisted that the lack of coherence in 
Hatoyama’s approach was conditioned by a central insight: that given its breadth and 
strength, the current structure of the US-Japan alliance could not be challenged directly. 
Within this framework, Hatoyama found himself using a trial-and-error approach to find 
methods of slowly displacing the military aspects of the alliance. His trial-and-error 
approach would be most conspicuous during negotiations over Futenma. As negotiations 
dragged on, he found himself in the uncomfortable position of searching for a solution 
that appeased US officials, members of his cabinet with mainstream tendencies (Foreign 
Minister Okada Katsuya and Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi), a member of his 
cabinet who was ideologically committed to moving the base out of Okinawa (Fukushima 
Mizuho), and Okinawa Prefecture, while maintaining at least some of the spirit of his 
pledge to move Futenma “out of the country, or at least out of the prefecture.”  
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Given the conflicting expectations of the parties involved, a consensus-based 
approach seemed doomed from the beginning. Different designs were possible: 
Hatoyama could have opted for early acquiescence to US demands (retaining as much as 
possible his emphasis on climate change and cooperation on nuclear diplomacy) without 
the SDP in the coalition; another option was, as Terashima (2011) has argued, to have 
included the Futenma issue in a comprehensive review of the alliance, backed by a 
cabinet that understood and supported the scope of his challenge to the US-Japan 
Security Treaty. The latter approach would have borrowed extensively from Koizumi’s 
own challenge to the postmasters during his administration. Like Koizumi’s successful 
campaign to change Japanese politics by uprooting the influence of the Japanese 
postmasters, any approach to challenging US influence in Japanese defense would have 
needed a popular prime minister (a Hatoyama willing to promote his own political brand), 
cabinet ministers in important positions who shared his policy views and sense of 
purpose, and an advisory commission and special policy teams in the kantei to help turn 
principles into concrete policies. Most importantly, Hatoyama would have needed a 
series of proximate policy successes to maintain his popularity ratings. Even with these 
resources, given the popularity of the US partnership and the long-term relationship 
between the US and Japanese defense establishments, success would have been anything 
but certain.  
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Table 7: Quality of Strategy 
Prime Minister Guiding Insight Proximate Goals Design 
    
Prime Minister  
Hashimoto Ryutaro 
Insight 1: Only minor 
innovations to 
bureaucratic-level 
initiatives are needed 
Insight 2: From a 
revitalized alliance, 
measures can be taken 
to improve relations 
with China and 
Okinawa 
*Return of Futenma 
Agreement 
*Successful summit 
with President Clinton 
*Defuse base 
resistance in Okinawa 
*Successful summitry 
with Chinese leaders 
*Commitment in 
“areas surrounding 
Japan” cannot 
threaten China 
(balance military 
realism and political 
realism) 
*Any commitment to 
maintain US deterrent 
in Okinawa should 
help alleviate burden 
on Okinawa 
Prime Minister  
Koizumi Junichiro 
Insight 1: The US will 
be an important 
political partner not 
only for defense of 
Japan, but also for 
reforms. 
Insights 2: Pursue all 
opportunities to 
demonstrate 
effectiveness in policy 
and energize non-
aligned voters.  
*Successful personal 
relationship with 
Bush. 
*2001 Anti-Terror 
laws; 2003 Iraq 
Special Legislation. 
*Trip to Pyongyang to 
secure release of five 
abductees.  
*Pursue trips to 
Yasukuni Shrine 
*Proximate objectives 
support personal 
brand as maverick 
*Emphatic embrace of 
the US allows 
flexibility on policy 
toward North Korea 
and abduction issue. 
Prime Minister  
Hatoyama Yukio 
Insight 1: The US 
cannot be challenged 
directly  
Insight 2: 
Displacement of US 
influence in defense 
affairs will need to be 
displaced gradually 
*Allow Anti-Terror 
Legislation to expire; 
substitute with 
development 
assistance.  
*Attempt to move 
Futenma “out of the 
country, or at least out 
of the prefecture” 
*Trial and error 
approach to Futenma 
negotiations (low 
coherence) 
*Trial and error 
approach to East 
Asian Community 
(low coherence) 
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Destabilizing an External/ Internal Capital Model of Leadership, Strategy, and 
Entrepreneurship  
 
 
Thick description of a limited number of cases can provide new insights into 
the nature of leadership, strategy, and entrepreneurship. Instead of creating a highly 
parsimonious model of prime ministerial strategy--one that boils down success and 
failure to a few major components--this study has instead developed rich descriptions 
around thematic elements drawn from literatures on leadership, strategy, and 
entrepreneurship. Prime ministers were evaluated for: the quality of their insights both at 
an overall level and at a “tactical level”; their ability to create coherences in their many 
initiatives; the way they were able to develop focus; their ability to formulate proximate 
goals that were obtainable; and their ability to use unique or underutilized resources.  
Certainly, there were similarities in cases of effective policymaking. Successful 
approaches frequently used the knowledge and accumulated personal networks of 
bureaucrats, supplemented bureaucratic initiatives with top-down personal diplomacy, 
and used a revitalized US Japan strategic relationship as a political resource for a stronger 
prime ministership. Strong prime ministers have also been opportunistic in finding 
proximate objectives that can prove their acumen to the public and allow them to 
snowball one success into another.  
Yet, this dissertation has resisted the urge to formalize these elements into a 
model of effective strategy. There was nothing inevitable about this approach. Shinoda's 
(2007a) concentric circle model of foreign policy, for example, gives us the foundation 
for theorizing effective strategy in terms of internal and external capital. In Shinoda's 
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concentric circle model, foreign policy is pictured as similar to an onion. The general 
public is pictured as the outermost layer, with interest groups coming next, then 
opposition parties, followed by coalition parties, the ruling government, and finally the 
prime minister and his cabinet in the center. In this model, the prime minister can use 
support from outer layers, such as the general public, interest groups, and even opposition 
party members to pressure actors within the inner core to accept a policy57.  
When we look at the three case studies, we might be tempted to suggest that 
Koizumi was a triumph of “external” capital. His bold policies entertained the public, 
helped maintain high popularity figures, and allowed him to keep pressure on the inner 
core to enact his policies. Hashimoto, on the other hand, might be categorized as a 
triumph of “internal” capital. Leaving aside the boldness of some of his initiatives outside 
of defense, his successes came largely from his stewardship of conservative policies 
developed in the inner policymaking circles. By promoting initiatives that had been 
softened up by bureaucrats, his skillful management allowed him to win some support 
from the outer core (the public recognized his skillful management of the process). 
Hatoyama, on the other hand, was someone who was unable to master either internal or 
external capital to any great degree. Not only did he mismanage affairs with his own 
party and coalition partners, but he confused the public with mixed messages on his 
policy objectives.  
                                                 
57 It should be noted that Shinoda’s approach itself was highly descriptive and that his model was meant to 
demonstrate how Koizumi was able to achieve policy success outside of more conventional policymaking 
approaches.  
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An approach that highlights these elements misses much of the nuance that was 
important for good strategy in both the Koizumi and Hashimoto cases. As Shinoda's 
(2007a) study demonstrates, Koizumi was a master of manipulating public opinion. 
However, a great deal of his success in defense came at certain points from his ability to 
use internal capital when such an approach was called for. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
Koizumi had few great options in negotiations over the realignment of US forces in Japan, 
and more importantly, little political energy to expend on the issue. For this reason, he 
chose to allow Director General Nukaga and Vice Minister Moriya to deal with the issue 
at a bureaucratic level. Other elements of Koizumi's success were equally as important 
but difficult to categorize. Koizumi's annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine, for example, were 
meant to appease a specific interest group: the Bereaved Family Association (izokukai). 
In Shinoda's model, this group would be placed within the second most outer layer as an 
interest group. Depending on how you categorize this group, they would either be an 
important part of external capital or internal capital. However, even if they were 
categorized as a form of external capital, the visits to Yasukuni could not be categorized 
purely as an asset for external capital purposes. For most of Koizumi's administration the 
visits were more unpopular than they were popular. As I have also argued, the pacifist 
tones in which these visits were often framed were also an important softening 
mechanism for these visits, creating a limit on the amount of damage he caused to his 
reputation in the Japanese mainstream and overseas. What was important about these 
visits was that they helped support a consistent persona: Koizumi was a “maverick” that 
would not back down when faced with opposition. Thus, his visits to Yasukuni are only 
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coherently about “external” capital when linked with other high profile actions during his 
administration. 
In the Hashimoto case, we also see details that upset any ambitions to settle 
him as an exemplar of “internal” capital. In his early interventions into the details of US-
Japan alliance diplomacy, Hashimoto would flout the advice of experts from MoFA and 
the JDA and bring up the thorny issue of Futenma Airbase at the summit with President 
Clinton at Santa Monica. The decision to reject the advice of internal actors, at least from 
the beginning, was not part of a grand scheme to win over public support. Instead, the 
move was made as a gesture to Okinawan Governor Ota with whom Hashimoto was 
developing an important working relationship. As many authors and critics have pointed 
out, Okinawan views have long been marginalized in policy discussions. And indeed, 
Okinawan interests fit uneasily in Shinoda's (2007a) concentric circles: they at once make 
up important (but marginalized) segments of the general public, interest groups, 
opposition parties, and on rare occasions coalition partners. They can be described as 
“external,” but only on rare occasions can they be thought of in terms of “political 
capital.” Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, the exact language Hashimoto used to 
bring up the Futenma issue was important: he both acknowledged the problem of 
Futenma Airbase without making a direct demand for negotiations over its return.  
Was this an instance of the use of external capital or internal capital?  
Instead of answering this question, I have instead chosen to define it as an 
entrepreneurial moment. As a prime minister who had come up through the LDP system 
and had been groomed through numerous cabinet posts, Hashimoto understood the 
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importance of the US relationship and the importance of US armed forces in Japan. 
However, as a politician, he also understood the limitations of the bureaucracies and 
bureaucratic thinking, especially their aversion to risk.  
Does an external/ internal capital perspective help us understand the failure of 
Hatoyama Yukio? To an extent, this model might have some utility. Throughout the 
Hatoyama case, I compared his attempts to displace the influence of the US in Japanese 
defense affairs as similar to challenging a key stakeholder in a subgovernment. In past 
instances of success, this has required a public relations strategy that uses popular politics 
aimed at the general public to pressure actors in the inner core. However, even if 
Hatoyama had developed a strategy aimed at galvanizing the general public (his external 
capital), he would have also needed to master elements of internal capital as well. He 
would have needed to create institutions within government that could harness this 
popular support, as Koizumi did with his establishment of the Council of Economic and 
Fiscal Policy (with Takenaka Heizo as his policy guru) for his reforms. What Hatoyama 
would have needed was a coherent strategy that linked an ambitious public relations 
strategy with a high level body (an independent commission, for example) tasked with 
finding an alternative to defense policy as usual.  
In short, though a focus on external/ internal capital captures some of the 
ingredients of success, it is ultimately underspecified in ways similar to theories 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
The devil truly is in the details.  
 254 
Indeed, as this dissertation has sought to demonstration, nothing is as 
vulnerable to the tyranny of context as the study and practice of leadership, strategy, and 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Reevaluating Major Approaches to Japanese Defense Politics 
 
Throughout the case studies, prior approaches to defense policy and politics 
were an important resource, pointing to relevant factors and creating connections between 
data points both within case studies and among the different cases. The case studies and 
their specific focus on political strategy and policy entrepreneurship, however, also 
provided opportunities to evaluate the major theoretical approaches.  
 
Re-evaluating Reluctant (or Transitional) Realism. Sensitivity to external 
threat was a major component in each of the three prime ministerships studied. In two of 
the case studies (Hashimoto and Koizumi) we saw prime ministers with a similar 
perspective on the importance of the US-Japan alliance. Both Koizumi and Hashimoto 
believed that any rift in the US-Japan security relationship would negatively impact 
regional stability and that pains should be taken to reaffirm, reconstitute, and reinvigorate 
the alliance. In a sense, there was very little that was “reluctant” about the realism of 
either Hashimoto or Koizumi. Rather, the “reluctant” aspect was a product of both 
residual pacifist elements within the Japanese public and governing institutions, and the 
tendency of different political actors within the Japanese body politic to resist forceful 
leadership. For the most part, neither the Hashimoto nor the Koizumi case stretch the 
insights of reluctant/ transitional realist theory (indeed, Kliman (2006) originally included 
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Koizumi’s political acumen as a major “cause” of Japan’s newly discovered realism). In 
addition, the Hatoyama case seems to further confirm the predictions of reluctant realism. 
Having come to power with strong electoral support, a preference for creating an 
alternative to the current US-Japan Security Treaty, and policy ideas based on expanding 
civilian internationalist policies and regional reconciliation, Hatoyama presented the best 
hope for a tough case against reluctant realism’s predictions. And yet, by the end of his 
administration Hatoyama’s agenda for shifting Japan toward a less militarized version of 
the alliance had all but collapsed. By the end of his administration, he would publicly 
announce that he had a newfound respect for the important deterrent value of US forces 
in Japan and that in light of the sinking of the South Korean naval ship the Cheonan he 
would not take actions that would harm US deterrence in the region (see Hatoyama, 2010, 
June 2; Norimatsu, 2011, February 28). In the language of realism, Hatoyama had been 
(reluctantly) socialized into the security dilemma. As a result of Hatoyama’s policy 
failures in defense, subsequent DPJ prime ministers have found themselves—also 
reluctantly—following policies that were more or less the same as their LDP 
predecessors, including policies that improved Japan’s military capabilities within the 
one percent limit of GDP.  
If this dissertation has not presented a refutation of reluctant realism, it has 
attempted to present a broader framework for explaining its mechanisms. As this 
dissertation has argued, political strategy—both effective and not—has been an important 
cause in Japan’s defense trajectory. Contextual aspects, such as the Cheonan sinking, as 
well as a sense of threat presented by China and North Korea, were important variables, 
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but so were very obvious weaknesses in Hatoyama’s approach. Hatoyama would later say 
in an interview some months afterwards that the use of the word “deterrence” had been a 
“means” or “pretext” (depending on the translation of “hoben”) for explaining his 
decision to endorse the original 2006 Henoko plan. In the same interview he would 
explain that one of the major reasons he could not move the base outside of the prefecture 
is that his administration had not been well prepared to take up the policy issue prior to 
coming to office (Ryukyu Shimbun, 2011, February 13; Norimatsu 2011, February 28). 
As my case study has also demonstrated, failures of strategy could be seen in Hatoyama’s 
basic approach (a gradual approach, a de-linking of Futenma from broader aspects of the 
US-Japan Security Treaty) and in his execution (poor cabinet management, a self-
imposed deadline that made little sense, and the decision to distance himself from 
bureaucrats with necessary expertise). These failures were at least as important as 
external threats to Japan’s security. In short, an approach that fully conceptualizes the 
possibilities of strategy and entrepreneurship demonstrates that there was nothing 
inevitable about Hatoyama’s socialization.  
    
Reevaluating the Security Identity Approach. Certainly, Japan’s anti-militarist 
security identity was a major constraint on each of the prime ministers. Constitutional 
limitations on the use of force as policy, the one percent of GDP limit on defense 
expenditures, the ban on arms exports, and the three non-nuclear principles all remained 
in place and helped to shape what was possible for each of the leaders studied. However, 
the three cases also demonstrate how executive leadership was responsible for the gradual 
rollback—what Samuels (2007a) has called “salami slicing”—of Japan’s anti-militarist 
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security identity. Policy entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship were major “causes” 
enabling the persistence of Japan’s anti-militarist security identity. However, these actors 
were mostly on the margins, extracting costs from violators of the security identity and 
deterring more aggressive actions in the areas of collective self-defense, constitutional 
revisions, and rearmament. These groups included Okinawan peace activists, grassroots 
Article 9 societies, and to a point minority parties such as the Komeito and the SDP. In 
the Koizumi case study, these groups were an active participant—particularly the 
Komeito. Koizumi would frequently have to take into account the sentiments of this party, 
even privileging negotiations with this party before engaging in negotiations with his own 
party on specifics of defense policy. Entrepreneurship was also evident in the actions of 
citizen groups that filed suit against Koizumi for his trips to Yasukuni Shrine, arguing 
that his visits violated the constitutional separation between church and state (Tanaka, 
2004a, 2004b). Though these suits did not deter Koizumi in his visits to Yasukuni Shrine, 
they may have played some small part in deterring future prime ministers. In the 
Hashimoto case, self-constraint was a major pillar of anti-militarism. Hashimoto, with his 
tendency to be neither too hot nor too cold in his relationship with different actors, made 
the decisions to abandon his trips to Yasukuni Shrine after one visit, embrace the 
Murayama apology (in his own words) and the Asian Women’s Fund, and improve 
relations with China, even as he revitalized the US-Japan security relationship and broke 
down the walls between political leaders and the military.  
Hatoyama, the prime minister most inclined to aggressively pursue anti-
militarist policies, would fall from power before he ever had a chance to implement his 
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most ambitious anti-militarist policy ideas. These policies included plans for a shrine that 
would serve as an ideological alternative to Yasukuni Shrine, a new formulation of the 
Murayama apology, the promulgation of the three non-nuclear principles into law, and 
concrete proposals to create an East Asian Community (to say nothing of his desire for an 
alliance structure without bases). The three case studies, however, do suggest a common 
prognosis for Japan’s anti-militarist security identity: anti-militarist institutions that are 
atrophying, a growing realism among the public (as emphasized by the reluctant realism 
perspective), and a failure of left-leaning politicians to find innovative approaches (forms 
of good strategy) that allow them to achieve major breakthroughs in regional 
reconciliation and demilitarization. Counterfactual analysis suggests that the slow 
atrophying of Japan’s anti-militarism was anything but inevitable. A focus on political 
strategy and entrepreneurship, for example, points to avenues not taken that could have 
drastically improved the chances for anti-militarist policies.  
In the early days of his administration, when his popularity ratings were still 
relatively high and when the issue of Futenma was not yet a focal point of policy, 
Hatoyama could have relegated the issue of Futenma to the backburner, and sought 
aggressively both to counter domestic nationalism through a new formulation of the 
Murayama apology backed by a Diet vote and through a proposal for a new shrine that 
would counter the ideology of Yasukuni. In addition to combating nationalism, an issue 
Hatoyama had written of as a threat to peace and stability in Asia (Hatoyama, 2009), 
these initiatives would have been much more achievable proximate goals than a new 
agreement on Futenma. These initiatives would have had an even greater chance of 
 259 
success had Hatoyama been able to form a solid relationship with President Obama from 
the outset of his administration.  
 
Reevaluating Governmental Politics. As Chapters One and Two demonstrated, 
there are reasons specific to Japanese politics why governmental politics approaches have 
been useful for explaining policy outcomes. The Japanese political system has a long 
history of allowing mid-level actors extensive power. These mid-level actors--notably 
bureaucrats and politicians, but also in some cases civic leaders and business interests--
are often part of a dense system of entrenched interests that make grand policy shifts 
difficult. However, as was seen in the case studies, in the post cold war era there has been 
a consistent public appetite for politics that can overcome these entrenched interests. 
These public sentiments were important aspects of reform initiatives during the 
Hashimoto administration and during the Koizumi administration. As a result of key 
reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s, the formal strength of the prime minister has 
never been stronger. In addition, the possibility for a strong “maverick” prime minister 
has been made possible by the persistence of a large number of voters—consistently over 
50 percent—who support neither major party. These nonaligned voters can be a 
significant political resource for a prime minister who is able to rally their support.  
And yet, Japan has still been beset by weak prime ministers unable to make 
significant policy changes. Against the backdrop of weak political leadership, bureaucrats 
and other mid-level actors have been left to manage the policy status quo. Indeed, a 
governmental politics approach provides important intellectual resources for explaining 
the difficulties Hatoyama faced in renegotiating the Futenma Airbase issue. As someone 
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unfamiliar with past negotiations over the airbase and little subject matter knowledge on 
defense issues, Hatoyama faced severe disadvantages in relation to professional defense 
bureaucrats with intimate knowledge of their subject. He soon allowed himself to become 
involved in a negotiating framework where outcomes were decided at least partially by 
technical details related to US defense capabilities and the feasibility of various 
construction methods.  
What this dissertation has tried to point out, however, was that at different 
stages of the case studies the varying persistence of government politics was conditioned 
by choice. By failing to incorporate negotiations over Futenma into a larger process of 
reevaluating the alliance at a political level, Hatoyama allowed himself to get caught up 
in an ossified negotiation structure with a predefined result. Though Hatoyama at one 
point barred bureaucrats with past experience negotiating the 2006 Henoko plan from 
negotiations (replacing them with less experienced bureaucrats), this approach did little to 
upend the strong influence of mid-level bureaucratic actors. What was missing was a 
strong political challenge to the status quo in US-Japan security affairs. As soon as 
Hatoyama accepted that an alternative plan would need to meet with US approval—and 
thus would need to meet the major condition of maintaining US military standards of 
operability in the region—the 2006 Henoko plan became all but inevitable.  
However, as this dissertation has also demonstrated, the entrepreneurial prime 
minister does not have to choose governmental politics as an approach to issues. There 
are alternatives. The case of Koizumi’s postal reforms is an important one for scholars of 
Japanese defense politics because it bears possibilities for future revolutionary 
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approaches to policy. In short, the use of popular appeal and electoral politics can be an 
important asset for breaking the monopolies of information and calcified action networks 
that sometimes appear in bureaucratic politics.  
Certainly, there will remain strong barriers to the entrepreneurial prime 
minister. The foremost of these barriers is the selection process for the prime minister. 
Since the prime minister is elected by his party, he has often been beholden to faction 
leaders and other powerful members within the party. Thus, the Japanese prime minister 
has often spent much of his energy maintaining factional support and appeasing 
entrenched interests. Even entrepreneurial-minded prime ministers like Hashimoto have 
had a hard time breaking this mold (see Chapter 3). Party members have little incentive to 
elect mavericks like Koizumi who threaten these entrenched party interests or have their 
own agenda. Other barriers to strong prime ministerial power include a media that can be 
quite sensationalist in its approach to politics. However, the media can be both a liability 
and strength. For Hatoyama, media scrutiny of his handling of the US-Japan relationship 
proved a proximate cause of his downfall. For Koizumi, however—someone who was 
media savvy and sought out chances to improve his brand—a sensationalist media was an 
important strength. (For Hashimoto, the role of the media was mixed). Finally, prime 
ministers suffer from the weakness of party cohesion in Japan. In the Japanese political 
system, political parties tend to have weak ideological cohesion, meaning that in order to 
implement important policy changes, prime ministers often have to reach outside of the 
party for support. A major impediment to Hatoyama’s ability to formulate a coherent 
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defense policy was the rather large division in policy preferences in his cabinet, and 
indeed, his party.  
For the most part, this dissertation, however, has found that governmental 
politics explanations of policymaking can be enriched by understanding the relationship 
between bureaucratic politics and politics more broadly. As we have seen in several of 
the case studies, mid-level actors have often desired the intervention of the prime minister. 
As was seen in the Hashimoto case study, the process of reevaluating the US-Japan 
alliance that had taken place through bureaucratic initiatives (the combined Nye Initiative, 
SACO commission, and drafting of the Joint Declaration) meant little without the 
approval of top leadership. Hashimoto’s approval of the process and his personal 
summitry with President Clinton legitimated the work of alliance bureaucrats. As was 
seen in the Koizumi case study, it was the special relationship between President Bush 
and Prime Minister Koizumi that made possible such bureaucratic initiatives as BMD, 
aggressive alliance contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the negotiations over base 
realignment. Certainly, these initiatives would not have been possible without the hard 
work of bureaucrats. But also, they would not have been possible without Koizumi. 
Without the support of top leadership, bureaucratic initiatives, however inventive, tend to 
stall or to settle at a kind of lowest common denominator.  
 
The Future of the Study of Strategy, Leadership, and Policy Entrepreneurship in 
Japanese Politics and Beyond 
 
 
At the writing of this dissertation, the challenges that Japanese leaders face are 
substantial. Domestically, leaders find themselves faced with enormous public debt, 
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questions over the political sustainability of the nuclear power program, a population in 
decline, and—most significantly—a volatile political situation that features constant party 
reshuffles, perennial leadership changes, and growing public discontent with politics 
altogether. On top of these pressing domestic issues are the lingering issues of territorial 
disputes, growing Chinese power, and historical tensions that disrupt relations with 
neighboring powers, some—like South Korea—that would otherwise seem like natural 
allies. In the future, as in the past, leadership will be conspicuous both in its presence and 
in its absence.  
The study of leadership has always been a risky venture for scholars of 
international relations and the social sciences more generally. As Maclachlan has written 
about the trouble with studies of leadership:  
 
Leadership matters deeply in political studies, but the social scientist who cares about theory and 
methodological purity would be well advised not to touch it. As most scholars would agree, the 
definition, causes, and consequences of political leadership are conditioned by a complicated web of 
variables ranging from the leader’s individual psychological characteristics and his relationship with 
his political constituency, to the structure of the institutional arena in which he operates (Maclachlan, 
2010, p. 4).  
 
This study has attempted to cope with this “complicated web of variables” by focusing on 
the guiding principles that conditioned different prime ministers’ approaches to defense 
policy and politics. As Rumelt (2011) has argued, at the heart of strategy is a hypothesis 
about the way the world works that tests the limitations of what is currently known. A 
dramatic success usually is a clear sign of a new insight regarding how to apply strength 
to weakness. Dramatic failures are often conditioned by a failure of recognition, and thus, 
often serve as a challenge for future leaders and social scientists to examine through 
comparison and counterfactual analysis.  
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Despite issues of method and purity, there has nevertheless been no decline in 
the demand for studies of strategy and leadership. In a sense, it is only natural to wonder 
why some leaders succeed while others fail, why some are able to overcome their 
circumstances (in reality they are conspiring with them), and why others seem 
overwhelmed by them. In both the unexpected successes and failures of leaders we find 
fertile grounds for new research into our understanding of policy complexes. In the study 
of leadership, strategy, and entrepreneurship we also find the bridge between the practice 
and study of international politics.  
Beyond the study of political strategy, this study has also sought to contribute 
to the study of policy entrepreneurship. Certainly, entrepreneurship is an important aspect 
of strategy. Good strategy usually comes from a new insight, a challenging idea that 
comes from seeing the world differently. As an outsider to defense and foreign policy in 
general, Koizumi was able to see possibilities in US-Japan relations that few 
knowledgeable insiders could. These insights came from seeing the alliance from the 
perspective of a politician fighting for his political life against hostile forces within his 
own party. Similarly, from his position as a politician, Hashimoto was able to ignore the 
advice of bureaucrats to pursue negotiations on Futenma Airbase. However, as Chapter 1 
discussed, policy entrepreneurs can also influence policy through their deviance. As this 
dissertation has demonstrated, though prime ministers are outsiders to defense policy and 
politics, their position at the head of government usually limits the degree to which they 
can be deviant. Certainly, forms of deviance were on display during the Koizumi 
administration. A Japanese prime minister singing Elvis songs to a US president is 
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certainly not a normal state of affairs in US-Japanese relations. Beyond mere diplomatic 
showmanship, Koizumi also displayed deviance through his annual visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine, which occurred despite the strong criticisms of regional powers. Given his views 
on the US Security Treaty, Hatoyama had the most potential to play a deviant role, but in 
the end proved less risk-accepting than either Koizumi or Hashimoto. From the early 
days of his administration, when he first tried to minimize the importance of criticisms of 
the US in his infamous Voice article, a great deal of effort was spent closeting his early 
ideas on the need for a qualitatively different US-Japan relationship. Though at one point 
he mentioned to his Chinese and South Korean counterparts that he would like to 
decrease “dependence” on the US for defense, and at one point seemed like he might 
challenge the US directly over the issue of Futenma Airbase, for the most part Hatoyama 
did his best to temper his criticisms of the US and to move closer to the mainstream.  
As recent events have shown, however, there still exists ample space for 
deviance in Japanese defense politics. To take one example, the outspoken nationalist, 
decorated author, and former Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro, has proven his ability 
to “stir the pot” of Japanese nationalism time and time again. Despite his often racist 
public statements, Ishihara has consistently proven a popular candidate for prime minister 
(for additional biographical information see especially, Samuels, 2003, p. 333-343; 
Samuels, 2007a, p. 120-122). His most recent initiative has proven the most ambitious. 
On April 12, 2012, Ishihara began a campaign to have the Tokyo Prefectural government 
purchase the disputed Senkaku Islands, five uninhabited islands southwest of Okinawa 
and east of Taiwan. These islands are claimed by both China and Japan and have proven 
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a consistent sore spot. As reported by MacKinnon (2012, August 14), a website set up to 
collect money for the Tokyo Prefecture’s purchase of the islands collected 17 million 
dollars in private donations. This move forced the central government to act, spurring 
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to promise to buy the islands (MacKinnon, 2012, August 
14).  
The activity of minor parties, grassroot organizations, and protesters has also 
been significant. SDP head Fukushima Mizuho played a considerable role in the events of 
the Hatoyama administration. Her threat to leave the coalition if the prime minister did 
not live up to his campaign pledge to move Futenma Airbase off of Okinawa was a strong 
factor in preventing Hatoyama from settling on the original Henoko plan early in his 
administration. Protesters in Okinawa have also done much to upset the implementation 
of the relocation of Futenma Airbase to the Henoko area of Okinawa, and grassroot 
Article 9 societies were a major reason why LDP efforts to revise the constitution failed 
in the mid-2000s. In short, a study of entrepreneurs as plot-foilers, deviants, and risk-
takers will enrich our understanding of how Japanese defense politics has been shaped in 
ways that are counterintuitive to more structurally oriented explanations.  
Following the example of this dissertation, future studies may also look to 
show how differing qualities of leadership can produce above optimal outcomes and 
suboptimal outcomes in similar contexts. These research studies will work best when 
they seek to accomplish two goals simultaneously—to interrogate the relevance of 
different strategies and partnerships within rich descriptions of contexts and to use 
different examples of leadership and entrepreneurship to test the limits of understanding 
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of those contexts. As Samuels argues, scholars should “do agency” not as a way of 
challenging the validity of constructing structurally-based explanations, but rather, to 
make our structurally-based explanations more robust (2003, p. 18). The study of 
leadership, strategy, and policy entrepreneurship is truly a practical pursuit that can be 
applied in all areas of social interaction.  
No doubt the study of leadership, policy strategy, and policy entrepreneurship 
will be an important component in our understanding of Japan’s future approach to 
defense policy and politics (as well as the larger story of how Japan goes about rebuilding 
itself in the post-March 11, 2011 world). These events take place in a landscape of 
evolving contexts that will shape Japan’s future. Leaders will have to face dire domestic 
problems, the most prominent being: economic malaise, growing sovereign debt, 
demographic decline, and growing discontent with the political status quo. Against this 
backdrop, China will continue to rise as a significant regional power with growing 
military, political, and economic dimensions. All of these contexts suggest the potential 
relevance of political leadership without specifying its content. As has been seen in the 
years following Koizumi’s resignation, leadership is as conspicuous by its absence as it is 
by its presence.  
Will leaders find new ways to revitalize the US-Japan strategic relationship, 
continuing to shape its contours and make it relevant to a changing world? Will leaders 
energize nonaligned voters through dramatic political acts (either confrontation with the 
US or personal alignment with individual US presidents)? Will politicians—as many 
have in recent years—neglect the challenge of leadership, instead opting for backroom 
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deals, party realignments, and muddle-through? Or, are other forms of political 
entrepreneurship in the making that will radically transform the Japanese state? These are 
the crucial questions of Japan’s political leadership that will help define its defense 
trajectory in the coming years. 
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